The Implementation of Governance to Counter Islamist Militancy in Pakistan\u27s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province by DiOrio, David Robert
Walden University
ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral StudiesCollection
2016
The Implementation of Governance to Counter
Islamist Militancy in Pakistan's Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa Province
David Robert DiOrio
Walden University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Public Policy
Commons, and the South and Southeast Asian Languages and Societies Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.
  
Walden University 
 
 
 
College of Social and Behavioral Sciences 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by 
 
 
David DiOrio 
 
 
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects,  
and that any and all revisions required by  
the review committee have been made. 
 
 
Review Committee 
Dr. Olivia Yu, Committee Chairperson,  
Public Policy and Administration Faculty 
 
Dr. Stephen Morreale, Committee Member,  
Public Policy and Administration Faculty  
 
Dr. Kristie Roberts, University Reviewer,  
Public Policy and Administration Faculty 
 
 
 
Chief Academic Officer 
Eric Riedel, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Walden University 
2016 
 
 
  
Abstract 
The Implementation of Governance to Counter Islamist Militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa Province 
by 
David R. DiOrio 
 
MA, United States Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1995 
BS, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1983 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
Public Policy and Administration  
 
 
Walden University 
March 2016 
 
  
Abstract  
Militancy inspired by Islamists is escalating globally, and government action is necessary 
to protect vulnerable populations. Security professionals generally agree that governance 
may complement the use of force to defeat militants; however, current doctrine does not 
address the concurrent integration of governance in a comprehensive strategy. This 
interpretive case study explored Pakistan’s application of governance during the 2009 
Khyber operation in Swat Valley, code-named Operation Rah-e-Rast. The central 
research question focused on how governance activities were integrated with military 
operations to subdue militancy. Data were collected through interviews with 6 planners, 
Pakistani secondary source survey data, and government artifacts. Data were inductively 
coded using a progressive axial coding process and validated through methodological 
triangulation. Data were then analyzed using a case study analytical model, grounded in 
neo-Clausewitzian theoretical principles, to derive key themes. Key findings indicate that 
an interministry collaborative approach to regain the public trust was more effective in 
placating violence than was solely using military action. Sound governance, enabled by 
strategic communications and intelligence, fostered tribal relationships that promoted 
confidence and undermined the militant support base. The civil-military planning 
protocols were successful, but mainly ad-hoc and suboptimized. Formal training, 
standing civil-military planning forums, and planning process improvements stemming 
from the Pakistan experience could instill social change by assisting national leaders in 
developing a cogent countermilitancy strategy to defeat the global Islamist movement. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Top Pakistan government officials conceded that the Islamist militancy problem 
within their borders was an imminent threat to the nation. In an address to a joint session 
of Parliament in June 2013, Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari remarked, “Militancy, 
extremism, and terrorism pose the greatest threat to our national security. The nation is 
united against militants” (Gul, 2013, para.4). The Pakistani Taliban led a conglomeration 
of Islamist extremists who sought to undermine the Islamabad government and gain the 
right of autonomous governance based in Sharia law. They attempted to establish a firm 
political base among the Pashtun in their Northwest Provinces to expand their radical 
worldview (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Due to a weakness of governance, the militants 
had the initiative and the government effort to deter the violence through a reliance on 
military force was faltering (Fair, 2011). Thus, policymakers and planners need to 
understand how governance and military operations may be integrated into a 
comprehensive countermilitancy strategy.   
Pakistan is at the epicenter of the violent Islamist militancy phenomenon. The 
escalation of global militancy is a significant social problem that warrants international 
attention and aggressive multinational action. The Institute for Conflict Management 
(2014) estimated that violence against innocent civilians will grow significantly in 
Pakistan and may then spread to other regions creating a worldwide crisis. The Pashtun 
are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant political and social 
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struggle between Islam, the global super powers, and the national government (Khan, 
2007). Khan suggests that the Pashtun perceived the government attempts to protect them 
as reluctant and only symbolic rather than a determined effort. Furthermore, Pakistan’s 
failure to address the escalating violence in their highlands has had global implications. 
 The Pakistan government is a fragile parliamentary republic that loosely governs. 
For the most part, the government has failed to achieve the trust and confidence of the 
Pashtun (Cohen, 2007; Panwar, 2010). Cordesman and Vira (2011) assessed that Pakistan 
is plagued by a semidysfunctional political system that is paralyzed with infighting 
between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. The government’s lack of 
understanding of cultural and social relations has perpetuated a fractured society. 
Humphrey (2012) asserted that the Pashtun were disenfranchised from the mainstream 
political processes and an Islamist shadow governance filled the leadership void. The 
Pashtun did not recognize Pakistan’s military or the government as their guardian or 
protectors, and the Islamists had the initiative (Nawaz & Borchgrave, 2009). 
 In this research, I explored Pakistan’s struggle to coordinate their government 
ministries with the military to mollify the destructive brutality of the Islamists and 
reinstitute the writ (authority) of government under the Malakand Division political agent 
of the Khyber Provincial Government. The 2009 Swat Valley operation conducted within 
the Malakand, codenamed Rah-e-Rast, was Pakistan’s first committed attempt to 
integrate governance with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy using a 
doctrinal countermilitancy approach. Haq and Malik (2009) and Khattak (2010) provided 
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convincing evidence that the operation effectively defeated the Islamic shadow 
government and brought calm to the valley. In this scientific study, I examined the 
planning and implementation processes during the Swat campaign. International 
terrorism experts are closely monitoring the Pakistani experience as a bellwether of the 
global Islamist movement.  
 The research promotes social change by recommending improvements to 
Pakistani government planning and implementation protocols that influence Islamist 
social behavior. After a decade of conflict with Islamists, there is a lack of evidence that 
the increased lethality of radical militants through military action alone will change social 
behavior or achieve an enduring peace. The problem is that contemporary 
countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent integration of 
governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. Governance and 
military activity were typically planned and implemented in different phases of an 
operation separated by time and location, depending upon the security situation. Current 
strategy focuses primarily defeating the militants through a force of arms. It largely 
discounts the potential synergy of integrating governance with military action to 
reestablish a peaceful social order. In short, planning doctrine does not adequately 
address the simultaneous integration of governance using all instruments of national 
power (Jones & Fair, 2010). The study findings and planning process implications may 
assist planners in achieving a more effective countermilitancy campaign design. 
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The purpose of this case study was to determine the successes and failures of 
integrating governance and military activities during the Swat operation conducted in the 
heart of Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province. The Swati-Pashtun endured the 
brutality of militants bent on instituting their radical Islamic worldview based in strict 
compliance of Sharia law and they sought protection from their government (Fair, 2011). 
During Operation Rah-e-Rast, the Pakistani authorities—for the first time—pursued an 
aggressive population-centered approach by connecting to the people through governance 
while conducting an aggressive military maneuver against the Taliban (Haq & Malik, 
2009). Pakistan’s approach emphasized the importance of a whole-of-government effort 
to defeat the Islamists. However, identifying the most effective amalgamation of 
governance and military activity was elusive. The Pakistanis made significant progress in 
subduing militancy, but their methods were neither well understood nor codified in 
doctrinal planning processes. In this study, I explored the operational successes of Rah-e-
Rast to improve the doctrinal foundation for future global contingencies.  
The nature of the research is qualitative, using a single case to assess the unique 
application of governance in a hostile militancy environment. The theoretical foundation 
for the study is an emerging adaptation of social conflict theory, referred to as neo-
Clausewitzian theory by military strategists, to explore the relationships between the 
people, the military, and their government that influence the implementation of 
governance under limited warfare circumstances. A qualitative approach was appropriate 
to assess the human dimension of the complex social environment by empowering 
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selected planners to share their personal stories (Creswell, 2013). This single case study 
includes an analysis bounded in time and location. Data analysis consisted of merging 
information from official government documents, interview data from a select cadre of 
planners, and credible survey data that captured the Swati perspectives.  
Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory provided a theoretical foundation for this 
research. The theory approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described 
as a severe imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 
2007). In this paradigm, the social imbalance is caused by a power struggle between a 
government and unconventional fighters (Islamist militants) who seek political and social 
change by collapsing the government and replacing it with their own authority founded in 
Sharia law. The neo-Clausewitzian school of thought emphasizes relationship building 
between the national government, the military, and the people as a counterbalance to 
stabilize the social situation (Clausewitz, 1832/1976).  
In neo-Clausewitzian design, strong and enduring social and political 
relationships are vital to counter the destabilizing militant activity. Governance policy 
then becomes a key instrument of national authority to connect with the people politically 
and socially—and promotes a public trust and confidence that will strengthen 
government legitimacy. According to neo-Clausewitzian theorists, the two instruments, 
governance and the use of force, working in mutual support are the essence of a 
counterinsurgency strategy. This study is an analysis of Pakistan’s implementation of this 
strategic approach during Operation Rah-e-Rast. 
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The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the nature 
of the social reality relied upon the epistemic and contextual values and experiences of 
the subjects and the views of the Swatis at large. The study was designed to analyze their 
subjective meanings through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon and their 
social interpretations of the Swati-Pashtun dilemma. Life truths were revealed by the 
analysis of the subjects’ beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence 
concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained 
by adjudicating the participants’ beliefs in governance with the social realities.  
 This study was significant and unique because I examined the Islamist problem 
from the viewpoint of Pakistani citizens rather than through a Western lens. The scientific 
approach to study this critical operation discerned a unique implementation of 
governance from those who planned the campaign, those who implemented the strategy, 
and those who endured the violence. There is a literature gap in attending to the root 
motivations of Islamic extremism and the implementation of competent governance to 
prevent it. Previous research has focused primarily on the overwhelming use of military 
force to defeat militancy. On the contrary, and perhaps more importantly, in this study, I 
focused on the integration of all instruments of national power to counter Islamist 
inspired violence. The Pakistan experience reflects the global Islamist movement, and 
this study yielded findings and recommendations that may be applied on a macroscale.  
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Major Sections of Chapter 1 
 Chapter1 provides a summary of the research including the geo-political context 
of the global Islamist problem. In the chapter, I present a qualitative research design of a 
single case study. Assumptions and delimitations are explained and a lexicon of relevant 
terms is included. Emerging doctrine, based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical thought, 
formed the basis for an analytical assessment model to explore potential doctrinal 
adjustments that better address the current global threat. Design strengths and weaknesses 
are identified and steps to mitigate weaknesses are presented.  
Problem Statement 
 Contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the 
concurrent integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive 
strategy. Militancy inspired by Islamists is on the rise, and the international effort to 
counter the emerging threat is failing (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Modern 
counterinsurgency doctrine describes a whole-of-government (interministry) approach to 
defeat the enemy, but the integration of governance in support of military operations is 
largely unproven. Most insurgency practitioners agree that a cogent governance strategy 
and improved planning doctrine are needed to develop an effective strategy.   
Current doctrine highlights the importance of military action to defeat militants 
and promotes an interagency approach but does not address the synergy that may be 
achieved by integrating governance simultaneously with military action. Nawaz (2011) 
asserted that doctrine emphasizes the importance of the military to deal with the 
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radicalization problem; however, doctrine ignores the role of governance to address the 
Islamist movement. Therefore, research is needed to fully explore the idea of fostering 
constructive relationships with the people to undermine the Islamists’ political and social 
base.  
A military strategy without governance proved to be unsuccessful in the current 
Pakistani sociopolitical environment. Bommakanti (2012) argued that Pakistan’s alliance 
with the United States and their aggressive operations are making the situation worse and 
will not achieve an enduring peace. However, others have suggested that the Army 
should take a more assertive role to crush the threat (Fair, 2011; Nawaz, 2011). A 
growing number of experts maintain that uncompromising military operations only serve 
to alienate the Pashtun and escalate the violence. Some experts argued that protecting the 
people to gain their unwavering support through improved governance is the right path to 
achieve positive social change (Imam, 2011; Siddiqa, 2011). Determining the correct 
balance between military operations and the application of governance is the challenge. 
 The application of governance is at least part of the countermilitancy solution. In 
this context, governance refers to Pakistani national policy, rules, processes, and 
decisions that define government sociopolitical activity or confer national authority. 
Governance describes the behavior by which national interests are articulated, and the 
instruments of national power are exercised. Governance may be perceived by Pakistani 
citizens as certain, predictable, and legitimate. For this research, governance is assessed 
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in principles that are valued by the Pashtun as confirmed in the literature review, 
including security, rule of law, and general services such as health and education.  
Pakistan’s experience in the remote and war torn highlands of Khyber Province 
provided an excellent opportunity to study governance during actual countermilitancy 
operations. Understanding the complex Islamic extremism phenomenon requires an in-
depth study of the Swati social environment to unravel the connection between 
governance and militancy. The study reveals new knowledge of the Islamist movement 
and redefines how a government and the military may work in harmony to build a public 
trust to disable the Islamists’ capacity to wage war. This research promotes positive 
social change by offering new approaches to synchronize the international effort and 
strike a decisive blow against the global Islamist support network.  
  There is a clear gap in the literature concerning the implementation of governance  
to counter the Islamist threat. Neo-Clausewitzian thought places a high degree of 
importance on understanding the cultural and social values of a vulnerable population—
and the government’s ability to protect the people. The right balance between military 
operations and governance remains unclear. Doctrine calls for isolating the insurgents 
without explaining how isolation is defined and accomplished. Doctrine also calls for 
enhancing government legitimacy, but assessing the trust and confidence of the governed 
is difficult. Furthermore, there is no methodology to ascertain the most important 
governance attributes for a given insurgency case. 
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  Policymakers and planners may benefit from this research that addresses doctrinal 
gaps. I suggest that supported governance initiatives will reduce the need for military 
action and subsequently reduce the risk of violence escalation. The call for nations to 
respond to militancy through governance has historically been overwhelming and largely 
unsatisfied. Enhancing governance capacity through improved information, diplomacy, 
economic development, and private-sector engagement in places where vulnerable 
populations are at risk would likely lessen the dependence on military intervention. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this research study was to determine how Pakistani government 
planners integrated governance and military activities during the 2009 Swat Valley 
operation in Khyber Province. The study promotes social change by providing a better 
understanding of the nexus between governance and Islamist inspired violence. The 
research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the 
complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan’s governance implementation. 
The new knowledge obtained in the study, codified in doctrine, may lead to a better 
strategic approach in addressing the escalating global militancy threat.  
 The central social phenomenon is defined as an escalation of militancy in Pakistan 
notwithstanding an aggressive military campaign to suppress the violence. The militancy 
phenomenon is complex, characterized by nefarious political, social, and ideological 
motivations. Lahoud (2010) listed three central themes that motivate the militants: a 
fervent pledge to a righteous Islamic cause, egoism in interpreting the Islamic faith, and 
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general defense of Muslims instilling violence as a moral obligation, often referred to as 
jihad. Islamists challenge government authorities and target institutions at all levels. 
Despite a concerted effort by the Pakistani government to address root grievances and 
neutralize the militants, the region has suffered an escalation of violence and reduction in 
national influence (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Islamists usurped the government in 
Khyber Province, and the implementation of governance to counter the militancy was in 
question. Henslin (2007) asserted that people are influenced by norms and beliefs in their 
culture and society and develop a social construction of reality based in life experiences. 
Understanding the Swati life experiences may lead to key insights into the proper 
application of governance in subduing the growing Islamist threat in their homeland.  
This study was necessary to explore the real world contextual situation in the 
region and how the government approached the militancy problem. The study exposes a 
correlation between an investment in governance and the effectiveness of military actions 
that generated an operational synergy to achieve success. In an unusual showing of 
solidarity, the Pakistani Parliament passed a consensus resolution that unanimously 
backed the Swat countermilitancy operation and resolved to unite the nation in the face of 
a determined Islamist insurgency. The study includes an analysis of the implementation 
of rehabilitation, reintegration, and reconciliation activities with military operations to 
defeat the Islamists, reassert governmental control, and stabilize the social environment. 
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Research Question 
During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in Swat 
Valley in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities 
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy? 
The research question was pursued by conducting a qualitative study with a single 
case design in assessing the Rah-e-Rast operation. The study is a planning process 
analysis that explored how operational success was linked to specific government actions.  
Theoretical Framework 
Neo-Clausewitzian tenets are a contemporary derivative of social conflict theory. 
The theory is a modern adaptation of Clausewitz's 18th century approach to war that 
attempts to address the complex nature of limited and total warfare (Clausewitz, 
1832/1976). As with conflict theory, neo-Clausewitzian thought approaches society from 
a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe imbalance within the social system 
that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). In this paradigm, the imbalance is caused by 
a power struggle between a government and unconventional fighters (insurgents) who 
seek political and social change by collapsing the government with a force of arms. 
Ashcraft (1991) reiterated the social tenet of the Enlightenment-era British social theorist 
Locke who asserted that political legitimacy emanates from the consent of the governed. 
In the context of an insurgency, both the government and the insurgents are caught in a 
desperate competition for the allegiance of the people.  
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Galula (1964) avowed that the insurgent power base emanates from the people, 
and a successful counterinsurgency strategy may isolate the people from the militant and 
connect the people to a legitimate governing authority. Galula embraced the neo-
Clausewitzian school of thought that emphasizes relationship building between the 
national government, the military, and the people as a balance to stabilize the social 
situation. When a government properly exercises control of the military to achieve 
policy ends—and the military enjoys the trust and confidence of the people—and the 
people perceive the government to be legitimate, the nation becomes resilient to 
militancy. The study data were analyzed through the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens 
to determine the strengths and weaknesses of a population-centered theory in contrast to 
a military-dominant theory.  
The research question is focused on the concurrent integration of governance 
with military operations to strengthen the relationships defined by the neo-Clausewitzian 
trinity. Galula (1964) hypothesized that governance supported by military operations 
may be applied to restabilize a social environment stressed by insurgent violence. Galula 
explained that the government may weaken the insurgents through a force of arms and 
then isolate them politically and socially through governance. In this construct, military 
actions become the enforcement tool to isolate and protect a vulnerable population. 
Governance policy then becomes a key instrument of national power to reconnect the 
people to their government. According to Galula, the two instruments working in mutual 
support are the essence of a well-conceived counterinsurgency strategy.  
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Neo-Clausewitzian theory, inspired by Galula (1964), significantly influences 
contemporary thinking and doctrine related to today's global militancy threat. According 
to U.S. doctrine, counterinsurgency strategy requires a comprehensive analysis of the 
sociopolitical environment to protect the people by isolating them from adverse insurgent 
influences (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). The Pakistani campaign focused on 
subduing militancy (through security operations) and dealing with its root causes (by 
promoting legitimacy through governance)—the key tenets of neo-Clausewitzian 
thought. According to Galula, protecting the population requires a balanced application 
of all instruments of national power—military, informational, diplomatic, and 
economic—to gain favor with the people. Then, a concerted effort to break the bond 
between the insurgents and their popular support base is possible.  
  Modern warfare theorists and military planners at large believe that the neo-
Clausewitzian model is applicable to the contemporary Islamist threat. Conflict in 
Pakistan is best described as a postcolonial regional destabilization. Ethnic subgroups, 
most notably the Pashtun, seek order and security by reestablishing the rule of law and 
education inspired by the Islamic tradition. The Western worldview of democratic 
governance is in direct conflict with the Islamists who seek to reestablish a 
fundamentalist governing structure and legal system based in Sharia law. The situation is 
further complicated by the traditional governing structure and norms of the Pashtun tribe, 
called Paktunwali, which evolved as a hybrid between modern and ancient tribal customs 
that existed even before Islam. Neo-Clausewitzian theory suggests that strong 
15 
 
 
 
interrelationships and balance between government, military, and the people serves as an 
inoculation against insurgents who attempt to radicalize the population.  
  Neo-Clausewitzian thought influenced Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign that 
shifted to a population-centered strategy. The diversity of the ethnic populations and the 
multiplicity of shifting motivations among the Islamists depict the complexity of 
Pakistan’s escalating militancy problem. Local militants are fighting alongside foreign 
fighters that have found sanctuary within the Pashtun homelands of Khyber Province 
(Mehboob, 2011). Therefore, the complex sociopolitical environment warrants an in-
depth analysis of the relationships within the Clausewitzian trinity.  
Nature of the Study 
The nature of the research is qualitative: applying a single case study 
methodology in assessing the implementation of governance during Operation Rah-e-
Rast. The Swat operation defined a critical case that occurred during a decisive juncture 
in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. For the first time, the Pakistanis employed 
military forces in mass working alongside government civilians to implement a 
counterinsurgency campaign. The campaign successes are adequately documented; 
however, the challenges of the government planners who designed the campaign were not 
fully assessed. Their personal experiences yielded valuable information pertaining to 
important planning principles.      
A qualitative case study was appropriate to explore the human dimension 
inherent in assessing complex social behavior (Creswell, 2013). The operation is bounded 
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by time and space that made it an ideal single case study (Yin, 2014). Gaining a 
comprehensive understanding of the social relationships required the collection and 
analysis of multiple qualitative data sources. The study includes a myriad of data sets 
related to government actions, popular support, and militant responses. A qualitative 
single-case study was an appropriate methodology to identify the essential attributes of 
governance. The study reveals answers to the "how and why" questions relevant to 
governance in the Swat campaign. A case study was well suited to assimilate actual 
events on the ground with the shared experiences of participants through interpretative, 
rather than deterministic, data analysis (Castellan, 2010; Fernandez-Cano & Fernandez-
Guerrero, 2011). 
The study incorporated the planners’ perspectives as part of a continuing series of 
deliberations between U. S. and Pakistan representatives conducted annually at the Joint 
Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. The college maintains a strong partnership 
with the Pakistan National Defense University in Islamabad, and the study benefited from 
that partnership by openly sharing ideas germane to the research topic. Conducting the 
research in conjunction with a series of annual conferences offered a measure of 
neutrality that promoted an open dialogue and unfettered information sharing without the 
barriers of political influence. The case study linear analytical model that follows 
contemporary planning doctrine, annotated in Appendix B, provided a systemic 
framework to analyze the planning of governance actions. The model promoted 
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credibility and transferability by codifying the data analysis methodology and organizing 
the data in an auditable and replicable format.  
Definitions of Terms 
 The following section lists the unique or special terminology that is used 
throughout the remainder of the study. 
 Counterinsurgency operations (COIN): COIN describes a sociopolitical struggle 
that applies all national power instruments–military, political, economic, psychological, 
and informational—to defeat or contain an insurgency (U. S. Department of Defense, 
2013).  
 Countermilitancy operations (CMO): A collective term used to describe the 
government military and governance activities to disable or defeat Islamist militants who 
are engaged in the full spectrum of warfare (COIN and CT) independent of political 
motivations.    
 Counterterrorism operations (CT): CT describes government preventative 
measures to deter or respond to terrorist activities, terrorism further defined as the use or 
threat of coercion to instill fear against civilians to advance political objectives (U. S. 
Department of Defense, 2013). Terrorism is an insurgent tactic. 
 Governance: Governing body policy, rules, processes, and decisions that define 
government activities or confer national power. In the context of this research, it is the 
behavior by which Pakistan’s national interests are articulated, and instruments of 
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national power are exercised. Governance is certain and predictable and is assessed in 
these governmental functions: security, rule of law, and life quality (general welfare).   
 Insurgency: An extended political-military struggle aimed at lessening the writ 
and legitimacy of government by using violence and subversion to challenge, neutralize, 
or supplant governmental authority (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Insurgents are 
militants bent on subverting the current government authority. 
 Islamist militant: Groups or individuals pursuing political goals through violence 
inspired by Islamic radical ideology. An Islamist describes a religious activist on the 
radical ideological fringe of the Islamic world at large. A militant is an all-inclusive term 
to describe insurgents seeking to undermine existing government institutions or terrorists 
seeking social or political change by instilling fear among noncombatants. The Islamist is 
inspired by a Salafist worldview and is predominately characterized as intolerant of non-
Muslims and adherent to strict compliance of Sharia (Islamic) law. The term Islamist or 
militant refers to all violent activists in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.    
 Mullah (Imam): Interchangeable terms to describe the local Islamic spiritual 
leader who is generally accepted as having knowledge of the Quran and teaches Sharia 
law. Mullah/Imam leads Islamic prayer and provides religious advice to tribal leaders. 
Assumptions  
The implementation of governance in countering the adverse effects of Islamist 
militancy may be explored by interpreting the meaning of the Swati-Pashtun social 
reality. This includes the tribe’s historical conflict with government, their sociopolitical 
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struggle with the Taliban, and their dilemma of reconciling Pashtunwali with Sharia. The 
research was designed to explore the social dynamics during the Swat operation. Hence, 
the study was an orientational qualitative inquiry that assessed the concurrent integration 
of governance with military activities to subdue the militant threat from the perspectives 
of those who planned it and those who endured it.   
The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the nature 
of the social reality relied upon the epistemic and contextual values and experiences of 
the participants and the views of the Swatis at large (Creswell, 2013). Participant 
perspectives were varied and complex, and the study was designed to analyze their 
subjective meanings through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon and their 
social interpretations of the Swati-Pashtun dilemma. The participant testimony was 
triangulated with government archival data and Pakistani survey data, processed through 
the application of a program-level analytical model to bolster credibility and 
confirmability. Life truths were revealed by the analysis of the subjects’ beliefs in the 
social dynamics contrasted with empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the 
militant threat. In essence, new knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants’ 
beliefs in governance with the social realities on the ground.  
Characteristic of critical theory interpretive analysis, I explored the militancy 
phenomenon through a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to illuminate social action that 
empowered the Swatis to undermine the militant support base. A scientific study of 
Pakistani social institutions was intended to illuminate transformational approaches and 
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key governance attributes that subdue militancy. Hence, I explored the role of governance 
through an interpretive inquiry of the subjects’ planning actions, influenced by social and 
cultural norms and guided by a doctrinal planning process based in neo-Clausewitzian 
theoretical principles. In the study, I focused on governance actions that empowered the 
Swatis to transcend social constraints and pursue their traditional way of life, absent the 
Taliban threat.   
The interpretative analysis supposes that an objective view of the operational 
planning process could be achieved through a faithfulness to facts provided by a cadre of 
Pakistani security professionals who are protected by a stringent interview protocol. Strict 
adherence to the protocol counteracted the inherent nature of qualitative study 
subjectivity (Stake, 2010). Anonymity of the subjects promoted objectivity, although 
total objectivity cannot be achieved from national professionals who are employed by the 
Pakistani government. However, I did not rely solely on individual objectivity. 
Qualitative interpretation was applied to identify suboptimizations in the planning 
process—the essence of the research question. The planning process is codified and 
structured, subject to inter alia, or explications in terms of measurement procedures, 
individual reasoning processes, and institutional or social dimensions (Reiss & Sprenger, 
2014). Reiss and Sprenger (2014) argued that process objectivity is achievable from 
subjective views because doctrinal processes do not depend upon individual social or 
ethical values.  
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My role as the researcher was to mediate the meaning of the participants’ 
experiences through personal interpretations, but the phenomenon is presented from a 
Pakistani perspective, not personal perspectives. My military planning background and 
experiences influenced my analysis and interpretation of the campaign, but I 
compensated for personal biases by suspending value judgments while conducting 
interviews and gathering information. Personal experience was applied to frame the 
questions and develop an analysis methodology, not sway the discussion. The research 
was conducted within a neutral environment that was conducive to the free flow of 
information without the undue influence of personal prejudices or political interference. 
To achieve a complete and balanced view, the participant pool was culturally diverse and 
included all the skill sets necessary for planning a complex contingency. Conducting 
research upon neutral ground within academia afforded an opportunity to share views 
without prejudice—protected by academic freedom and sheltered from political tensions.  
Research Scope 
In this study, I used a single-case design to explore the integration of governance 
with military operations during Operation Rah-e-Rast. Yin (2014) avowed that a single-
case design is appropriate under longitudinal, revelatory, unusual, or critical conditions. 
The operation occurred during a pivotal shift in elected governments from a military to 
civilian authority, and a swing in national policy from a military-dominant to a 
population-centered strategy. The Pakistan authorities—for the first time—pursued 
governance as an enabler to military operations. The operation was a key milestone in the 
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continuum of countermilitancy efforts that showcases government decision points and 
unprecedented civilian collaboration with the military.  
 Qualitative data analysis included a program-level linear analytical model 
(Appendix B) to organize data for interpretation. Patton (2002) described data analysis as 
clarifying what is most important to the study if we had only understood the data 
beforehand. The model followed the doctrinal process and provided a repeatable data 
collection framework to facilitate and validate the operational assessment. Yin (2014) 
recommended a model to operationalize a complex chain of events over a period of time. 
The model incorporated real-world contextual conditions that described the inherent 
problem of Islamic militancy and the rival interventions that challenged the theoretical 
construct. The modeling technique was a valuable research tool to match empirically 
derived activities with theoretically predicted events (Chenail, 2011). The analytical 
model, coupled with the strict adherence to an interview protocol defined in Chapter 3, 
provided a framework that promoted transferability, credibility, and confirmability.  
Limitations and Delimitations 
The study was delimited to a single case design bounded by time and location—
the District of Swat within the Malakand Division of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province 
between October 2008 and August 2009. I focused the theoretical lens on a relevant point 
in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign absent the bias of short term political instability. 
The Swat operation was an ideal case because it successfully integrated elements of both 
governance and military activities to defeat the Islamists (Haq & Malik, 2009; Kumar, 
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2009). The study included the Pashtun experience, although other subcultures reside 
throughout the region. Nawaz (2011) argued that the militancy problem centers on the 
political aspirations of the Pashtun—the social conditions, culture, and language. Islamist 
motivations were analyzed through their written proclamations and activities.  
The purposive sampling of six security professionals limited the scope of the 
qualitative inquiry. Purposive sampling is appropriate to represent the requisite expertise 
found in a typical joint planning group. All the skill sets of a planning cell were present in 
the participant pool. The small sampling was mitigated by selecting expert informants 
with a detailed knowledge of the Swat operation. Purposive sampling efficiently acquired 
the necessary research data despite a limited access to Pakistani civil-military planners. 
Although access to trusted planners was available, there was no direct access to the 
Pashtun or the Islamists. The study relied on secondary source surveys to gain the Swati-
Pashtun perspective. To mollify the limitations of a single case with few subjects, data 
triangulation was applied to merge the participant testimony, official government 
documentation, and Pakistani survey data.  
Transferability (external validity) is a significant limitation of a single case 
design. Transferability relies on a strong correlation between the empirical data and 
associated themes, the research question, and the theoretical construct (Chenail, 2011). 
The study applied a linear analytical model to highlight the facts and reduce 
unsubstantiated innuendo and opinion that is inherent in a qualitative method. The model 
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promoted external validity by organizing the data and analysis along global themes and 
internationally recognized doctrinal tenets (Yin, 2014).  
Given the time and adequate resources, a multiple case study approach may 
mitigate the aforementioned limitations. Scientific research of multiple cases would 
promote transferability and data validity by comparing different approaches in a myriad 
of sociopolitical environments, and the study design provides a methodology to conduct 
further research. Differing situations may require alternate governance strategies, and 
those distinctions may be determined with an analysis of multiple cases. The study 
findings are not absolute, but this case—albeit limited in scope—contributed to the social 
science discipline by highlighting an important case in the continuum of research. 
Significance of the Study 
The escalation of Islamist militancy is a global social problem that warrants 
international attention and aggressive multinational action. There was a literature gap in 
attending to the root motivations of the conflict and the implementation of competent 
governance to prevent it. The study reveals insights into the radical Islamic movement 
and offers an improved universal planning processes to subdue militant violence. The 
study includes a repeatable methodology to analyze the complex social relations between 
the people and their government and the effect of that relationship on militant social 
behavior. The research was unique by exploring the Islamist extremist problem from the 
viewpoint of an Islamic Republic—the State of Pakistan—rather than a Western 
perspective. The study exposes the synergy that can achieved by integrating governance 
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with military action. Policymakers and planners have new tools to design comprehensive 
countermilitancy campaigns and promote peace for the greater good of society.  
Summary 
In this qualitative study, I explored the concurrent integration of governance with 
military operations to counter the rising Islamist threat in Pakistan’s Khyber province. 
The successful Rah-e-Rast operation was significant and was planned with both 
governance and military elements. The operation offered a unique opportunity to 
compare and contrast the implementation of both theoretical constructs. The study 
includes a synopsis of the complex social phenomena to reveal the nexus of governance 
and military activity that made a difference in subduing Islamic extremism. The study 
includes a repeatable study methodology and a universal data analysis model to guide 
future countermilitancy research.     
The study engenders a significant social change for the millions of people 
suffering from the devastation of Islamic inspired violence. Understanding the modern 
way of sectarian conflict is relevant to our national security and of great concern to the 
global society. Militant violence may be suppressed and the Islamist cause undermined if 
policymakers understand and apply governance activities that promote social stability. 
The study findings and conclusions empower government planners with new knowledge 
to defeat militancy and protect vulnerable populations. Chapter 2 provides a 
comprehensive literature review that describes the Pakistani social environment and the 
evolution of neo-Clausewitzian theoretical concepts.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
 Chapter 2 is a comprehensive literature synopsis that fully describes the evolution 
of neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory. The study includes a theoretical construct to assess 
the current sociopolitical environment in Pakistan. The review links the Clausewitzian 
trinity model to the relationships between the government, military, and people of Khyber 
Province—primarily the Pashtun. The chapter ties the theory to the practical application 
of governance in a complex and hostile militancy situation. Neo-Clausewitzian thought 
provides a theoretical foundation to fully assess the integration of governance with 
military actions during the 2009 Swat Valley operation. 
The Research Problem 
 Contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the 
integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy to 
subdue Islamist militancy. Modern counterinsurgency doctrine describes a whole of 
government (all-agency or all-ministry) approach to defeat the enemy, yet the process to 
integrate governance in support of military operations was uncodified and unproven in 
the contemporary environment. Most policymakers and strategists involved with global 
militancy agree that improved planning doctrine to integrate military and civilian efforts 
was needed to development of a comprehensive strategy. Current literature and 
established doctrine promotes the implementation of governance to subdue militancy; 
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however, it does not adequately address the simultaneous integration of governance with 
military action as an enabler for social change. 
The Research Purpose 
The purpose of the study was to explore the concurrent integration of governance 
and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The research objective is to promote 
social change by contributing to the understanding of Islamist militancy and reveal 
findings that impact countermilitancy planning and policymaking implementation 
processes. This may be accomplished by researching the implementation of governance 
during the 2009 Swat Valley military operation to better understand the nexus between 
governance and military activity. The knowledge obtained in the study, codified in 
doctrine, may lead to better strategic approach and a net positive social change by 
addressing the escalating global Islamist militancy problem. The research design 
incorporates a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the complex 
sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan’s implementation of governance. There 
is a lack of evidence that increased lethality of insurgents or terrorists through military 
action alone will succeed in subduing the violence in the long run. In this scientific study, 
I explored the sociopolitical dynamic between the people, the military, and their 
government to determine the most effective integration of governance to counter the 
Islamist movement.  
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Literature Review Content 
 The review integrated the works of scholarly experts to describe the complex and 
tumultuous relationships within Pakistan and to provide a clear view of the sociopolitical 
environment. Both United States and Pakistan military doctrine promote this type of 
analysis in the first steps of military planning, referred to as gaining an understanding of 
the current operational environment (U.S. Department of Defense, 2013). Since 
governance reflects the intimate relationship between the people and their government, 
the literature review was designed to present the strengths, weaknesses, and 
vulnerabilities of those relationships. Literature sources include research by scholar 
practitioners and operational experts in global Islamist militancy. The literature review 
explored the root causes of how and why a segment of Pashtun society embraced and 
supported the militant cause at the detriment of their elected government.  
Literature Review Strategy 
 The strategy of the literature review was to present an impartial view of the 
militancy problem from leading experts in Pakistani sociopolitical and civil-military 
dynamics. In the review, I summarized what is known about the nature of Islamist 
militancy and the key government attributes that may be applied to counter the threat. I 
cited international experts and theorists from academic, government, and military 
disciplines. The review includes previous research by Pakistani scholar-practitioners to 
promote a balanced and ethical approach.  
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 In the literature review, I explored the contemporary application of warfare theory 
as it applies to the specific Islamist militancy problem in Pakistan. The review identified 
the origins the Islamic radicalization movement and the motivations of the Islamists. 
Because of the diversity in Islamic sects pursuing a variety of tactics to attain different 
political goals, Pakistan refers to the whole-of-government effort to subdue the violence 
as countermilitancy, derived from discrete counterterrorism and counterinsurgent 
elements. The series of operations is commonly referred to as a countermilitancy 
campaign. These terms are referenced in this context throughout the study. 
Review of Related Research 
  To understand the diverse sociopolitical dynamic in Pakistan, the literature review 
referenced ethnographic studies related to the Pashtun. The numerous subcultures within 
the Pashtun tribe make it impossible to satisfactorily illustrate every domestic conflict; 
however, the general militancy problem may be explored by examining the Pashtun at 
large. The study reveals the predicament of the tribe in the context of Islamic based 
militancy. The study also includes a synopsis of the Pashtun culture.  
  I explored qualitative studies and analysis associated with Pashtun life 
experiences, especially focused on perspectives and facts related to the Islamist militancy 
phenomenon. This revealed governance activities that promote, deter, or influence 
Islamist motivations. While mainstream Islamic values, in general, do not suggest a 
violent tendency, the religious extremist elements entrenched among the Pashtun may be 
thoroughly examined. Therefore, the research was focused on the Pashtun who reside in 
30 
 
 
 
the Malakand Division of Khyber Province and the Islamist militants who sought 
sanctuary among them.  
Literature Search Strategy 
 Understanding the regional social dynamics required a thorough examination the 
nature of Islamist militancy. The journals were found in databases accessed through the 
Homeland Security Digital Library, Sage Publications and Journals, and EBSCO host 
search engine including subdatabases: International Security and Counterterrorism 
Reference Center, Military and Government Collection, and Political Science Complete. 
Key words or phrases used in the literature search included Islamist, extremist, militancy, 
terrorism, insurgency, governance, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and Pashtun. 
Counterinsurgency and counterterrorism theories were derived largely from military 
doctrinal publications that form the basis of strategy and joint operational planning.  
 The literature review included sources from the archives of sociopolitical research 
groups that have specific subject matter expertise in Pakistan’s affairs such as the 
Islamabad Strategic Studies Institute (ISIS), Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), Rand Corporation (RAND), United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and National 
Defense University’s Institute for Strategic Studies (INSS). Secondary source survey 
databases provided unique perspectives not available by primary contact. Secondary 
sources included Government of Pakistan Statistical Databases, Gallup Polls, New 
America Foundation Survey Databases, and Pew Research Center Survey Databases. The 
study includes open source information concerning Pakistan’s government strategy and 
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policy as it relates to the sociopolitical landscape. Several of the literature resources were 
derived from scholarly journal articles that are based in countermilitancy strategy.  
Theoretical Foundation 
Neo-Clausewitzian Warfare Theory 
  Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory is a derivative of social conflict theory and 
serves as a foundation to assess the contemporary Islamist militancy problem. The 19th 
century military theorist Clausewitz concluded that the inspiration for warfare is a unique 
phenomenon, influenced by a “paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, 
hatred, and enmity” (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p. 89). Clausewitz asserted that pervasive 
violence disquiets the people, hatred motivates the Army and its commander, and enmity 
creates apprehension within the government. Clausewitz stated that a warfare paradigm 
that “ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them 
would conflict with reality” (p. 89) and would render the theory useless. The military 
planner may understand and “maintain a balance between these three tendencies, like an 
object suspended between three magnets” (p. 89). Clausewitz described the employment 
of professional militaries against militants as the dominant instrument of politics by 
“other means.” Success in warfare depended upon a strict civil control of the military in 
the pursuit of well-defined national objectives.  In Clausewitz’s paradigm, the power of 
government and the military is fueled by the “passion inherent in the people” (p. 89)—
but the implementation of governance to foster that passion is not specifically addressed.  
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  Theorists revisited the relevance of the Clausewitzian trinity during the Cold-War 
era of warfare. In the aftermath of total warfare experienced in WWII, modern theorists 
adapted Clausewitz’s conventional warfare model to the more complex sociopolitical 
dynamic of small conflict by irregular forces focused on limited political objectives. The 
theorist, Trinquier, adapted Clausewitzian dogma to the growing French insurgency 
conflicts in Algeria and Indochina. Trinquier (1961) asserted that insurgents are often 
supported by external foreign influences to subvert the population against their 
government. To counter the subversion, an aggressive use of military force—even 
torture—is acceptable to gain intelligence and isolate the population from the insurgent 
influence. Trinquier suggested disconnecting the enemy from external foreign support, 
undermining their internal popular support, and then methodically destroying the enemy 
directly with overwhelming military force. In Trinquier’s assessment, the aggressive use 
of the military, or quadrillage, must be integrated with other instruments of power such 
as diplomacy, information, and psychological operations to defeat the enemy and gain a 
popular allegiance—a shift to a population-centered strategy.  
Emergence of Neo-Clausewitzian Warfare Theory 
  Neo-Clausewitzian theory is a new adaptation to the complex nature of today’s 
global insurgency and terrorism threat. As with conflict theory, neo-Clausewitzian 
thought approaches society from a macrosociological viewpoint, described as a severe 
imbalance within the social system that makes it dysfunctional (Henslin, 2007). David 
Galula, a colleague of Trinquier, emphasized the importance of analyzing the social 
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system to understand the militancy phenomenon (Galula, 1964). After gaining knowledge 
of the culture and perspectives of a vulnerable population, Galula proposed a balanced 
application of all methods of national power—military, diplomatic, informational, and 
economic—to gain favor with the people and break the bond between the insurgents and 
their popular support base. Galula inspired a neo-Clausewitzian school of thought that 
shifted counterinsurgency dogma from a military-centric use of arms to a people-centric 
quest for popular confidence in governance as the dominate national instrument. 
  Neo-Clausewitzian counterinsurgency doctrine gained momentum in the 
postconflict study of the Vietnam experience. Summers (1982) explained that in 
insurgency warfare, there is a natural tension between the state, military, and the people 
(Clausewitzian trinity)—and they may remain united to achieve a successful political 
outcome. To Summers, weaknesses within the trinity relationships create strategic 
vulnerabilities, but solidarity fosters a formidable capacity to advance the national 
interest. Summers concluded that the lack of American public support for the Vietnam 
war effort coupled with the inability of the corrupt Saigon government to connect with 
their people doomed the counterinsurgency campaign. The lack of popular support 
ultimately led to undermining the military effort and losing the war.   
  Gray (1999) believed that a contemporary military strategy should provide an 
organization of violence to force a political connection between the people, the 
government, and the militants. Governance plays a large role in forming this connection; 
however, the nature of the conflict and the relationships may change depending upon the 
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motivations and desires of the participants. Gray avowed that understanding the logic and 
reason behind the motivations of the belligerents may unlock the secrets of a successful 
strategy. Gray argued that building a warfare strategy is not just about disciplined 
problem-solving, but also a function of morality, culture, politics, geography, technology, 
and the enemy. A comprehensive analysis of all elements is warranted—and warfare in 
itself does not represent the optimal way of solving a political problem.  
  These aforementioned neo-Clausewitizians stressed the importance of gaining 
popular support when pursuing the use of force; however, they advocated caution when 
attempting to apply generic counterinsurgency principles to all situations. Clausewitz 
contended that warfare is unpredictable, equating war to a “true chameleon that slightly 
adapts its characteristics to a given case” (Clausewitz, 1832/1976, p. 89). Doctrinal 
experts, O’Neill (2005) and Fitzsimmons (2013) cautioned us that developing a 
counterinsurgency plan to fit all sociopolitical situations is unlikely. Conversely, Islamist 
inspired militancy has common characteristics and the solution can always be found in 
the government’s connection to their people. General Sir Gerard Templar, in reference to 
the Malayan insurgency of 1960, first referred to this concept as “winning the hearts and 
minds” of the people—a phrase coined by his chief advisor, Sir Robert Thompson 
(Thompson, 1966). To secure the hearts and minds of the people, the war may be founded 
in a just cause and the government may convince the people that it holds the moral high 
ground. Thompson asserted that it is crucial for the citizenry to have confidence in both 
the national government to govern and the armed forces to protect. 
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Neo-Clausewitzian warfare theory greatly influences current international military 
doctrine and modern theorists believe that the theory is applicable to militancy inspired 
by Islamists. General David Petraeus, former U.S. Commander in Iraq, is the primary 
author of current U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. Kilcullen (2013)—his principal 
advisor—stressed the importance of winning popular support by establishing security, 
and using noncoercive means (governance) to connect with the people. According to 
doctrine, counterinsurgency requires a detailed analysis of the sociopolitical environment 
that encompasses social, cultural, economic, and political factors (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2013). Doctrine refers to a campaign as a comprehensive civil-military 
endeavor to check the insurgency (through security operations) and deals with its root 
causes (through improved governance)—the key elements of neo-Clausewitzian thought. 
Doctrine emphasizes the importance of understanding the nature of the conflict, then 
developing a plan to disrupt the militants and reduce their popular influence. 
Many scholars and military planners debunk Clausewitz’s original tenets—and 
his trinity—as not applicable to the world’s complex geo-political situations. Melton 
(2013) referred to the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan as convincing evidence that the 
complexity of the environment renders Clausewitzian thought obsolete. Olson (2013) 
insisted that Clausewitz was not relevant and the phenomenon of Islamist militancy is too 
complex to calculate political outcomes from the application of force. Rineheart (2010) 
characterized counterterrorism as inherently police centered and advocated using law 
enforcement to disrupt terrorists by legal means, not through military action.  
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Scholars agree that the contemporary militant environment is unpredictable. 
Kilcullen (2013) advocated that the application of force against Islamist militancy may 
not succeed if the militants do not have a coherent political strategy and are simply driven 
by a rapacious faith-based motivation. According to Kilcullen, the sporadic actions of the 
Islamists render them more unpredictable than any time in history, and their sporadic 
behavior undermines traditional counterinsurgency approaches. Kilcullen described a 
new phenomenon where the relationships between the insurgent, the population, and 
government are diametrically opposed. In his view, the counterinsurgent (government), 
not the insurgent (Taliban), may prolong the conflict with inept governance and 
aggressive military action in itself represents the forces of revolutionary change. 
Neo-Clausewitzian Theory and the Role of Governance 
Contemporary doctrine reflects the neo-Clausewitzian school of thought. The 
United States interagency guidebook described counterinsurgency as a blend of 
comprehensive interagency activities designed to simultaneously "contain insurgency and 
address its root causes” (U. S. Department of State, 2009, p. 2). This suggests that the use 
of soft power is the most effective element of an insurgent contingency, with security 
forces playing a secondary enabling role. The military’s counterinsurgency manual 
prescribed a similar population-centered strategy to promote government legitimacy and 
undermine the insurgent support base, while simultaneously isolating militant influence 
(U. S. Department of Defense, 2013). Both doctrinal directives caution planners that 
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success depends on the eagerness of the affected government to embark on the necessary 
political and social reforms to regain the public trust. 
Strength in the Clausewitzian trinity relationships promotes national stability. 
Clausewitz (1832/1976) professed that when the government properly exercises its civil 
control of the military, and the military has the trust and confidence of the people to 
protect them, and the people perceive the government to be legitimate: The nation is 
strong and stable. In social conflict theory, political and social stability is vital to counter 
the subverting influences of insurgents—and if the stability is threatened, then 
governance and military operations are necessary to restore order. Galula (1964) asserted 
that the insurgent power base emanates from the people, and a successful strategy must 
focus on protecting the people from the insurgent influence. Governance then becomes a 
key instrument of national power to connect with the people, and military operations 
become the enforcement tool to protect the people.  
Security forces working hand in hand with government institutions to address the 
militancy problem is better policy. Melton (2013) argued that an all-out military 
dominant approach is fundamentally flawed and a “fool’s errand” (p. 1).  Melton cited 
several successful counterinsurgency campaigns from the last century where small 
military groups—often called security force assistance teams—worked hand in hand with 
the host governments to conduct economic development. Melton cautioned policymakers 
that complex foreign entanglements and aggressive coalition operations may undermine 
host government legitimacy rather than promote it. Allied doctrine does not adequately 
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distinguish between garrisoning with indigenous national troops or with foreign troops 
(Department of Defense, 2013). Galula (1964) reaffirmed the importance of using local 
troops that are culturally sensitive to the needs of the people and well connected to the 
national government. To Galula, deploying indigenous security forces rather than foreign 
troops avoids undermining sovereign authority and government legitimacy.  
The prominence and strength of the relationship of the people to their government 
is the underpinning of neo-Clausewitzian theory. Samdani (2011) argued that economic 
development is the key to gaining popular support. He suggested a concerted 
multinational effort to drive away militants, then pursue economic development and 
political reforms to build relationships through government partnerships. Ahmad (2010) 
concluded that and enduring success requires Pashtun assistance—and popular support 
may be cultivated with effective community development and governance. Ahmad 
supported the Clausewitzian principle that popular participation in government is integral 
to achieving a durable peace through political reconciliation. Khan (2007) further 
suggested that achieving confidence in governance requires a peaceful approach that 
includes an information campaign, a smart strategy to improve basic life services, and a 
strong economy. To these scholars, military action only plays a supporting role. 
Many experts disagree on the sequencing of military force and governance. 
General McChrystal, as the International Security Assistance Force Commander, 
assessed that many forces on the ground were needed first to stabilize and secure the 
people before governance reform is pursued (Brand, 2011). However, many strategists, 
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most notably Cohen (2007), Cordesman and Vira (2011), and Melton (2013) proposed a 
balanced whole-of-government approach with a small specialized military elements 
working closely with government to establish security in parallel—rather than in 
sequence—with achieving a public trust. Despite the sequencing disagreements, 
insurgency experts generally agree that public confidence may be fostered through 
government reform and nationally sponsored economic development projects. In military 
doctrine, this is referred to as a “clear, hold, and build” strategy, first introduced by Sir 
Robert Thompson (1966), and currently the fundamental tenet of a counterinsurgency 
campaign (U. S. Department of Defense, 2013).  
  As a counterpoint; new thinking among some warfare strategist suggests that 
good governance does not necessarily promote legitimacy or enable security. Lamb and 
Shawn (2012) argued that improving the host-nation’s capacity to provide life services 
may not necessarily drive the people closer to the government. Government legitimacy 
requires a focused attention on politics as well as the social environment. Lamb and 
Shawn contended gaining legitimacy may be futile if government officials are perceived 
as apathetic to social injustices or sympathetic to foreign interest. The counterinsurgency 
effort may fail if the government is too fragmented to embrace meaningful political 
reform, and the use of force may be the only viable option.  
  Altering the way the people think about the conflict is the only path to achieving a 
lasting peace. U. S. Department of Defense (2013) doctrine advised planners that most of 
a population may remain neutral during an insurgency, and the support of the multitude 
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may be promoted with the assistance of an energetic and welcoming minority. 
Governance, in this context, may then be focused on gaining favor with the Pashtun 
leaders who would defuse militancy by distancing themselves from the militant factions. 
Lamb and Hameed (2012) concluded that the role of governance is to convince the 
people that the government is preferred over any rebellious militant faction. The 
countermilitancy challenge then, is to know when to engage the enemy with weapons and 
when to contest the enemy with good governance (United States Marine Corps, 2006). 
Neo-Clausewitzian Theory Applied in the Pakistan Case 
  The Pakistan government characterizes the Islamist inspired violence on their 
frontier as illicit militant activity; however, some experts contend that the situation 
signals a mature insurgency. Siddiqa (2011) explained that the Pakistan government lacks 
clarity in defining the nature of the threat, but the extensive violence was a clear indicator 
of the Islamists’ intent to dominate the region. Over the last decade, the government 
struggled with developing the right strategic approach. The strategy vacillated between a 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency effort. President Musharraf aligned with the 
United States in support of the “war on terror” and a strict counterterrorism effort against 
discrete leadership and logistics nodes; however, the limited attacks against al-Qaeda had 
significant consequences. Musharraf fell from public favor as the overall violence level 
escalated and Pakistan’s economy collapsed as the security situation degraded (Ali, 
2010). A new administration under President Zardari and the Pakistan People’s Party 
emerged and vowed to crush the rising militant threat.  
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  The Pakistan insurgency became more acute when large and organized Islamist 
militant groups emerged from the frontier provinces. In 2008, the militants bombed the 
Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi and the Marriott hotel in Islamabad demonstrating a 
direct and immediate threat to the new Zardari government and the Pakistani people. The 
militants escalated violence and created political instability by undermining the newly 
elected governing authority. Immediately after the Islamabad bombings, the Pakistani 
government initiated a new campaign against the militants in the closest region to the 
nation’s capital: the Swat Valley. However, a new strategic approach was needed. 
  A forceful military approach without governance proved to be unsuccessful in the 
current Pakistani sociopolitical environment. This view reflects the lessons of more than 
a decade of war in Pakistan where an escalation of military action only seemed to 
intensify insurgent activity. Bommakanti (2012) suggested that the military apply armed 
conflict to suppress the Islamists, but not defeat them. After violence is subdued, popular 
support may be pursued. Yet, Melton (2013) and Siddiqa (2011) asserted that governance 
activities may begin before military operations and extend long after operations are 
complete. These theorists avowed that governance is a long term solution and military 
operations are merely a near term enabler.  
Neo-Clausewitzian theory has a direct application to Pakistan’s new 
countermilitancy campaign. Mehboob (2011) argued that the diversity of the political 
objectives and the multiplicity of shifting motivations among the Islamists demands a 
new strategic approach. Pakistan’s complex sociopolitical environment warranted a 
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comprehensive analysis of the relationships within the Clausewitzian trinity with 
emphasis on the militant influence upon the people. According to Bommakanti (2012), 
the Pakistani planners believed that an enduring peace through military action alone 
would not work. Bommakanti asserted that the Swati-Pashtun were cynical toward the 
government, and the military had a track record of failing to achieve a durable peace. To 
Bommakanti, it was clear that the government must attain popular support in pursuing the 
use of force against the enemy. The incursion of militants into the Swat Valley in 2009 
prompted a strategic review emphasizing the application of neo-Clausewitzian thought.  
The neo-Clausewitzian paradigm promotes the importance of governance and its 
impact upon the Swati-Pashtun as an instrument of national policy. Cordesman & Vira 
(2011) concluded that Pakistani policymakers may apply logic and reason to properly 
apply all elements of national authority to counter the chaotic nature of the Islamists. 
Clausewitz's trinity relationships consisting of the Pashtun, government, and the military 
is complex and dynamic. Therefore, the key to a successful countermilitancy strategy 
resides in a thorough examination and understanding of those relationships. This requires 
a holistic assessment of the trinity and the influence of the militants upon it. Neo-
Clausewitzian theorists contended that the implementation of governance is linked to the 
ability of government to connect with the people, foster trust, and achieve legitimacy. 
The study’s theoretical foundation is based in understanding how governance is 
integrated with military operations to build meaningful relationships within the neo-
Clausewitzian paradigm. The complex socio-political relationships within Pakistan may 
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be fully analyzed to understand the nature of the militancy. The literature review 
continues with a comprehensive analysis of the neo-Clausewitzian trinity to explore the 
nature of the existing relationships between the government, the military, and the 
Pakistanis—with a special focus on the Pashtun who are engrossed in the violence.   
Review of the Literature 
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Pashtun 
 To gain the hearts and minds of the Pashtun tribesmen, Pakistani policymakers 
may strive to understand their tribal way of life. The Pashtun respect the traditional tribal 
hierarchy that functioned autonomously of national governing authorities (Kuhn, 2010). 
Estimated at about 50 million, the Pashtun reside along both sides of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border and are the largest tribal influence in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province.  
Kuhn asserts that the tribes were subject to brutal summary punishment under British 
colonial rule having very little interaction politically and are extremely cynical of ruling 
authority. According to Panwar (2010), the Pashtun tend to exhibit a conservative 
religious orientation that embraces the more moderate Sufi-Hanfi Islamic worldview 
which ideologically binds the tribe together.  
The Pashtun way of life. Pashtun life is centered on the extended family. Kfir 
(2010) described the tribe’s preference to gather in small family groups, known as khol, 
and congregate to form extended family lineages or clans, known as khel, that congregate 
into a tribal quam, led by a leader called the malik. The malik governs a group of elders 
known as a jirga that dictates tribal policies, enforces traditional laws, and institutes 
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taxes. The imam or mullah as part of the greater unified ulema or clergy is the religious 
leader who advises and guides the jirga on religious matters. For centuries, these tribes 
existed as a tight community socially and a loose confederation politically. Kfir explained 
that during the inception of the state in 1947, a loya jirga or grand council of Pashtun 
elders agreed to join with Pakistan in exchange for a degree of autonomy, which they 
have always exercised.   
  The Pashtun traditional tribal hierarchy of leadership shifted from the maliks to 
the mullahs. Buneri (2011) contended that the tribal hierarchy has been in a continual 
state of decline for the last several years. The malik traditionally served as the de facto 
arbiter in domestic disputes, interlocutors in national decision-making, tax revenue 
collectors, village leaders, and representatives to provincial jirgas. The Taliban 
marginalized the malik and emboldened the radical mullahs resulting in a diffusion of the 
traditional Pashtun culture. Cordesman and Vira (2011) reported that Wahhabist 
petrodollars have empowered the mullahs to break off from the protection of the maliks, 
and they have grown increasingly more independent. This enabled some mullahs to 
advance extremist policies that were far removed from mainstream moderate positions. 
Now, there is widespread Taliban domination of the ulema that trumps the traditional 
malik in Pashtu tribal life and decision-making. Mufti (2012) asserted that a portion of 
the older, more conservative generation, continues to honor and support the malik and the 
traditional Pashtun ways, but the mullahs are rising to prominence by championing the 
minds of the next generation of Pashtun.   
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 The Pashtun are anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant 
political and social struggle between Islam and the global super powers. Rudyard Kipling 
referred to the unresolved imperial struggle between Russia and Great Britain as the 
“great game” (Kipling in Kuhn, 2011, p. 66) that relegated the Pashtun tribal areas to a 
mere buffer zone between India and foreign intruders. Since colonial times, the Pashtun 
lands were situated to block undesirable raiders along the lucrative spice road into India.  
Akhtar (2008) confirmed the tragic plight of millions of Pashtun refugees who embraced 
a culture of arms as a result of centuries of warring imperial powers. The great game 
culminated with the tragic fracturing of Pashtun clans divided between Afghanistan and 
British India, later becoming the state of Pakistan, across a clumsily drawn international 
border called the Durand line of 1893—ill-conceived by a British bureaucrat. Kuhn 
(2011) argued that the Durand line is a de facto border that failed to establish political 
identities, create legal jurisdiction, or regulate commerce along mountain trails that have 
existed since time immemorial. The Pashtun never recognized the Durand line, and they 
maintain family connections by crossing the line with impunity (Milhalka, 2008). 
 Pashtun cultural and social values. The Pashtun value their autonomy and are 
self-governed by their own tribal code called Paktunwali. Government control of the 
tribal areas has been ineffective and, in essence, only symbolic (Kfir, 2009). In the 
absence of governance, the Pashtun relied on Paktunwali to govern and resolve disputes 
(Ahmad, 2010). Paktunwali dominates the Pashtun way of life and at its core are the 
principles of badal (justice), ghayat (respect and courage), sabat (loyalty), melmastia 
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(hospitality), badragga (safe conduct), nanawatai (asylum), nang (defending the weak,), 
and naamus (protection of women). The tribes vowed to defend and protect guests as a 
matter of honor—and an attack against them was considered an assault on the tribe. 
 The Pashtun became isolated and sought to preserve family connections and 
cultural traditions in the midst of strained geo-political tensions. The tribes claim a legal 
right to cross national boundaries based on easement concessions guaranteed by the 
original British arrangement. This enables a freedom of maneuver for Pashtun families to 
communicate and preserve ancestral ties. According to Milhaka (2008), the government 
was not prepared for the voracious determination of the Pashtun to preserve their tribal 
heritage and traditional customs. The Pashtun contest Western democracy initiatives 
because these foreign intrusions threaten their traditional livelihood. Ahmad (2010) 
characterized the Pashtun as victims of the American war that was not of their making. 
Javaid (2011) asserted that a series of devastating wars created severe negative economic, 
political, and social repercussions and fostered an intense hatred for foreign intervention.  
  The Pashtun value family, security, health, and education. A New America 
Foundation survey analysis by Bergen and Doherty (2010) found that the Pashtun place a 
far greater priority on the health and education of their children than defeating foreign 
intruders. Dealing with an insecure environment has been a way life for generations, but 
an investment in the Pashtun children is considered essential for a prosperous society. 
Pashtun value security to the extent that it affords an opportunity for education. 
According to Bergen and Doherty, the Pashtun view education as an escape from 
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poverty, a way for women to gain equality to men, and a means to achieve recognition 
from the affluent Punjabi majority. This is contrary to Salafist fundamentalism that 
discourages female education. A ultraconservative view among Islamists considers 
naamus, or the protection of women, as a prohibition of female exposure within the 
public domain, including the pursuit of education. Although the Quran promotes 
education, Islamists prohibit female education under Sharia law.  
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
 The Pakistan government is a weak parliamentary democratic republic that 
loosely governs a confederation of four provinces and lesser territories. Since the 
inception of the State and the partition from India, political infighting within dozens of 
political parties, rampant ethno-nationalism, and friction with the military inhibited the 
power, reach, and effectiveness of the government (Panwar, 2010). Most Pakistan experts 
would not dispute the weakness of the state. Ali (2010) identified significant government 
deficiencies that include the inability to provide basic services, escalating poverty, 
illiteracy, poor healthcare, and corrupt policymaking. The government has a history of 
political instability, a poor human rights record, and a notable lack of authority presence 
in the remote provinces. Pakistan’s security situation is unstable, ranking 13th in the Fund 
for Peace Failed States Index for nations likely to collapse or lose control of internal 
security (Global Fund for Peace, 2013). Many scholars contend that the Pakistanis have 
lost faith in government. In 2010, Pew Polls cited in Cordesman and Vira (2011) declared 
that only 14% of the population was satisfied with their government’s performance. 
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 Throughout the tribe’s existence, the Pashtun have been at odds with their 
government. Ahmad (2010) and Panwar (2010) described the phenomenon of “neo-
Talibanism” that emerged from the politics of ethnic nationalism after a government 
inspired jihadist force designed to protect Pakistan against the Soviets backfired—and the 
militants turned against their own government. Panwar asserts that internal tribal 
tensions, and a pervasive disrespect for tribal sovereignty, undermined Pashtun support 
for Islamabad. Panwar asserted that building enduring relationships with the Pashtun 
requires a respect for tribal traditions and sovereignty. Ahmad further concluded that the 
use economic assistance (carrots) and punitive measures (sticks) to control tribal activity 
is faltering. Today, the Pashtun remain fiercely independent and will defend their 
families, and their foreign militant guests, against all threats external to the tribe, even if 
the threat is their own government. 
Pakistan’s semidysfunctional political system. Some scholars assert that the 
government neglect of social services perpetuated a fractured society. Farooq (2012) 
reported that a class divide is evident with 60% of the Pashtun below the poverty line. 
Cohen (2007) argued that weak government institutions created a social gap because of 
an unequal distribution of water, lack of fertile lands, and lack of a fair energy allocation. 
Cordesman and Vira (2011) characterized Pakistan’s governance systems as 
semidysfunctional and attributed Pashtun dissatisfaction to economic stagnation that 
created a political “systemic malaise” (p. XIII). The malaise created a vulnerability that 
threatens a complete social destabilization and a fracturing of Pakistani society. Some 
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scholarly experts disagree. Aktar (2010) asserted that the class divide is not directly 
linked to weak governance, but rather it is a function of the historical salience of an 
Islamic jihadist idiom in Pashtun society that promotes a distinct and natural separation 
of cultures. Aktar asserted that the radical Islamic ideological agenda in itself is 
fracturing the society. 
 Lack of civil-sector development, investment, and security in the Pashtun regions 
is perceived as discrimination by the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated government. Panwar 
(2010) avowed that the Pashtun were never integrated into mainstream governance. He 
stated that a culture of ethno-nationalism, legacy hatred, and mutual suspicion, 
superimposed on a “democratically unconsolidated polity” (p. 8) encouraged ethnic fault 
lines that create instability and inspire sectarian violence. According to Nawaz and 
Borchgrave (2009), the Pashtun are excluded from the legal and bureaucratic systems that 
are afforded to the Pakistan majority. The Pashtun contend that government bureaucrats 
wield an inordinate judicial power that infuriates the tribal elders, and they resent outside 
intrusion into their internal affairs (Cordesman and Vira, 2011). The Islamist militants 
have taken full advantage of this prejudice by harnessing the narrative that pits kashers 
(poor young tribesmen) against mashers (Pakistani elite and privileged).  
Pakistan is plagued by a fragile political system that is paralyzed with infighting 
between the politicians, military, and the mullahs. Cordesman and Vira (2011) 
characterized the civilian governance as impotent with self-serving politics, internal 
squabbling, and an eagerness to exploit ethnic tensions for political gain. Humphrey 
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(2012) goes further and postulated that Pakistan is an incomplete nation with competing 
religious and secular components caught between an unstable Democratic State and 
ineffective Islamic Republic. Humphrey concluded that the weak government “franchised 
its sovereignty” (p. 145) by ceding security to para-military militias and the rule of law to 
the local mullahs. Humphrey asserted that the parallel existence of two forms of “hyper 
governance,” one local and one centered in Islamabad, have created a contemporary crisis 
that is being played out in a frontier war where violence is used as a basis for political 
legitimacy. 
Pakistan’s political corruption and nepotism. Political ineptness and social 
injustice have alienated a large segment of the Pashtun population. Fair (2011) postulated 
that the dysfunctional government pushes away the Pashtun who have become cynical of 
government corruption and nepotism. Top down decision-making from Islamabad rarely 
considers the voice of the tribal elders and fosters patronage networks instead. Political 
parties are legally banned in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, and there are no delegates at 
the provincial level. Representation at the national level is merely symbolic since 
Parliamentary acts are not recognized without presidential endorsement (Haider, 2009). 
Cohen (2007) stated that the major source of Pakistan’s instability and rising extremism 
stems from a culture of governmental injustice, misguided impunity, and nepotism. 
Cohen also asserted that the government deliberately leveraged ethnic tensions among 
former tribal allies to maintain the Pashtun in a weakened political posture. Hussain and 
Khan (2012) recommended a different approach. They suggested that the government 
51 
 
 
 
leverage nationalism to rally the diverse ethnic factions against the rising Islamist threat 
rather than weaken the Pashtun into a submissive position.  
The Pashtun were disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and 
Islamist shadow governance filled the leadership void. In the absence of a national level 
presence, the Pashtun formed a religious alliance of Islamist sectarian parties, the 
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA).  The coalition evolved into a shadow government that 
applied strict Sharia law and governance practices that restricted civil liberties. Though 
not directly affiliated with the Taliban, the MMA provided maneuverability for the 
Islamists as the jirgas ignored the growing militant threat. At first, many elders tacitly 
condoned strict Sharia adherence. However, as the Taliban created a foothold among the 
tribes, any resistance to the adoption of Sharia was met harshly with severe 
repercussions. Sial (2009) asserted that the maliks are caught in the middle of the 
government and the warring Islamists, and many are killed if they fail to support the 
Taliban. Others are set-aside if they have acquiesced to Taliban demands. The ability of 
Islamabad to protect the progovernment maliks has been grossly ineffective. Sial reported 
that over 600 dissenting maliks were killed and many others forced into hiding. 
Weak government institutions in Pakistan. Provincial judicial processes are not 
recognized as legitimate by the Pashtun. The antiquated British Federal Crimes 
Regulations (FCR) of 1901, applied inequitably and only to the frontier provinces, were 
instituted as a tool of imperialist subjugation. The regulations deny basic rights to the 
Pashtun—basic rights that are afforded to Pakistan’s majority. The existing courts poorly 
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execute the rule of law as a hybrid between Sharia law and the legacy statutes. Jones and 
Fair (2010) argued that the outdated and idiosyncratic FCR may be reformed to comply 
with the Sharia based Paktunwali code. The court system rarely challenges the authority 
of magistrates who are not bound to follow the recommendations of the tribal jirgas. 
Senior civilian bureaucrats wield unlimited judicial authority and corruption is rampant 
(Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Cohen (2007) reported that the militant lawbreakers operate 
with impunity and citizens doubt the capacity of Pakistan’s law enforcement to arrest and 
imprison criminals. Pashtun frequently explore extrajudicial means to solve legal 
problems rather than pursue the official system. Cohen further asserted that there is an 
absence of rule of law, and concluded that government officials are “viewed by most as 
predators, not protectors” (p. 29) and the region is simply “a lawless society” (p. 30).   
The Pakistan government neglected the public education system and significant 
reform is needed. A large disparity in education across Pakistan created a demand for 
private madrassas (increase from 12,448 in 2008 to 19,104 in 2010) to fill the education 
gap (Cordesman & Vira, 2011). Cordesman and Vira avowed that the rapid growth in 
madrassas was a sign of the dissatisfaction with the federal education system and a clear 
symptom of a failed state. They provided convincing evidence that the poor educational 
system is a significant cause of social stagnation, but not necessarily a breeding ground 
for militancy. Although evidence for the direct correlation of Islamic teaching to 
militancy is not clear, there is little doubt that the madrassa education system 
significantly promotes Islamic nationalism and anti-Western sentiment.   
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 The madrassa religious schools are known to profess fundamentalist views; 
however, their linkage to militancy is widely debated. Madrassas represent only about 
10% of Pakistan’s education sector, but have a significant impact on societal perceptions 
(Cordesman & Vira, 2011). According to Mufti (2012), the radical Deobandis control 
two-thirds of the madrassas although they represent only 15% of the population. Mufti 
asserted that a segment of Pakistan’s children, mostly those in poverty, attend madrassas 
to recite the Quran and promote the Islamic worldview rather than learn how to read or 
write. Imams profess a highly potent and extremely dangerous ideology to the Pashtun 
youth. On the contrary, Bergen (as cited in Cordesman & Vira, 2011) concluded that the 
madrassas are theological and do not teach the technical skills necessary to wage 
violence. Bergen’s study included 75 active militants and found that only a few attended 
a madrassa, implying that there is no direct correlation between graduates and militancy.  
 Call for a greater Pashtun Nation. Militarization and escalating violence have 
driven the Pashtun away from their government. Kuhn (2011) contended that the level of 
violence reached intolerable levels and obstructed reconciliation. Scholars disagree on the 
causes of the rising violence. Cordesman and Vira (2011) concluded that the growing 
Islamist shadow government inspired the youth to engage in an antistate violence 
campaign. Lamb and Hameed (2012) disputed this assertion by suggesting that the 
Islamist shadow governance is widespread and welcomed by the Pashtun. They 
concluded that Islamabad—not the Taliban—promotes violence by implementing policy 
that does not resonate with the tribe.  
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Islamic nationalism is on the rise. Despite the differing views on the causes of 
militancy, Kuhn (2011) found that the devastation of the tribal structure severed the last 
remaining channels of communication between the elders and Islamabad. Panwar (2010) 
confirmed that a social disconnect created a rise in Pashtun nationalism. The nationalism 
encouraged a self-determination movement and inspired calls for the formation of a 
greater “Pashtunistan.” Panwar concluded that uncontrollable violence is promoting 
“autonomy, unity, and identity” (p. 11) that inspires the creation of a separate state.   
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: Civil-Military Relationships 
  The Pakistan Government and their military have a tumultuous relationship. The 
Army ruled over half of Pakistan’s existence and has a tendency to overtake a civilian 
government by coup when the military elite loses confidence in the civilian 
administration. Government authorities and their associated political parties rarely 
challenge the military and they often seek the “military’s good graces” (Cordesman & 
Vira, 2011, p. 3). The military is headquartered in Rawalpindi, near the government 
center in Islamabad, and is the most professional and efficient institution in Pakistan. 
According to Cordesman and Vira, the military controls about 10 % of Pakistan’s 
economy including managing extensive landholdings and controlling many large 
businesses—and, in essence, the military is the only glue holding Pakistan together.  
  Pakistan’s military is popular despite a history of overwhelming defeats with 
India. Fair (2011) asserted that Pakistan’s military is dedicated to more than the security; 
the military advocates for the overall welfare of the people and may intervene politically 
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and economically to promote nation-building. Military leaders are much more popular 
than the sitting civilian president, with 79% of Pakistanis responding that the military has 
a good influence on the country and only 14% have confidence in the president (Pew 
Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011). Military leaders, many still in uniform, were 
appointed to prominent ministry positions and oversee important government institutions. 
Fair concluded that the military is the true political authority in Pakistan, not the civilians. 
Fair postulated that the Army offers the best solution to the nation’s political dysfunction; 
however, he argued that civil control of the military is preferred and both institutions 
need to conduct policymaking with solidarity.  
  Senior Pakistani leaders recognize the vulnerability and instability that is inherent 
with a dominant military. According to Fair (2011), the military created a secretive 
decision-making process that mislead the national security debate. The government 
recognized the danger of an overbearing military—particularly in the provinces—and 
attempted to promote civilian influence by passing the 18th Amendment to the 
constitution. The amendment vested more power in Parliament and the Prime Minister 
and limited military and judicial powers. Fair (2011) concluded that the new legislation 
promoted popular confidence in government and healed some ingrained political wounds. 
Fair argued that policymakers should refrain from pandering to military leaders, and may 
divert financial allocations from the military to the people. Despite these reforms, it is 
clear that the military remains the main instrument in the conflict. Connable and Libicki 
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(2010) and Jones and Fair (2010) recommended that the Army collaborate with the 
civilian administration to achieve enduring social solutions.  
  Pakistan tends to resolve its political conflicts with the aggressive application of 
the use of arms that destabilizes the fragile civil-military relationship. Bommakanti 
(2012) asserted that the Pakistanis prefer armed conflict over diplomacy despite the lack 
of clear progress in the war against the militants. Ahmad (2010) concluded that the 
government is over-reliant on warfare as an instrument of national policy. Ahmad found 
that the inadequacy of sound policy coupled with the inability of the military to 
successfully implement policy is unsettling to the people. Exum, Fick, Hummayun, and 
Kilcullen (2009) agreed that the aggressive military campaign induced instability that 
resulted in a periodic confidence crisis for both the military and the government. Brand 
(2011) argued that a renewed civil-military collaboration  would regain public confidence 
and stabilize the popular unrest. Brand argued that military operations may be used as a 
strategic communication campaign to win a popular allegiance.  
  The Pashtun do not recognize the military as their guardian or protector. This is in 
stark contrast to the support that the military enjoys from the Pakistani majority. 
Pickering and Rubin (2009) asserted that the military relied upon a scorched earth policy 
to undermine the enemy support base rather than protecting the population from the 
militants—and this exacerbated the trust problem. Brand (2011) explained that gaining 
popular support is problematic for a Punjabi dominated military that many Pashtun 
consider to be a foreign force within their own borders. The people’s confidence in the 
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military is a key component of neo-Clausewitzian theory, and confidence in government 
cannot be achieved without a trust in the military. 
Neo-Clausewitzian Trinity Analysis: The Islamist Militants 
The Taliban rose to prominence after the Soviet exodus from Afghanistan. The 
Taliban were primarily a Pashtun politico-religious movement focused on reestablishing 
the Afghan state under Sharia law (Dorronsoro, 2009). When the Soviets withdrew in 
1989 and the United States disengaged, several mujahedeen alliances splintered to pursue 
their own vision and political objectives. After 5 years of devastating civil war, from 
1989-1994, it became clear that a single legitimate governing authority would not 
emerge. Instability on the northwest border threatened national sovereignty, and the 
Pakistan government was anxious to seize the initiative. According to Kfir (2009) and 
Panwar (2010), the Pakistanis shifted financial and equipment support to a new leader, a 
relatively unknown, albeit charismatic, Afghan cleric, named Mullah Muhammad Omar 
who inspired the Taliban movement. According to N. Akhtar (2008), the followers of 
Mullah Omar’s movement, many recruited from refugee camps in Pakistan, became 
known as the Taliban, referring to students of ultraconservative Saudi-Wahhabist 
financed madrassas. 
 The Pakistan government exploited the religious affiliations between the Pashtun 
and the Islamists to form a formidable jihadist force to advance their national interests. 
Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2010) asserted that Pakistan employed Islamists as tools of 
foreign policy. Ahmad (2010) further maintained that the government leveraged the 
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tribe’s strong adherence of Paktunwali to bond them with the foreign fighters called 
mujahedeen who sought sanctuary in the tribal lands. Ahmad explained how the 
mujahedeen were afforded safe conduct throughout the region, and once accepted into the 
clans, the Pashtun were loyal to their guests. The government leveraged Paktunwali to 
gain a political advantage with the Islamists who were postured to defend the border 
against foreign intrusion. The Taliban, however, were never successfully subordinated to 
the government and became violent toward all external authorities (Kfir, 2009).  
 The Taliban influence with the Pashtun expanded far beyond the government’s 
intent and expectation. Fair (2011) postulated that the military considers most Taliban to 
be their strategic reserve in the event of an Indian incursion. Government support of 
sympathetic Islamists is founded in strategic interests that ensure the survival of the state. 
Fair maintained that it is unlikely that Pakistan would abandon their long-standing 
relationship with dangerous militant proxies. Ahmad (2010) attributed Islamist inspired 
violence to the policy of recruiting militants to hedge against India—and the policy 
backfired. The escalating level of violence in the Khyber Province reaffirms that discrete 
militant factions are undoubtedly out of the political control of the government. Ahmad 
asserted that these extremist groups are dangerous—bent on destabilizing the region to 
advance a radical Islamic political agenda.    
 The Taliban made clever use of social tensions to gain influence with the Pashtun. 
The Taliban subscribe to the Barelvi, Deobandi, or Ahl-e-Hadith neo-fundamentalist 
worldview that professes a return to traditional Islamic principles. These principles 
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resonated with the Pashtun yearning for moral guidance and justice (Mufti, 2012). Neo-
fundamentalism has two main features: a strict interpretation of Sharia that dominates 
politics, and a vehement opposition to Western influence. Mufti explained that the 
Taliban's belief in a simple, messianic, and puritan Islamic worldview resonated with the 
village mullahs. In keeping with Paktunwali, the mullahs offered sanctuary to the 
Islamists who embraced their worldview. For the Pashtun, it became a matter of tribal 
honor to extend hospitality and safe conduct to the Taliban who professed a righteous 
conflict for the greater good of the Pashtun. Kfir (2009) explained that the Taliban 
influence had a second order effect; it weakened the traditional tribal hierarchy and began 
shifting the political powerbase to the mullahs who professed a more radical worldview.   
 The ascendency of the Taliban movement emanated from the growing influence 
of the political mullahs who became arbitrators and enforced a more righteous legal 
system. The Taliban and their mullahs gained the respect of the “common people” by 
providing an alternate means of governance that afforded safety and order. An Asian 
Indigenous and Tribal People Network study attributed the strong Pashtun-Taliban 
alliance to a complete breakdown of Pakistan’s legal system (Editorial: The Dark Region 
of Pakistan, 2014). According to the study and reaffirmed by Kfir (2009), the Taliban 
succeeded in marginalizing the Pakistan authorities by subverting the ineffective and 
antiquated British legal system. Kfir explained that the implementation of Sharia was 
astute but ruthless, described as an innovative form of Islamic fundamentalism combined 
with Paktunwali. To the Pashtun, Sharia law was brutal, yet just, and in keeping with 
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their Islamic faith. Kuhn (2011) found that the atrocious Taliban enforcement of Sharia 
law was far more appealing to the Pashtun than corrupt Pakistani magistrates enforcing 
the archaic and unjust British system. 
Islamist influence gains an enduring foothold. The Taliban were adept at 
altering their social structure to assimilate within society and promote themselves as the 
preferred governing authority. Mufti (2012) reported that today’s Taliban—often called 
neo-Taliban—have evolved into a network of fundamentalist affiliates that are 
sophisticated in their use of propaganda and adept in coercing the Pashtun to support 
them. Mufti (2012) found that acerting control of the media is normally their first order of 
business. The Islamists effectively use propaganda to communicate azadi which means 
freedom or self-determination. Azadi became a political rallying cry that inspires the 
Pashtun to fight against non-Muslims and corrupt authorities (Fair, Malhotra, & Shapiro, 
2010). Mufti explained that the Taliban network is flexible with decentralized command 
relationships that are capable of initiating operations quickly and resilient to military 
action against it.  
 There is disagreement to whether the Pashtun-Taliban alliance is inspired by the 
higher calling of radical ideology, or simply influenced by local politics. According to A. 
Akhtar (2010), Islamists replace the tribal malik with  a “political mullah” (p. 600) who 
takes full advantage of the tribe’s Islamic identity and fills the moral void left by the 
elders who were corrupted by the government. Scholars disagree on the Taliban's  
primary motivation. N. Akhtar (2008) postulated that radical ideology in itself forms the 
61 
 
 
 
support base for the mullahs. According to N. Akhtar, the Taliban reflected a common 
religious zeal that resounded with the Pashtun and the tribe rallied to their cause. Mufti 
(2012), however, concluded that Taliban support is inspired by both a religious call for 
Islamic fundamentalism and a political correction of social injustices. A. Aktar agreed 
with Mufti, and explained that the militants have not been inspired by a revolutionary 
upheaval. They are primarily motivated by social injustices rather than by the religious 
call for “jihad.” A. Akhtar concluded that the Islamists have rearranged the tribal social 
fabric to gain influence by hijacking the Pashtun dispute resolution process. Despite the 
disagreement on motivations,  most scholars agree that the voracity of Islamist factions 
creates a social weakness and political vulnerability that may be exploited.  
  The Taliban offer a better quality of life for the Pashtun, although they often use 
coercion to institute reform. Khan (2007) postulated that the government’s helplessness 
in providing any substantial level of social services delegitimizes the state and its 
capacity to maintain good order. Lamb and Hameed (2012) reported that the Islamists 
have effectively filled the void by providing life quality and security to the Pashtun, but 
the tribesmen pay a huge cost. Tribesmen are forced into obedience through intimidation 
or threat of assassination. In a terror campaign, tribal elders were intimidated to comply 
with a stringent enforcement of Sharia law or be killed. Kfir (2009) reported that some 
Pashtun leaders fled and many were slaughtered, yet a majority conformed to Taliban 
rule. Jones and Fair (2010) characterized the Taliban as extremely dangerous and capable 
of terrorizing the population into total submission.  
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An Islamic fundamentalist network of opposition. Taliban enforced Salafist-
Deobandi radical ideology supplanted the more tolerant Sufi–Hanfi doctrine that united 
extremist factions into a network of opposition. The Taliban movement transcended tribal 
structures across the mountain regions to create an expansive sphere of influence (Mufti, 
2012). The Taliban foothold spread across Pakistan by creating alliances with other 
jihadist groups who professed radical ideology and promoted violence. They shared 
common objectives with other Salafist sects that included the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP), often referred to as the “Pakistani Taliban,” based in Waziristan. Mufti explained 
that the Taliban cannot match force-to-force with a competent military, so they have 
adopted a defensive stance by attacking vulnerable civilian targets such as aid workers or 
government officials.  
 Though skeptical of their long-term political intentions, the Taliban found a 
formidable ally in al-Qaeda, comprised of mostly foreign fighters who found sanctuary 
among them. The TTP considered the rugged terrain of the Khyber region to be a perfect 
sanctuary due to the close cultural and religious ties to the sympathetic Pashtun. Mufti 
(2012) postulated that a synergistic relationship developed within these Islamist groups 
who became competent in militant activity against the government. The result was a 
resilient and united Islamist adversary, able to engage in strategic planning and 
coordinated attacks to achieve common goals while remaining autonomous to pursue 
local political objectives. Javaid (2011) assessed that many Pashtun entered into a grand 
alliance of convenience with al-Qaeda foreign fighters to protect their families from 
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unwarranted foreign aggression. Javaid explained that al-Qaeda fighters sought refuge 
from intense military operations and gained influence with the TTP and local Pashtun 
tribesmen who were sympathetic to their cause. The Taliban and Pashtun sympathizers, 
seeking spiritual guidance and the rule of law in an era of incessant violence, turned to 
the al-Qaeda for leadership, logistical support, military prowess, and political stability 
(Dorronsoro, 2009).  
 The Western pursuit of the global war on terror encouraged violent extremism and 
enabled the uncontested authority of the Taliban mullahs. This view discounts the idea of 
a common strategic or ideological objective between the Pashtun and Taliban, and 
suggests that the violence brought on by the West itself. Hence, many Pashtun consider 
Allied aggression as the root cause of the swelling radical opposition—referred to as 
Talibanization. Javaid (2011) asserted that Western military raids have pushed the 
Pashtun to the Islamist militants for protection and security. Javaid (2011) cited drone 
attacks and persistent raids by special military forces that killed innocents and conducted 
unlawful search and seizure as the primary reason for Talibanization. Javaid postulated 
that Islamist militants are enabled by cash-flushed fundamentalist groups aimed at 
ousting the corrupt Western influence that brought war upon them, not of their own 
choosing.   
The Islamist strategy. The Pakistan Taliban seeks to undermine the government 
and exercise the right of autonomous governance based in Sharia law. According to 
Cordesman and Vira (2011), the TTP strategy aligns with the Maoist insurgency 
64 
 
 
 
approach of a protracted popular war. The militants are capable of operational planning 
and coordinated attacks with sophisticated networks that reach beyond the national 
borders. The local networks often compete with each other, resulting in violence 
manifested in different ways: intertribal warfare, antistate violence, sectarian violence, 
global jihad, and criminal activity. According to Cordesman and Vira, the militants 
sought to replace traditional tribal values with its own form of Islamic extremist ideology 
by destroying the traditional Jirga system. They asserted that the Islamist strategy 
emphasizes patience in an attempt to gain influence with the Pashtun and exhaust 
Pakistan’s political will and resources over time—for years if necessary.  
  The Taliban established a firm political base among the Pashtun as a foundation 
for militancy. Nawaz and Borchgrave (2009) reported that the Taliban operate 
clandestinely through propaganda, subversion, and intimidation to supplant the traditional 
tribal leadership and foster support among the Pashtun, especially the vulnerable youth.  
Cordesman and Vira (2011) explained that the Taliban effectively disseminate a strategic 
narrative that connects tribal grievances to a governance platform that invigorates the 
tribesmen. Taliban accomplish this by either co-opting existing ethnic identities or 
fashioning new identities based on religious extremism rather than traditional Pashtun 
culture. After achieving a firm political base, the Taliban pursue coercion and 
intimidation to recruit young warriors, collect intelligence, and acquire logistical support 
for guerrilla or terrorist operations against the military and police constabulary.  
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Islamist inspired militancy and political action generated gaps in state control 
that the Taliban filled with “shadow” governance. According to Cordesman and Vira, the 
Taliban sought to inspire and mobilize the people—known as Focoism—to collapse the 
government through civil disobedience rather than outright military defeat. Focoists 
pursue limited military operations supported by a sustained tempo of strategic 
propaganda to inspire the people into rallying against the government. It remains unclear 
whether the militants seek to collapse the government or merely wound it enough to settle 
for some limited political objectives such as the right of self-determination, 
independence, or simply equal representation in government. 
  The Pakistan countermilitancy campaign is irresolute. The national strategy to 
counter Islamist militancy is marked by indecision and limited success. Pickering and 
Rubin (2009) and Nawaz (2011) assessed that the military has been ineffective in 
clearing and holding territory because of an incoherent strategy. Mohammad (2009) 
further explained that the government does not understand the dynamic between a 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency situation. The counterterrorism strategy, 
conceived to disempower the worldwide terrorist network by eliminating support nodes 
may be counterproductive in achieving the Pashtun trust and confidence. Mohammad 
reported that hundreds of innocents were hurt or killed in the process to annihilate the 
Islamist support networks. The radical movement is emboldened by the anger exuded by 
the families of those killed. Cohen (2007) affirmed that military operations have not only 
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failed to reduce violence, but caused additional civil unrest stemming from the 
lawlessness left by the exodus of competent governing bodies.  
  The Islamists move throughout the region with impunity and the lethality of 
insurgents is not a valid indicator of success. Cordesman and Vira (2011) concluded that 
constant military pressure on the Taliban tends to displace them to other provinces, 
merely transferring the militancy problem to other locations. They describe the freedom 
of maneuver as a “balloon” where the militants pressured by intensive military action in 
one sector were pushed into another by seeking refuge in benign provinces where they 
could reconstitute and receive local support. In order to maneuver more effectively, the 
militants cleverly modified the cultural diversity of their forces to mirror the population 
and thus became more accepted. As the militants moved through tribal regions, they 
acculturated and assumed many young fighters into their ranks. The new diversity in 
tribal makeup bound by a common religious ideology promoted the concept of a united 
Islamic front and pushed moderate Muslims closer to the radical factions.   
  The Pashtun were not convinced that it is better to be a Pakistan citizen rather 
than a Taliban subject. Khan (2007) contended that governance steadily deteriorated at 
the very time when it is needed to gain the confidence of the people. Khan asserted that 
the government demonstrated little interest or ability to engage in economic development 
or correct social disparities that would foster enduring relationships. Aslam and Yilaz 
(2011) studied the impact of decentralized reforms on service delivery in Pakistan’s 
remote provinces and concluded that bringing inclusive decision-making to the Pashtun 
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people would improve life services and promote trust that is clearly absent. N. Akhtar 
(2008) concluded that peace cannot be achieved with weapons. Peace may only be 
achieved with harmony—and good governance is the key to achieving that end.  
  The current countermilitancy strategy lacks a coordinated whole-of-government 
effort and is over reliant on military operational success. Overwhelming military activity 
has completely overshadowed the government’s effort to intervene politically, socially 
and economically. The neo-Clausewitzian approach is hampered by political instability 
and turmoil. A healthy dialogue and mutual understanding between the Pashtun and their 
government is clearly lacking.  
Conclusion  
 The militancy problem in Pakistan is an imminent threat to their national security 
and has global security implications. The Islamist phenomenon is complex and violent, 
and a solution requires a comprehensive analysis of the Pashtun social and political 
environment. A scientific study of the Pashtun and the government operations in their 
lands is need to discern the right balance of governance and military actions to subdue the 
militancy threat. The cynicism and distrust between the Pashtun, their government, and 
the military destabilized the sociopolitical environment and created vulnerabilities for the 
Islamists to exploit. Due to a weakness of Pakistan’s governance, the militants have the 
initiative; however, the Pakistani government achieved significant success during the 
Swat operations in Khyber Province. This study explored the reasons for that success. 
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Current doctrine and the application of classic insurgency and terrorism theory 
have significant gaps that require additional scientific research to determine the true role 
of governance in a countermilitancy campaign. Current strategies remain military 
dominant rather than population focused. Neo-Clausewitizians stress the importance of 
earning the allegiance of the people to undermine the enemy support base. However, the 
planning process to identify and implement the right governance services to promote 
public trust is lacking. An aggressive military approach has proven to be problematic in 
the current sociopolitical environment, and most scholars agree that military forces 
working hand-in-hand with the government institutions is more effective. Still, there is 
disagreement on the best methods to integrate governance with the military effort.   
 Altering the way the Pakistan government and the Pashtun think about the conflict 
is the only path to achieving a lasting peace. To gain the confidence and trust of the 
tribesmen, the government may study the Pashtun way of life that was centered on the 
extended Pashtun family and governed by a traditional tribal hierarchy. The Pashtun are 
anchored at a geo-political fault zone where there is a constant social struggle between 
Islam, the global super powers, and their own government. The Taliban, created and 
supported by the government as a strategic reserve, made astute use of ethnic tensions to 
gain favor with the Pashtun seeking justice and moral guidance founded in Islam. The 
Taliban were skilled at altering their communal fabric to assimilate with the people and 
promote themselves as the chosen governing authority, thereby supplanting the Pakistani 
authority. The Pashtun are not convinced that it is better to be a Pakistani citizen than a 
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Taliban subject. The Taliban do not have the capacity to openly confront the military in 
large conventional formations, so they resort to irregular warfare and terror tactics. The 
national strategy to counter the threat lacks a coordinated whole-of-government effort 
and is marked by an over reliance on military operational success.  
The Pakistan government has experienced limited success in the conflict. Pakistan 
is plagued by a dysfunctional political system that is paralyzed with infighting between 
the politicians, military, and the mullahs. It is a fragile parliamentary democratic republic 
that loosely governs and failed to achieve the trust of the Pashtun. Lack of development 
in infrastructure and social services perpetuated a fractured society. The Pashtun are 
disenfranchised from the mainstream political processes and the Islamists have filled the 
leadership void. Militarization and escalating violence further alienated the Pashtun from 
their government which is at odds with their own military. As a result, the Pashtun do not 
recognize the military or the government as their guardian or protectors. The tribe may be 
reconnected to their government to achieve an enduring peace.  
There is a clear gap in the literature concerning the specific implementation of 
governance and the potential for a whole-of-government approach to counter Islamist 
militancy. Current doctrine focuses on military operations as the primary instrument to 
defeat the militants. Governance plays only a secondary role. Neo-Clausewitzian thought 
clearly places a higher degree of importance on understanding cultural values, and the 
application of governance throughout the campaign. Determining the right balance 
between military operations and governance is the challenge.  
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Chapter 3 describes a qualitative design that applies a neo-Clausewitzian 
theoretical lens to analyze the successes of Pakistan’s 2009 Swat Valley operation. 
Conducting scientific research to gain an understanding of the relationships between the 
participants in the conflict may provide a baseline of knowledge of how governance may 
be integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist inspired violence. Clearly, 
promoting a trust in government provides a promising method to counteract militant 
influence upon a vulnerable people. The research methodology explored the best 
processes and methods to promote government legitimacy and disable the Islamists’ 
capacity to wage war. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction  
 In this chapter, I describe the qualitative study research design and the rationale 
for a case study strategy of inquiry. The single case design methodology and tradition are 
primarily based upon the approach developed by the recognized leader in the field, Yin 
(2014).  In this chapter, my role as a researcher is defined, and the process for recruiting 
and protecting the participant pool in an appropriate and ethical manner is described in 
detail. The specified design elements of the Yin-inspired methodology are illustrated. The 
data collection plan includes a description of the desired instruments and the methods of 
collection are provided. To facilitate data analysis, the application of a linear analytical 
model and manual coding scheme are depicted.  The specific steps to promote study 
trustworthiness are expressed in the final section.     
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this study was to determine the most effective integration of 
governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The study results and 
conclusions promote social change by gaining a better understanding of Islamist inspired 
violence and recommending planning improvements to subdue it. The new knowledge 
obtained in the study, potentially codified in planning doctrine, may lead to a better 
strategic approach in addressing the escalating global Islamist militancy problem. The 
research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare theoretical lens to assess the 
complex sociopolitical environment and evaluate Pakistan’s implementation of 
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governance. A qualitative approach to explore the relationships between the people, the 
military, and their government may facilitate the integration of governance and militarism 
to subdue violent extremism. 
Research Design Summary  
In the study, I explored the sociopolitical phenomenon of Islamist militancy and 
deteriorating writ of government in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. The nature of the 
research is qualitative, focusing on a single case in assessing the integration of 
governance with civil-military operations. I focused on the practical problem that 
contemporary countermilitancy doctrine does not adequately address the concurrent 
integration of governance with military operations into a comprehensive strategy. The 
study contributes to the social science discipline by addressing the broader problem of 
escalating militancy inspired by Islamists spread around the world. 
The Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA, hosted Pakistani policymakers and 
operational planners involved with the Swat Valley campaign. My role as a professor at 
the college and researcher was to create a neutral environment that is conducive to the 
free flow of information without the undue influence of personal prejudices or political 
barriers. To achieve a balanced view, six Pakistani planners with a breadth of planning 
experience were selected to participate in the study. Primary data were merged with 
Pakistani secondary source survey data to include the perspectives of the Swatis.      
The study includes qualitative data from official government records and other 
source documents that record the facts of the operation. The qualitative data analysis flow 
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included a program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to analyze the 
implementation of governance. The model was useful in analyzing the impact of 
government policy, planning, and governance actions that directly supported the military 
effort. The model incorporated real-world contextual conditions that describe the inherent 
problem of Islamic militancy and the rival interventions that challenge the neo-
Clausewitzian theoretical construct. The analysis technique proved to be a valuable 
research tool to match empirically observed activities to theoretically predicted events.  
Trustworthiness, confirmability, and transferability remain a significant concern 
and weakness of a single case study in comparison to a multicase approach. Small data 
sampling sizes may produce subjective results (Stake, 2010). To address this concern, the 
participant pool included key Pakistani subject matter experts across the breadth of 
required planning skill sets that were directly involved in the Swat operation. Moreover, 
the case leveraged the strength of triangulating data from a myriad of official sources 
(Yin, 2014). Data triangulation between the testimony of trustworthy participants, 
reliable surveys of the affected population, and official documentation upholds 
credibility. The analytical model promotes transferability by organizing the data analysis 
along global militancy themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets. Stringent 
compliance with the data collection methodology and development of a transparent audit 
trail for other researchers to follow enhances confirmability. 
 The participants were protected by safeguarding their identities in a nonattribution 
forum to foster a forthright dialogue. The political situation in Pakistan is tenuous and the 
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United States-Pakistan relationship is volatile, so the Pakistanis who participated were 
vulnerable to political pressure and their employment security could be at risk. In 
accordance with National Research Council (2013) guidelines, informed consent 
procedures were strictly applied and subject confidentiality guarded while exercising the 
research methodology. The study does not contain personal information or subject 
identities: No names are included. 
 My profession as a professor of military studies at the Joint Forces Staff College 
in Norfolk, VA placed me in a unique position to gain access to Pakistani planners. The 
study provides these planners with a standard for researching additional countermilitancy 
cases. Study conclusions and recommendations may be used to formulate improved 
doctrine as codified in Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency Manual (U. S. 
Department of Defense, 2013). New countermilitancy doctrine based on real-world 
operations could provide a valuable tool to address the escalating global militancy 
problem. By researching the Rah-e-Rast operation, policymakers and planners may better 
understand how to design and implement governance activities that undermine the 
Islamist support base and subdue their violent activity. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research Question   
During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in Swat 
District in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities 
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?  
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The Islamist Militancy Phenomenon 
The research revealed the sociopolitical phenomena of escalating Islamist 
militancy and deteriorating writ of government in Pakistan’s Khyber Province.  Despite a 
concerted government effort to neutralize the militants, the region experienced an 
escalation of violence and reduction in governmental authority (Cordesman & Vira, 
2011).  However, there was a marked reduction in violence after the Swat Valley 
operation (Khattak, 2010). Khattak (2010) reported that the sociopolitical activities and 
military operations restored national confidence and brought calm to the valley. This 
study exposes the reasons behind the operational success by analyzing the complex 
relationships between the Islamists, the Swati-Pashtun, and the government security 
forces—all from the Pakistani perspective. Understanding the social dynamics may 
provide insights into an effective application of governance in a hostile militancy 
situation. Improved governance might enhance or supplant the execution of costly and 
often counterproductive military activity in the overall effort to subdue violence.  
Research Tradition 
The nature of the research was qualitative, using a single case study to assess the 
integration of governance during the Swat campaign. This design was appropriate to 
examine the wide variety of available information, the complexity of the sociopolitical 
environment, the subjectivity of Pakistani perspectives, and the inductive nature of the 
analysis. Yin (2014) explained that the strength of the case study methodology is the 
ability to triangulate multiple qualitative data sources on a complex research problem.   
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Case Study Design 
 In the study, I examined the integration of governance during Operation Rah-e-
Rast using a single case study design. Yin (2014) contended that a single case design is 
appropriate under longitudinal, revelatory, unusual, or critical conditions. The operation 
was conceived during a critical juncture in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. Rah-e-
Rast occurred during a pivotal shift from a military to civilian administration and a swing 
in national policy from executing a military dominant strategy to an interministry strategy 
focused on governance. The operation defined a key milestone in the continuum of 
countermilitancy efforts that showcased government decision points and an 
unprecedented civilian collaboration with the military. The operation directly challenged 
the neo-Clausewitzian theory of social conflict. 
Rationale for Qualitative Research 
 A qualitative case study methodology was the most appropriate design. Morse 
(1991) recommended a qualitative approach in complex sociopolitical situations where 
existing social theories fall short. The qualitative approach was founded in a paradigm of 
subjectivity and emphasized the importance of interpretation and popular perspective 
(McLafferty, Slate, & Onwuegbuzie, 2010). The subjectivity of governance and 
complexity of the militancy phenomenon lends itself to a qualitative inquiry. Birkinshaw, 
Brannen, and Tung (2011) suggested that the analysis of sociopolitical phenomena within 
the human domain be described qualitatively rather than measured quantitatively. A 
qualitative design was well suited to assess the implementation of governance in 
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countering the adverse effects of Islamist militancy by interpreting the meanings of 
Swati-Pashtun social realities. This includes their historical problems with government, 
their social struggle with the Taliban, and a vision of what positive social change could 
occur with the proper application of governance.  
The study is based upon an ontological philosophical assumption that the 
understanding the nature of the social reality relies upon the contextual values and 
experiences of the subjects, and the views of the Swatis at large (Creswell, 2013). 
Participant perspectives were varied and complex, and subjective meanings were 
assessed through their views on the Islamist militancy phenomenon. Life truths were 
revealed by the analysis of the subjects’ beliefs in the social dynamics contrasted with 
empirical evidence concerning the diminution of the militant threat. In essence, new 
knowledge was gained by adjudicating the participants’ beliefs in governance with the 
social realities in the region.  
Characteristic of critical theory analysis, I explored the militancy phenomenon 
through a neo-Clausewitzian theoretical lens to illuminate social action that empowered 
the Swatis to undermine the militant support base. A scientific study of Pakistani social 
institutions was designed to illuminate transformational approaches and key governance 
attributes that subdue militancy and then improve planning processes to leverage the 
government’s social actions. Hence, I explored the role of governance through an 
interpretive inquiry of the subjects’ planning action, influenced by social and cultural 
norms and guided by a doctrinal planning process based in neo-Clausewitzian theoretical 
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principles. I focused on governance actions that empowered the Swatis to transcend 
social constraints and pursue their traditional way of life, absent the Taliban threat.   
Rationale for the Case Study Design 
The case design complements the qualitative methodology and critical theory 
interpretative analysis. Kapoulas and Mitic (2012) directly linked the methodology to the 
research purpose, knowledge being sought, and the inquiry strategy. The case offered a 
pragmatic inquiry of the complex phenomenon with precision. Yin (2014) asserted that 
case studies are useful in explaining causal links between variables that may be overly 
complex for experimental or survey designs. Yin recommended the case methodology for 
a real-world context, especially when the seam between the context and the phenomenon 
are not clearly defined: a direct application to the social dynamics in Pakistan.  
The study was designed to explore the concurrent integration of governance with 
military operations in a countermilitancy campaign. Yin (2014) explained that research 
questions that pursue the “how and why some social phenomenon works” (p. 4) are 
germane to a case study method.  How and why governance was integrated with military 
operations in the Swat case is the essence of the research question. There were many 
governance activities of interest, and the case study methodology was particularly 
effective in analyzing the approach to deal with such a socially complex situation.  
Selection of the Swat Valley Operation for the Case 
The selection of the Rah-e-Rast operation had several advantages. First, it was a 
critical case that defined a decisive event in Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign. The 
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Pakistani authorities—for the first time—pursued an aggressive population-centered 
approach to conducting military operations. The militant violence at that time created a 
level of public desperation previously unseen, and the government intervention was 
unprecedented. Second, the operation provided elements of both a governance and a 
military approach. More so than any time in the past, governance and military operations 
were planned and conducted in a mutually supporting way. In this context, the case was a 
revelatory where the phenomenon was previously approached in a different way and 
inaccessible to a social science inquiry.  
Role of the Researcher 
Creswell (2009) referred to qualitative study as interpretive research where the 
inquirer is the key instrument and is involved in an intensive experience with the 
respondents as an observer-participant. As the director of a Department of Defense 
endorsed U.S.–Pakistan Senior Officer Program, I developed longstanding relationships 
with Pakistani military officers and government civilians involved with ongoing 
countermilitancy operations. The program included a series of important strategy 
conferences over the last several years between U.S. and Pakistani planners who were 
engaged in actual operations. The study subjects were selected from former conference 
participants. I had the privilege to engage in frank and open discussions concerning 
ongoing countermilitancy operations in the Pakistani tribal areas. The conferences also 
afforded access to planning discussions and operational documents not available to the 
general public.  
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Avoiding Bias in the Research 
Moustakas (1994) emphasized the importance of establishing a comfortable 
interview environment in a neutral venue to foster a candid and frank sharing of thoughts 
and experiences. Conducting the research on secure military academic networks within 
academia at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia had many advantages. 
Academia provided a neutral venue that promotes an open dialogue without the biases or 
political constraints found within a national embassy, military operational headquarters, 
or government ministry. Academia offered an environment that was conducive to the free 
flow of information absent external political or military influence. The study includes 
Pakistani perspectives with a measure of discretion and autonomy to protect the 
participants from potential government retribution. The study was conducted within 
academia that is protected by the principles of nonattribution and academic freedom.  
Yin (2014) stressed the importance of maintaining an open mind to rival theories 
and contrary evidence. As a researcher conducting a qualitative study, my role was to 
suspend preconceived ideas or doctrinal tenets with respect to militancy. The study does 
not favor a particular political stance between the Islamists and their government, 
although a research objective was to reveal findings that may impact the social behavior 
of violent Islamist militants. The study includes evidence that supports alternate theories 
or opposes the mainstream narrative concerning countermilitancy operations. The risk of 
partiality was minimized by suspending personal value judgments while gathering 
information. Qu and Dumay (2011) cautioned researchers to guard against 
81 
 
 
 
preconceptions and concentrate on the participants’ life experiences absent leading 
questions. The study was designed with an open-ended questioning methodology that 
afforded an opportunity to present contrary views.  
Ensuring an Ethical Approach  
Presenting perspectives of the predominantly Muslim Pakistanis through a 
Christian or Western lens may be unjust and even unethical. To ensure an ethical and 
moral approach, the study embodies the Pakistani view irrespective of politics or religion 
by including a culturally diverse participant pool. The subjects represent an equitable 
sampling of planning professionals from a religiously and tribally diverse cross-section of 
Pakistani society. A diverse cadre interviewed on neutral ground within academia 
minimized the likelihood of misrepresenting views in an unethical manner. 
Methodology – Case Study Protocol 
Participant Selection Logic 
Garza (2011) suggested that the participants must have more than casual 
knowledge or limited involvement with the phenomenon to fully benefit from their 
experience; therefore, purposeful sampling was utilized. The participant pool included 
Pakistani planners, both civilian and military, who actively participated in the planning of 
Swat operations, for the expressed purpose of determining the most effective integration 
of governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The participants were 
selected based on their operational experiences, diversity in culture and military 
background, and the government permission to access them. 
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Sampling Strategy 
A critical case sampling strategy within the purposive sampling construct 
efficiently gathered information directly related to the operation. Patton (2002) asserted 
that critical case sampling targets participants who are intimately familiar with the 
phenomenon and are capable of providing the most detailed information on the research 
topic. Patton also contends that the audience is an important factor in determining the 
best sampling approach. The participant selection focused on a small cadre of Pakistani 
professionals who were formerly engaged in the countermilitancy effort, and were 
directly involved with the Swat campaign.   
Creswell (2013) contended that a critical case typology facilitates a logical 
generalization of a specific event that may be directly compared to other cases. Creswell 
recommends sampling at least four or five “cases,” referring to individuals in this 
context, for any given case study. Creswell also prefers diverse perspectives within the 
small sample to employ some variation in data that upholds credibility and ensures that 
contrary perspectives are represented. For these reasons, a sampling size of six 
experienced Pakistani security professionals were interviewed. The comprehensive 
knowledge, judgment, and experiences of this small selected sampling created an 
information rich source of qualitative information.   
Criterion for the Participant Pool  
To include all the desired operational planning skill sets, the selectees included 
one government civilian familiar with policy, two Pakistani military planners (one 
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familiar with military operations and one with civil-military coordination), and three 
military operators (one intelligence officer, one air operations officer, and one doctrine 
expert) to gain a balanced perspective on how the operations were planned and executed. 
The selection provided a balanced view of government policymaking, military planning, 
and all-government execution, including civil-military collaboration.  Since all 
participants worked on the same operational plan, the balanced skill sets reached 
saturation by assimilating their extensive operational experiences.  
Procedure for Participant Recruitment and Assignment 
To select the most qualified participants, the United States Office of Defense 
Representative Pakistan (ODRP) in Islamabad was consulted. The office is a subordinate 
military command to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) and affiliated 
with the United States Embassy in Pakistan. The ODRP addresses Pakistan’s militancy 
issues with a cadre of security professionals to synchronize United States and Pakistan 
operations, facilitate military sales, and coordinate humanitarian support. Access to the 
participants was arranged as part of a USCENTCOM sponsored conference to promote a 
collaborative dialogue among the joint planners. Within the pool of approximately 60 
conference attendees within a three year range, six qualified respondents were screened 
and selected.  
Due to the political sensitivities between Pakistan and the United States, 
interaction with the participants was structured by military liaison officers assigned to the 
National Defense University. This approach had some distinct advantages. First, the 
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conferences offered an efficient and convenient way to gain access to vetted participants 
who have been officially sanctioned by the United States and Pakistan. Second, the Joint 
Forces Staff College, as an academic institution, offers a neutral venue with adequate 
communication equipment to provide a secure environment that promotes academic 
freedom and an open exchange of ideas. Third, the researcher was an active participant in 
the conferences, and therefore developed personal relationships with the Pakistani 
contingent. Connecting with the Pakistanis over an extending period of time fostered a 
more comfortable interview environment and promoted a frank exchange of ideas.  
Qualitative Interview Protocol 
A comfortable and neutral interview climate within academia maximized the free 
exchange of ideas. The questions were predetermined and consistent with the research 
themes and propositions while maintaining the option for additional questions to take full 
advantage of their experiences (Oyegoke, 2011; Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). The 
semistructured interviews were conducted via secure audio-teleconference channels. 
Testimony verification and follow-up questions were addressed by secure email. The 
questions are presented in Appendix A. The interview duration was between 60 and 90 
minutes consistent with interview protocol standards (Petty et al., 2012).   
Subjects were briefed on the purpose and objectives of the study prior to 
conducting the interviews. Subject credentials and experience were verified at the onset. 
All participants were assured of nonattribution and provided an opportunity to either 
consent or opt-out. Interviews were recorded (with interviewee permission) and verbatim 
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transcripts produced for verification and analysis. The recordings were password 
protected and secured under Department of Defense security protocols. To promote an 
ethical approach, the participants were afforded an opportunity to review the transcripts 
for accuracy of translation and intent (Osborne, 1994). All interview recordings, 
transcripts, and correspondence are secured under lock and key.   
Theoretical Propositions 
Yin (2014) stated that theoretical propositions are derived from the theoretical 
framework and will help define the appropriate data collection to assess the existing 
theory. The study includes three theoretical propositions that are derived from the 
theoretical framework. First, positive governance interactions integrated with protective 
military activities create stability and trust between the government, the people, and the 
military. Stability and trust, in turn, fosters government legitimacy. Second, trust in 
government undermines the Islamist militant support base and empowers the mainstream 
Islamabad government.  Third, governance may enable or partially supplant military 
operations in subduing the Islamist militancy. These propositions guided the 
methodology design and shaped the data collection plan.  
Data Collection Plan 
Creswell (2013) described four main forms of information: survey or observation 
information, public open source documents, interview transcripts, and multimedia 
materials. The collection was comprised of three units of observation: interviews, 
secondary source survey data to gain the perspectives of the Pashtun people, and official 
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government artifacts of the operation. The design included analysis elements 
characterized by the total system, intermediate units, and individuals (Yin, 2014). The 
following sections describe the specific embedded units. 
Embedded Unit of Analysis 1: The Swat Valley Operational Construct  
The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit was linked to the strategic 
planning of the operation in the context of the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical construct. 
The total system for this embedded unit was the actual operational plan and associated 
artifacts that are releasable to the public domain. The intermediate units include the 
associated information plan and economic development plan. Documents are available in 
the public record at http://www.pakistan.gov.pk. This internet source is the official 
authoritative archive for the Pakistani government. The main instrument includes 
researcher produced individual interviews by those who conducted the different facets of 
governmental planning, both military and civilian.  
Embedded Unit of Analysis 2: Government Policy and Activities  
 The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit was the implementation of the 
operational plan and the compliance with elements of the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical 
framework. The total system for this embedded unit was the executive decision-making 
chain to execute the plan and the facts surrounding the activities on the ground. The 
intermediate units include government archival directives and documentation, public 
declarations, and open forum speeches. The documentation instruments for this 
embedded unit were published official government memos, documents, minutes, and 
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multimedia materials that describe the relevant policy actions and activities of the 
Pakistan government. Government policy resources for a broad spectrum of governance 
services were readily available on http://www.pakistan.gov.pk. Documents associated 
with defense policy, strategic communications, Pashtun culture, and rule of law were 
particularly insightful. The website represents the best information available from a 
reputable open-source. The study includes additional operational source materials 
obtained directly from the planners, and are not releasable to the public.  
Additional demographic survey instruments were available on official 
government open-source websites. The Government of Pakistan official population 
census website provides germane demographic data at http://www.census.gov.pk. The 
survey information was provided by the Population Census Organization, a department of 
Pakistan’s government Statistics Division. This division is the official agency that is 
chartered to plan and implement the population census and provide access to the 
information for public use. The organization processes and disseminates data in the form 
of regular census reports based on analysis of demographic information. 
Embedded Unit of Analysis 3: Pakistani Perspectives 
The key chain of evidence for this embedded unit were the popular perceptions of 
governance. The study revealed the popular support for the mainstream government and 
the linkage to militant freedom of maneuver. The total system for this unit includes 
Swati-Pashtun perspectives of the government plan and associated activities. Direct 
access to the Pashtun or the militants was problematic, but survey information was 
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readily available. The intermediate units were restricted to secondary source survey data. 
Reputable survey instruments employed by internationally recognized survey 
organizations were available on open source websites.  
Secondary source survey instrument: Pashtun popular sentiment. The New 
American Foundation (NAF) provided comprehensive survey data and agency-specific 
analysis from regional experts with interview data from Khyber residents conducted 
before, during, and after the Swat operations. New America monitored the effect of drone 
strikes and conducted extensive research on Islamist militancy, written by recognized 
regional experts. The surveys were conducted by the NAF, with field support provided by 
the Community Appraisal & Motivation Program (CAMP). Respondents were selected 
using a multistage random stratified sampling methodology. The surveys involved over 
1,000 Pakistanis, conducted by professional interviewers and field supervisors.  
Secondary source survey instrument: Swati perspectives. Popular perspectives 
on the Swat Valley conflict, compiled into survey information, was available at the 
World Public Opinion (WPO) website. WPO was a collaborative project comprised of a 
consortium of reputable international research centers that voice public views from across 
the globe. The surveys revealed popular sentiments during the Swat Valley operations 
(Fair, 2009; Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis, 2009).  Professional survey experts from 
Socioeconomic Development Consultants, Islamabad, conducted numerous surveys in the 
native languages. The surveys were oversampled, and the results were weighted to reflect 
actual religious and cultural proportions. 
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Secondary source survey instrument: Pakistani public opinion at large. The 
International Republican Institute (IRI) provided public perspectives and surveys on the 
Swat Valley conflict. Two surveys of special interest were conducted, one before and one 
after the Swat Valley operation. These surveys were particularly useful in analyzing the 
real impact of the government actions. The IRI methodology consisted of interviews 
conducted by professional consultants. To establish content validity, a multistage 
probability sample was used and the Kish selection method was applied. In addition, 
Gallup conducted a study through their Abu Dhabi Gallup Center that included 10,139 
Pakistani adults from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. This survey provided 
insights into popular in government confidence during the Swat campaign.   
Secondary source survey instrument: Islamist militant perspectives. The Pew 
Research Center provided information on Pashtun surveys conducted on the topic of Swat 
operations. The Center’s Global Attitudes project explored international public opinion 
on a broad range of topics from individual assessments of their own lives to views about 
governance and the geopolitics. Pew used Crimson Hexagon statistics technology and 
computer coding to establish content validity.  
Data Analysis and Interpretation Plan 
 My qualitative information analysis included a content analysis flow and 
program-level linear analytical model (Appendix B) to assess the relevant data. Patton 
(2002) described data analysis as clarifying what is most important to the study if we had 
only understood the information beforehand. The model provided a precise analysis 
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framework that directly follows the planning process. Yin (2014) explained how a 
modeling technique operationalizes a complex chain of events over a period of time: a 
perfect tool to assess the Swat case. The model is designed to assess real world contextual 
conditions that describe the inherent problem of Islamic militancy, and the rival 
interventions that challenge the theoretical construct. The model was a useful research 
tool to match empirically observed activities to theoretically predicted events.  
Application of Manual Coding   
 Babbie (2004) asserted that the fundamental process for analyzing qualitative 
research is categorizing and coding the plethora of information in a logical and useful 
way. To accomplish this, the data were organized and coded manually using Microsoft 
Excel to bin the information within the modeling construct. Axial coding was applied to 
deductively determine content identifiers based upon the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical 
tenets. The interviews were coded with respect to the political, social, or operational 
attributes relevant to the case. Additional codes were derived inductively through 
selective coding to identify preeminent codes relevant to civil-military planning. Data 
analysis revealed correlations between governance, military operations, and militancy.  
Quality of Research Design and Trustworthiness 
Credibility (Construct and Internal Validity) 
 Data triangulation from the testimony of knowledgeable participants, official 
documentation, and secondary source survey data were my primary method to achieve 
credibility. Patton (2002) asserted that triangulation may be used to discover a deeper 
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meaning of the information and may uncover discrepant information. Thurmond (2001) 
explained that, “the benefits of triangulation include increasing confidence in research 
data, creating innovative ways of understanding a phenomenon, revealing unique 
findings, challenging or  integrating theories, and providing a clearer understanding of the 
problem” (p. 254). The case method inherently applies methodological triangulation to 
merge multiple sources data into coherent chains of evidence (Yin, 2014). Chains of 
evidence based on upon an operational set of measures within a linear logic model dispels 
the critique that a qualitative approach tends to reflect a researcher’s opinion.  
 Achieving data saturation enhanced credibility. Saturation defines the point at 
which additional information collection was not anticipated to provide additional 
evidence or insights (Suri, 2011). The saturation level for this study was linked to a 
purposive sampling of planners with a detailed knowledge of the operation. With 
semistructured interviews, Suri explains that data saturation is achievable with a small 
sampling. My interview sample size of six knowledgeable and reputable participants, 
who worked on the integrated plan, reached data saturation. The study explored all 
aspects of the theory, with no known gaps or unexplained parts of the militancy 
phenomenon.   
Transferability (External Validity)  
The implementation of governance in the Pakistan case is transferable to the 
global militancy problem. Transferability relies on a strong correlation between the 
empirical data and associated themes, the research question, and the theoretical construct 
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(Chenail, 2011). The study includes a linear logic analysis model derived from the 
theoretical construct. The model promotes external validity by organizing the data along 
global militancy themes and internationally recognized doctrinal tenets. Also, the 
literature review was pursued within a global context that merged the testimony of 
Pakistani regional experts with global experts.  
Confirmability and Dependability (Reliability) 
Stringent compliance with the information collection methodology and 
development of a transparent audit trail enhanced confirmability (Petty et al., 2012). 
Reliability was further enhanced by the strict adherence to the interview protocol. The 
protocol leveraged the strength of a semistructured questioning methodology that 
promoted information consistency (Hanson, Balmer, & Giardino, 2011). The structured 
protocol combined with a model analysis framework allows researchers to replicate my 
analysis processes and procedures. Dependability was strengthened by a secure data 
collection protocol that is auditable by researchers in the field (Hanson et al., 2011; Petty 
et al., 2012). These measures combined fostered a data collection process that is 
transparent and verifiable.  
Ethical Considerations and Human Subject Protection 
 The subjects were protected by safeguarding their identities in a nonattribution 
forum. Israel and Hay (2006) emphasized the importance of developing a trust by 
guarding against misconduct and impropriety that would impugn the integrity of the 
research or reflect poorly upon the institution. The political situation in Pakistan was 
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tenuous and their relationship with the United States was volatile, so the Pakistanis who 
participated were vulnerable to political pressure. To mitigate undue influence, informed 
consent was obtained and confidentiality guarded in accordance with National Research 
Council (2013) guidelines. Study participation was voluntary and interviewees could opt-
out at any point. All participants were informed of the study objective and there was no 
obligation to complete the interview after commencement. The identities and information 
provided by the respondents is nonattribution and is safeguarded. Personal information 
was not directly or indirectly attributable to a specific participant. In addition, names and 
personal information are not included in the study.  
 Authority to access Pakistani participants was obtained from the appropriate 
United States and Pakistan government officials. Furthermore, Walden University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) granted study approval; reference number 03-18-15-
0225369. A letter of cooperation from the Office of the Defense Representative in 
Pakistan authorized access to United States and Pakistan government representatives in 
direct support of this specific study. USCENTCOM delegated the authority to conduct 
the U.S.-Pakistan Senior Officers program to the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, 
VA. The charter of the program is to build relationships, and this study was a natural 
extension of the program charter to codify the operational lessons.  
 Due to the political nature of the topic, the identity of the participants will not be 
published. The subjects’ identities will remain confidential and their privacy will be 
protected. The Joint Forces Staff College is located on a secure military installation that 
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provides a safe and secure environment, protected by the Norfolk Naval Support Activity 
security infrastructure. Since the study was authorized in conjunction with a government 
sanctioned conference, there was little risk of a political influence. Interview data were 
personally transcribed and secured in a safe that restricts access to only the researcher. To 
ensure confidentiality, the raw data will be destroyed by shredding after a period of 10 
years following the study.   
Summary 
The study exposed the facts and realities concerning the implementation of 
governance to subdue Islamist militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. The single-case 
design was bounded by time and space, focusing on the successful 2009 Swat operation 
codenamed Rah-e-Rast. The research design applies a neo-Clausewitzian warfare 
theoretical lens to assess the social environment and evaluate the implementation of 
governance to counter Islamist inspired violence. Islamic extremism is multifaceted, so 
multiple qualitative data sources were needed to validate the theoretical construct.  
Stringent adherence to the case study methodology promoted transferability to the 
macro militancy problem. The interpretive inquiry of six Pakistani planners was 
supported by empirical evidence derived from official documents that included 
operational metrics. A strict data collection protocol protected the participants, avoided 
the injection of biases, and built an auditable data trail that other researchers may easily 
access and review. The study includes a program-level linear analytical model to 
determine the nexus between governance and military activity in the countermilitancy 
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campaign. The study promotes social change by offering improved processes to integrate 
governance in a real-world countermilitancy operations. The new knowledge obtained, 
potentially codified in doctrine, may lead to a better strategy in addressing the global 
Islamist phenomenon. The lessons from the Pakistan experience in Swat may have a 
direct impact on how modern nations approach the global militancy threat.   
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Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
 This qualitative research revealed the facts and circumstances related to the 
implementation of governance during the 2009 countermilitancy operations within 
Khyber Province. In this chapter, I present the testimony of six operational planners using 
a critical case sampling construct to assess the impacts of governance on Islamist inspired 
militancy in the Swat Valley. The participants were familiar with the design of the 
Pakistani countermilitancy campaign and were selected for the sole purpose of providing 
descriptive information concerning the planning effort.  
 Data collection and analysis included three units of observation: semistructured 
interviews of selected respondents, secondary source survey data to gain Pakistani 
perspectives, and official government artifacts of the Swat operation. Progressive axial 
and selective coding schemes organized and validated the data through methodological 
triangulation. The study includes a qualitative content analysis flow model to 
conceptualize themes and analyze the data through a countermilitancy theoretical lens. 
The findings are organized by themes, germane to the research question and the 
theoretical propositions. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the study was to determine the most effective integration of 
governance and military activities to subdue Islamist militancy. The research objective is 
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to promote social change by contributing to the understanding of Islamist militancy and 
reveal findings that impact countermilitancy planning and policymaking processes. 
Research Question 
During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in Swat 
Valley in the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance activities 
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy? 
Setting 
The study includes interviews from six Pakistani countermilitancy professionals 
who met the study selection criteria. All respondents were familiar with the planning and 
implementation of the 2009 Swat operation, codenamed Rah-e-Rast. The participants 
were involved in an ongoing dialogue with U.S. military planners concerning operations 
in the South Asia region. A stringent participant verification process and interview 
protocol was applied. The testimony revealed diverse perspectives concerning Pakistani 
national policy objectives, leadership guidance, operational planning processes and 
barriers, and civil-military coordination successes and failures.  
Participants were informed about the purpose and objective of the study and its 
intended use. Each respondent was afforded an opportunity to verify the data and review 
the preliminary study results. Informed consent was achieved with each participant. 
Semistructured interviews were conducted using protected audio teleconferencing 
capability to maximize privacy and security and government security protocols were 
applied to protect information storage. Interviews were conducted on encrypted audio 
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networks, and the recordings are kept in a secure location with limited distribution. The 
transcripts are available for review without restrictions. Archived transcripts are not 
attributed to any named participant and may be publicly released. None of the 
respondents expressed a concern about the release of information or their participation.  
Demographics 
The participants consisted of knowledgeable experts familiar with Rah-e-Rast. 
They possessed the desired operational planning skill sets typical of a joint civil-military 
planning group. Each respondent was assigned a code based on the person’s occupation 
and experience, and the rest of the report refers to each of them by the assigned code. The 
participant codes are as follows: 
MILA1 – Pakistani military air operations officer 
MILO2 – Pakistani military operational planner 
MILI3 – Pakistani military intelligence expert 
MILN4 – Pakistani military civil-military coordination expert  
MILO5 – Pakistani military educator and countermilitancy doctrinal expert  
CIV6 – Pakistani civilian national security professional and policy advisor 
The participant pool was reflective of the religious and tribal diversity of the 
general Pakistani population. The pool included three respondents from the Punjab 
province, one from Karachi in the province Sindh, one from the Kashmir region, and one 
Pashtun from the Malakand Division. The diversity in representation provided a balanced 
view of government policymaking, military planning, and the interministry execution. 
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The balance and breadth of skill sets in the participant pool was representative of 
practitioners in the field who plan civil-military operations.  
Data Collection and Flow 
The study includes data relevant to the Rah-e-Rast operational case. The interview 
protocol was consistently applied with no exceptions, and there were no unusual 
circumstances or deviations from the plan presented in Chapter 3. Data were analyzed 
using the qualitative content analysis flow model shown in Figure 1. The flow provided a 
directed comparative analysis to link theory and the research question directly to results. 
Krippendorff (2013) asserted that a qualitative content analysis flow is a valid and 
replicable method for making inferences from qualitative source information. 
 
Figure 1. Qualitative content flow model. 
Conclusions
Civil-Military Planning Process Improvement Recommendations
Interpretations of the Findings 
Findings Linked to the Research Question 
Interpretations of the Results
Determine Process Impact Findings Relevant to Civil-Military 
Integration  
Interpretations of the Qualitative Data
Assess Governance Integration with Military Operations
Verification of the Qualitative Data
Triangulation of Data between Transcripts, Government Artifacts, and 
Surveys
Organize Data by Themes Embedded in the Model 
Coded Transcripts and Survey Data
Develop Linear Analytical Model (Appendix B)  
Based on Current Joint Operational Planning Process
Development of Conceptual Themes
Based on Theoretical Propositions
Research Question 
Based on Neo-Clausewitzian Theoretical Foundation
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Development of Conceptual Themes 
 The conceptual themes were derived from the theoretical propositions that follow 
the civil-military planning process. Pakistan’s planning process was aligned with military 
decision making, called the joint operational planning process in military doctrine (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2013). A progressive coding process was applied: axial coding, 
to inductively formulate conceptual themes and selective coding to determine the most 
important content identifiers germane to the integration of governance and military 
operations. Pakistani perspectives were additionally role-time matrixed to assess shifting 
views over time. The conceptual themes and content identifiers are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
Conceptual Themes and Content Identifiers 
Conceptual theme Content identifiers in the scripts 
 
National policy objectives 
 
Cultural values, social justice, end-state, effects, 
objectives, and reform. 
 
Strategy and doctrine 
 
Strategy, doctrine, governance, writ, rights, legitimacy, 
and root causes. 
 
Military operational 
planning 
 
Defense, militancy, security, sovereignty, threat, and 
internally displaced persons. 
 
Information planning 
 
Information, public affairs, messaging, media, 
dialogue, reconciliation, and madrassa. 
  
Civil-military planning Social reform, culture, root grievances, education, rule 
of law, and civil-military. 
 
Rival interventions  
 
Culture, foreigners, United States, immigrants, and Al-
Qaeda 
 
Pakistani perspectives 
 
Militant support, Government support, Army support, 
trust, confidence 
 
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
 The linear analytical model shown in Appendix B provided a prestructured 
sequential analysis framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The model proved valuable in 
coding the data logically and sequentially through the planning process. The framework 
facilitated the data analysis from a naturalistic approach to validate the countermilitancy 
approach. The analytical model enabled the development of assessment standards for 
replication and application to other contingencies (Stake, 2010). Data collection and 
interpretation included only the civil-military aspects of the planning process that dealt 
102 
 
 
 
directly with the research question and did not fully explore all military operational 
planning aspects.  
The analytical model provided a coherent and repeatable means to assess the 
effectiveness of the planning process. The results closely follow the thoughts and actions 
of the six planners who translated national policy guidance into a multiministry action 
plan that was synchronized with the military effort. The analysis started with an 
assessment of the national policy guidance, including the planner’s interpretation of 
national policy and their analysis of the social environment. The analysis then shifted to 
the staff estimates of the threat situation and the associated civil-military activities. This 
phase of analysis focused on the integration of governance with military activities. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Use and validation of the analytical model framework and the naturalistic 
generalization analysis approach promoted trustworthiness.  
Credibility (Construct and Internal Validity) 
 The case study method inherently applies methodological triangulation to merge 
multiple sources of evidence into coherent chains of evidence (Yin, 2014).  Data 
triangulation from the testimony of knowledgeable participants, official government 
documentation, and Pakistani secondary source surveys was accomplished through the 
coding and modeling flow shown in Figure 1. A linear analytical model (Appendix B) is 
embedded in the flow to enhance credibility by providing a systematic framework that is 
repeatable and verifiable.  
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Data saturation further reassured the reliability of the data. The saturation level 
was linked to a representative and purposive sampling of planners with an in-depth 
knowledge of the operation and who were immersed in the same planning effort. With 
purposive sampling and comprehensive interviews, data saturation was achieved with a 
small sampling of six planners who were directly involved in the integrated plan.  
Transferability (External Validity)  
The analytical model promotes transferability to the global Islamist problem by 
organizing the data and conducting analysis along international militancy themes and 
universal doctrinal tenets. The model focuses on process rather than content or actions, so 
the model methodology may be readily applied to other countermilitancy planning 
contingencies. The literature review was written within a global context and the model 
provides a framework that facilitates a worldwide peer review.  
Confirmability and Dependability (Reliability) 
The participants were vetted and selected in a collaborative effort between the 
Pakistan Embassy in Washington, the Pakistani military, Office of the U.S. Defense 
Representative in Pakistan, and me. Their reputations are impeccable and the reliability 
of their testimony was enhanced by a strict adherence to the interview protocol. The 
protocol leveraged the strength of a semistructured questioning methodology that 
promoted data consistency and a depth of exploration with probing follow-up questions 
(Hanson et al., 2011). The stringent interview protocol, qualitative content flow, and 
systematic analytical framework enable other researchers to follow the same study 
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methodology and facilitates their ability to confirm the results. Confirmability was 
bolstered by archiving verbatim transcripts and coded spreadsheets based on propositions 
derived from the literature review (Petty et al., 2012). Verbatim transcripts provide 
quality objective evidence for independent confirmation.   
Swat Valley Case Study Overview 
In 2009, the stability of Pakistan was significantly threatened by the deteriorating 
security situation in the Khyber Province. The Swat Valley within the Malakand Division 
became the focus of Pakistan’s struggle against Islamist inspired militancy. The regional 
terrorist group, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and elements of the 
broader Pakistani Taliban group, Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP), converged in the Swat Valley 
and collaborated with religious extremist elements to exert political influence through 
intimidation and violence. The Taliban goal was to supplant regional civil authorities and 
institute Sharia law in keeping with their radical worldview.  
The militants openly showed contempt for the Pakistani Constitution and directly 
challenged government authority by gaining complete political and social control of the 
Swati Pashtun. The militants called for the overthrow of the Pakistani government and 
the imposition of Sharia law under their terms. Violence in the region erupted between 
the militants, the police constabulary, and the tribesmen who resisted the Taliban 
authority. The Pakistani military attempted to augment the regional police, but the 
militant infiltration was overwhelming. The Pakistani Army reported 142 soldiers and 
230 security personnel killed from August 2008 to December 2008 (Pakistan Operations 
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in PATA and SWAT, 2009). One participant reported that the military was losing more 
soldiers to violence per day that in any other period in the decade long campaign. By 
April 2009, the militants had control over most of the Malakand region. The international 
media portrayed the Taliban encroachment as a direct threat to the national capital of 
Islamabad. The Taliban-led insurgency had the initiative and the Swatis began a period of 
enormous deprivation, persecution, and suffering. 
The escalating violence triggered an unprecedented national response, supported 
by a rare all-party political consensus, to subdue the militant violence and reestablish the 
provincial government authority. Pakistani religious leaders from all denominations 
united against the violence that was inspired by a rogue Islamist faction. After a collapse 
of government negotiations concerning the implementation of Sharia, the militants 
launched a brutal offensive against government officials, security forces, educators, and 
the media. They engaged in violent demonstrations, launched suicide attacks against 
innocents, and destroyed government property. The Taliban banned the media and killed 
several reporters. Many foreign aid workers were kidnapped or killed. Militants targeted 
hotels and restaurants, police stations, intelligence agencies, and military check points. 
Popular support for government intervention grew as the violence escalated. During this 
period, the International Republican Institute (2009) reported that the concern among the 
general population of Islamist militancy reached a three-year peak at over 74%. 
Islamabad responded with an aggressive national countermilitancy operation 
named Rah-e-Rast or Right Path to restore order and reassert the writ of government in 
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the Swat. With widespread support from the Parliament and the populace, the Pakistani 
Army reasserted the government authority and subdued militant violence throughout the 
region. Within eleven weeks (April 26, 2009 – July 15, 2009), Pakistani forces regained 
control of the Swat Valley and killed or captured over 1700 militants, dismantled their 
support network, eliminated their camps and sanctuaries, and recovered huge weapon 
caches. However, the fighting displaced over two million Swatis.  
The military operation created a humanitarian crisis not seen since the mass 
exodus experienced during the partition of India in 1947. Care and protection of the 
displaced persons overwhelmed national resources, but multiministry collaboration and 
coordination showed promise and ultimately the ministries provided sufficient life 
services. On June 12, 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced victory and ordered a 
military cantonment (garrison) to foster an enduring popular trust and confidence in 
government at all levels. Rah-e-Rast represents a key milestone in the continuum of 
countermilitancy operations that showcases the planning nexus between governance and 
military action. 
The Rah-e-Rast operation provides an ideal case to achieve the study purpose: to 
determine the most effective integration of governance to subdue Islamist militancy by 
analyzing the Pakistani operational planning process. The planning and implementation 
of the operation occurred at a critical juncture, representing a pivotal swing in strategy 
from a military dominant antiterrorism approach to an interministry counterinsurgency 
approach. Pakistan’s new strategy embraced many of the doctrinal elements of the neo-
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Clausewitzian theoretical construct, and shaped the associated civil-military planning 
process as a component of the overall military planning effort.  
Case Study Results 
Introduction  
The results answer the research question; how were governance activities 
integrated with military operations during the implementation of Operation Rah-e-Rast? 
Tables 2 through 15 provide a synopsis of the participants’ perspectives and approaches 
to key governance attributes, expressed in contextual themes, and assessed through an 
analytical framework. The tables document first-hand insights into the planning process: 
factors considered, approaches applied, and barriers encountered. The participants also 
describe planning successes, shortcomings, and failures.  
The results section begins with the participants’ interpretations of the national 
policy and guidance concerning the operation. These interpretations are reflected in the 
planning approaches pursued by each participant. Individual approaches often differed 
based on personal biases and experiences. The participants’ assessments of the real world 
contextual environment provides insights into planning priorities—or lack thereof—and 
the adequacy of the process to identify the most important governance activities to apply. 
Results of the integration of governance within the operation are described in detail to 
determine if the planning process efficiently and effectively achieved the right balance to 
achieve success. The last three sections focus on the postconflict planning effort to 
resettle, reintegrate, and reconcile with the Swatis and foster an enduring peace. In 
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summary, the results section follows the planning process from inception, through the 
military operations phase, culminating with the postconflict stabilization period.  
Pakistani Governance Policy  
Government documentary evidence reaffirms that the Pakistani government 
considered the deteriorating security situation in the Swat Valley as a significant threat to 
the State. Pakistan’s 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008) convened an All 
Parties Conference (APC) in October 2008 to address the immediacy of the rising 
violence in Swat. The APC, in a rare display of multiparty solidarity, issued a consensus 
resolution that was adopted on May 19, 2009. The resolution stated that militancy and the 
manifestations of terrorism posed a grave danger to the stability and integrity of the 
Pakistani nation-state. The APC avowed that Pakistan stands united against any militant 
incursions of the Malakand, and called upon all government ministries and the military to 
immediately address the threat (Haq & Malik, 2009).  
The resolution provided the operational framework for planning Rah-e-Rast. The 
national policy objectives were to subdue violence, discredit the Taliban influence with 
the Swatis, and regain the writ of the State. Specific tasks included the re-establishment 
of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, restoration of peace, rehabilitation of 
internally displaced persons, and implementation of economic development. The 
objectives were consistent with Pakistan’s overarching countermilitancy strategy to 
alleviate root grievances stemming from poverty and widespread unemployment 
(Pakistan Strategy for Countermilitancy, 2009). Pakistani policymakers envisioned a 
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collaborative approach by the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries to lead an 
interministry effort to decisively combat Islamist militancy and counter extremist 
ideology.  
National planning guidance. The National Assembly Standing Committee of 
Defense provided strategic guidance and oversight for the operation. The 
countermilitancy strategy evolved to what planners commonly refer to as a 3-D approach 
of deterrence, development, and dialogue. Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT 
(2009), a key planning directive, describes the convergence of military and political 
components to subdue and deter violence, conduct economic development, and establish 
a meaningful dialogue with the militants. At the provincial level, Pakistan Government of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reaffirmed that all elements of national power, political, 
socioeconomic, and military may be applied to eliminate the Taliban menace.  
The Defense Committee was successful in gaining broad political support for the 
operation, and emphasized the importance of sustaining popular support of the military 
during the campaign. To achieve this, all participants recognized the importance of the 
provincial government to be synchronized with the national effort to fully support the 
aggressive military maneuver against the Taliban. Table 2 provides a synopsis of the 
participants’ perspectives on the overarching planning construct for Operation Rah-e-
Rast.  The data were derived from interview Question 2: What was your overarching 
national policy guidance? A follow-up question was included in the analysis: How was 
policy guidance integrated into the campaign plan?   
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Table 2  
Interpretations of the National Planning Guidance  
Participant Interpretations of operation Rah-e-Rast planning guidance  
 
MILA1 
 
 
Promote District governance and reassert the writ of the State by 
reinstating the traditional tribal hierarchy, establishing the rule of 
law, and empowering the elders with resources.  
 
MILO2 
 
 
Reconnect Swatis to the government by protecting them, then show 
immediate signs of social investment. Launch an evenhanded 
military operation and regain popular confidence through 
development. 
 
MILI3 
  
 
Disperse the militants and separate them from the population, then 
re-establish a legitimate local authority. Employ a divide and rule 
approach to win hearts and minds with a hybrid strategy to 
integrate the military campaign with the political dimension.   
 
MILN4 
 
 
Conduct a comprehensive civil-military effort to contain the 
insurgency and address the root causes of militancy. Efforts to be 
coordinated functionally through political, economic, security, 
information, funding, and transnational dynamics. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
Multiministry effort with a sustained military engagement 
supported by strategic messaging. Convince Swatis that it is better 
to a loyal subject than to support militants.  
 
CIV6 
 
 
Apply political measures that foster a meaningful dialogue with 
the Swatis, supported by real socioeconomic development. 
Promote an enduring confidence in the local civil administration.   
 
National guidance finding. All planners understood the National Assembly 
policy directive and strategic framework, but their approaches varied based on individual 
biases and different policy interpretations. The planning process did not adequately 
translate national policy to specific governance tasks or activities.   
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All participants understood the concept of a multiministry approach; however, the 
priorities and methods to develop a joint action plan were left to the discretion of the 
planners. Some respondents focused on district level actions and politics while others 
approached the problem from a national perspective. Some planners stressed the 
importance of governance and others focused on improving national institutions. The 
interpretation differences were largely due to a lack of governance priorities, and a varied 
perspective on the most significant social problems. At the onset of planning, the causes 
of militancy were conjecture, and the activities to address grievances were merely 
anecdotal. Consistent with current planning doctrine, a comprehensive study of the social 
environment was necessary to gain a common understanding of the militancy problem.   
Operational approaches and methodology. The planners’ assessment of the 
Swati social conditions revealed that planning was focused on protecting the population, 
building trust and confidence in government, reforming the legal system from detention 
to prosecution, and investing in economic development. The planning challenge was to 
prioritize potential activities and determine the best value in terms of time and money, 
and both were limited. Table 3 provides a synopsis of the approaches and priorities of 
each respondent as they commenced detailed operational planning. The data were derived 
from interview Question 7: What was your involvement with and perspective on the joint 
civil-military planning process? 
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Table 3  
Perspectives on the Operational Planning Approach 
Participant    Operational approach    Planning priority 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Collaborative multiministry 
approach with strategic 
patience to influence social 
environment.  
 
Foster relationships and build 
confidence with elders and create 
progovernment militias that deter 
violence.  
 
MILO2 
 
 
Countermilitancy approach 
(focusing on people) through a 
sustained multiministry 
campaign.  
 
Use military and police to set the 
security conditions for social 
reform and investment.  
 
MILI3 
 
 
Hybrid civil-military approach 
to disperse militants by 
isolating them politically, then 
reconnect with tribes.  
 
Re-establish the rule of law, and 
win support through a military 
campaign supported by strategic 
communications. 
 
MILN4 
 
 
Comprehensive civil-military 
effort to contain the violence 
and address the root causes of 
militancy.   
 
Coordinate within ministries to 
apply political, economic, 
security, information, funding, 
and transnational dynamics.  
 
MILO5 
 
 
Comprehensive interministry 
response across all agencies 
supported by the international 
community. 
 
Seal borders with international 
help, contain and crush the 
militants, and protect the people. 
Conduct economic development 
to regain popular support. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Apply soft power (diplomacy 
and political reform).  
 
Focus on Pashtun culture 
(Paktunwali) to devise activities 
that resonate with the people. 
 
Operational approach finding. The government policy to apply a civil-military 
approach that included all ministries was understood, but each respondent had a different 
view on ministry roles, responsibilities, and priorities. The government had no formal 
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venue or forum to plan or coordinate interministry activities. A comprehensive analysis 
of the social environment was necessary to determine ministry priorities and coordinate 
government capabilities within a fiscally constrained environment. 
The participants had significantly different perspectives on how to implement the 
civil-military approach. Each participant stressed the importance of connecting with the 
Pashtun people; however, the precise role of each ministry working in coordination with 
the military was not clear. Some respondents focused on establishing physical security, 
such as border security, while others focused on institutional reforms to gain a public 
trust. Other participants placed a greater emphasis on diplomacy and public affairs while 
others focused on infrastructure development.  
The respondents unanimously agreed that a synergy could be achieved with a 
balanced civil-military effort. Each participant realized that the problem required the 
conduct of both military and governance activities to destroy the militants and regain a 
public trust. Most respondents conceded that a further exploration and understanding of 
the social environment was warranted. A comprehensive social assessment would reveal 
the actual contextual conditions that would drive the planning process.  
Real World Contextual Conditions  
The government initiated Rah-e-Rast operational planning within weeks of the 
conclusion of the National Assembly’s All Parties Conference in October 2008. During 
the initial planning, the participants received daily reports of escalating militant violence. 
Militants raided coalition convoys and marauded check points. Suicide bombers, inspired 
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by religious zealots, killed hundreds of soldiers, police, and innocent bystanders. The 
participants explained that the violence created an urgency to quickly plan an aggressive 
move in the Swat. Planners had little time to frame the problem during this phase.   
The planners quickly, albeit methodically, assessed the social environment in the 
Swat District. Planners needed a comprehensive analysis to outline the root causes of 
government dissatisfaction. Each respondent reviewed the social conditions to gain a 
deeper understanding of the most pressing problems. Axial coding of the interview data 
revealed that the Swati social problems were framed within five themes that link directly 
to grievances: a predominant mistrust of government, a dangerous security environment, 
a malicious radical ideology, a lawless society and unfair judicial system, and widespread 
social injustice. All participants recognized the importance of establishing priorities 
within these themes to properly allocate limited fiscal resources and manpower to achieve 
the greatest political and social gains. 
Government trust deficit. The Pakistani National Assembly (2009) reaffirmed 
that the state shall reestablish its authority by instituting confidence building mechanisms 
with customary communities, such as the elder council or jirga. Pakistan SWAT 
Campaign Strategy (2011) also characterized government legitimacy as a major policy 
objective. These directives were consistent with the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical 
construct that emphasizes a strong relationship between the people and their government 
to mitigate the influence of radical elements. The planners understood that the Taliban 
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effectively exploited government weaknesses to exert their influence, and saw an 
opportunity to reverse the trend. 
The participants sought to identify institutional weaknesses that could be bolstered 
to gain favor with the Swatis. In May 2009, the Pakistani Minister of Defense conceded 
that militant antistate activities were paralyzing the civil authorities in Swat. Gallup Poll 
(2011) survey of June 2008 supports this assertion by reporting a three year low of only 
33% public confidence in government. The lack of Swati trust in government was 
indisputable; however, there were notable differences in interpretation concerning the 
aspects of governance that would regain trust. Table 4 describes the participants’ 
interpretations of the trust deficit and their considerations in planning governance 
activities to promote trust. The data were derived from the responses to interview 
Question 3: Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy 
problem. 
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Table 4  
Perspectives on the Popular Trust Deficit With Government  
Participant   Causes of trust deficit     Planning considerations 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Government not providing 
security and quality of life is 
below national standards. 
 
Complement military capabilities with 
economic strength to protect and 
provide for the people. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Destitute and illegitimate 
government with history of 
broken promises…and unequal 
distribution of assistance.  
 
Conduct political reform to eliminate 
corrupt system and gain an allegiance 
through military enabled economic 
development. 
 
MILI3 
 
 
Political parties were 
disorganized and corrupted by 
family oligarchies who seek 
power without purpose.   
 
Offer Pashtun representation and 
participation in governance.  
Devolution of government to empower 
provincial and local authorities. 
 
MILN4 
 
 
Poor quality of life, lack of 
security and legitimacy due to 
disenfranchised tribal elders. 
 
Protect and resettle the internally 
displaced people. Promote political 
legitimacy through tribal jirgas. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
Poor governance. Institutional 
neglect empower the Taliban. 
Passive Pashtun were 
disenfranchised. 
 
Form an inclusive government and 
counter the militant call for jihad. 
Improve Pashtun quality of life to 
prove a viable alternative. 
 
CIV6 
  
 
No popular confidence in 
security forces or the civil 
administration.  
 
Restore popular trust in security 
forces by reforming security teams.  
  
Trust in government finding. The planning process adequately identified causes 
of popular mistrust in government, but the planning protocol was insufficient to develop a 
coherent confidence building strategy. Political corruption and popular 
disenfranchisement were identified as major grievances, but the participants differed on 
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the manifestation of these issues. Some respondents suggested that an inept and 
untrustworthy government created a leadership void for the militants to assume, while 
others believed that it promoted social instability that encouraged violence. The 
difference in perceptions would lead to differing governance solutions, and the planning 
process did not sufficiently link potential solutions with root causes.  
Most respondents suggested that the political mistrust was systemic and a 
significant barrier to reassert national authority in the region. Some participants favored 
economic investment, while others pursued legal or political reform. All agreed that 
stemming political corruption would foster trust, but only if it resulted in positive social 
change and real development within the villages, and this would take time to achieve. 
The participants generally understood that pursuing government reform to bridge the trust 
deficit, such as eliminating corruption or offering inclusive representation, required a 
long-term strategy beyond the scope of the forthcoming operation. Therefore, most of the 
planning effort focused on regaining confidence at the District level by reestablishing the 
traditional tribal jirga system and affording the Swatis a voice in government.  
The Taliban’s brutal methods of governing and draconian enforcement of Sharia 
law offered a strategic opportunity. During the time of the operation, despite the 
widespread mistrust of politicians, a World Public Opinion survey reported that 70 % of 
Swatis preferred national government, and only 5% preferred the Taliban (World Public 
Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis, 2009). The planners leveraged the Swati 
cynicism toward the Taliban by devising actions that offered immediate protection from 
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their brutality. This included a greater presence of police and military security forces and 
the temporary resettlement of the people in well-resourced displacement camps until the 
operation was completed. Offering the Swatis a measure of near-term security would go 
far to pull them away from the militants. 
Security environment. In April, 2009, a vicious cycle of violence ensued in the 
Swat Valley after the collapse of the government negotiations with the militants. The 
Taliban began a spree of criminal activities, such as stealing livestock, berating men 
without beards, and impressing teen males into their ranks. They also stole vehicles 
belonging to government officials and ransacked the offices of local nongovernment 
organizations. Police withdrew to their stations, and the militants began patrolling the 
villages to assert their authority and enforce Sharia law. In response, government troops 
in and around the Malakand poised for a major offensive. New American Foundation in 
Tankel (2010) reported that 69% of the tribesmen perceived a lack of security as the most 
important factor in undermining government authority.  
In contemporary doctrine, establishing a safe and secure environment is a vital 
precondition to exercising any governance activities. Interministry efforts and activities 
can only be pursued and sustained in a relatively benign environment. Pakistan 13th 
National Assembly of Parliament (2008) reaffirmed that the safety of civilians was 
paramount and operations may include provisions to minimize harm to the noncombatant 
population. Table 5 provides a synopsis of the participants’ perspectives on the security 
situation prior to operations and the linkage of violence to the planning effort. This data 
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were derived from Interview Question 4: How did you coordinate the government’s civil-
military ability to counter militants operating in Swat Valley? 
Table 5  
Perspectives on the Swat Valley Security Situation  
Participant     Security Situation   Planning Considerations 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Lack of security. Tribesmen 
traumatized by militant intimidation 
by illegally occupying government 
buildings…and attacking police.  
 
Coordinate police constabulary 
and military effort to prevent 
innocent deaths and protect 
schools. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Persistent violence created social 
instability and a psychological 
strain. People suffering from trauma 
– most pronounced with children.  
 
Establish secure environment 
with capable security teams and 
provide adequate healthcare 
resources to reduce stress. 
 
MILI3 
  
 
Militants rendered government 
ineffective by intimidating or killing 
elders and threatening politicians. 
Warlords escalate violence to divide 
the tribal hierarchy.   
 
Reduce fear among public to 
disable the militant authority. 
Reinvigorate local administrative 
structure and government 
institutions. 
 
MILN4 
 
 
People grieving the martyrdom of 
security personnel and family. 
Maintaining the safety and security 
of civilians is the first priority. 
 
Protect the people and eliminate 
militant infrastructure and 
leadership before pursuing 
economic development.   
 
MILO5 
 
 
Militants pursued targeted killings, 
the destruction of government 
buildings, and attacks on police 
posts. Islamabad responded with 
massive bombing and shelling that 
posed a risk in itself.  
 
Change perceptions. People were 
torn. Brutal militant actions 
generate resentment and 
disproportionate government 
actions portray military as an 
occupier rather than protector. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Militant brutality and coercion 
against innocents was significant, 
but Swatis were disenchanted with 
the Taliban because of brutality.  
 
Leverage popular mistrust with 
militants by offering improved 
government services to draw the 
people away from the violence.   
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Security finding. The planners were adept in determining the proper balance 
between using a force of arms and applying governance activities to subdue the militant 
threat. Some respondents cautioned that an overambitious military response risks 
inducing unwarranted fear. This portends the selective and judicious use of military force, 
and the integration of local militias, to plan a balanced and proportional response. The 
planning success of integrating a measured military response with governance activities 
that afforded protection and life quality services was particularly noteworthy.  
The Swatis became disillusioned with the militants who exercised a brutal and 
unjustified use of violence. The Taliban fostered a dangerous security environment and 
most Swatis feared for their lives. Tribal elders attempted to reassert their authority by 
organizing lashkars (private militia loyal to tribal elders) to counter the Taliban savagery. 
The lashkars began torching the houses of Taliban commanders and vowed to fight them 
until they were expelled. Several tribal elders proclaimed that anyone found sheltering 
militants would be fined and their homes would be destroyed. The violence escalated and 
clashes erupted between the Taliban and a growing number of progovernment factions. 
Many civilians were killed or displaced in the crossfire, creating over two million 
displaced Swatis who emerged from the valley to escape the Taliban brutality.  
The opportunity to leverage the Taliban brutality against them became a primary 
focus of the planners. One respondent explained that the people blame the Taliban twice 
as much as they criticize the generals. During this period, 86% of all Pakistanis agreed 
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that the Taliban militants posed the most serious threat to the country—not India 
(International Republican Institute, 2009). This was the highest level ever surveyed. The 
planners considered the dangerous security situation to be the most significant challenge 
for the police constabulary and military. However, some participants suggested that this 
offered an opportunity to bolster popular confidence by protecting the vulnerable 
population in crisis. Capable civil-military teams established checkpoints, enforced 
curfews, and targeted suicide terrorists. The military working with their civilian 
counterparts exploited the Taliban atrocities through strategic communications via social 
and conventional media. The objective was to characterize the Taliban as villains, and 
characterize the police and the military supporting them, as saviors.  
Foreign military integration finding. The planning process did not adequately 
integrate foreign military assistance. Most participants reported that external support 
from the United States merely complicated the situation, and joint planning coordination 
was necessary to prevent mutual interference. Advances in Pakistani government 
credibility with their people were often undermined by violations of territorial integrity 
from Allied strikes within Pakistan’s borders.  
The participants generally considered foreign intervention as a barrier to regaining 
popular support. Throughout this period, the United States and their Allies conducted 
several military ground and air raids (mostly drone attacks) against key Taliban leaders 
and militant strongholds throughout the region. Some respondents reported that military 
gains were often negated by unilateral U.S. attacks that compromised Pakistani 
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sovereignty. To appease an incensed population, Islamabad provided tacit approval for 
the attacks, but openly scorned the U.S. for violating its sovereignty. Pakistanis generally 
believed that the government was not doing enough to protect its sovereignty. World 
Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reported that during this period, 
82% of Pakistanis believed drone attacks to be unjustified and not in their national 
interest, and 79% felt that the Allied bombing of Taliban elements within Pakistan was 
not justified. Some participants cautioned U.S. advisors that a close coordination was 
necessary to prevent strikes from derailing the government efforts. 
Radical Islamic influence. The militants effectively used radical religious 
ideology as a call to mobilize against the government and foreign invaders (U.S. and their 
Allies). Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009b) survey in early 2009 reported 
that 76% of Pakistanis were concerned or somewhat concerned with Islamic radicalism 
and only 12% were not concerned. The militants invested in madrassas that professed 
radical doctrine that inspired violence against established institutions. Table 6 provides 
the participants’ insights into the role of radical ideology in the militancy situation. The 
data were derived from the responses to interview Question 3: Please share your views 
on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem. 
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Table 6  
Perspectives on the Social Impact of Radical Ideology  
Participant     Impact of Radical Ideology    Planning Considerations 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Militants use ideology to recruit young 
warriors. Radio and social media used 
to inspire young men to clash with 
security forces. 
 
Requires constant rhythm of 
strategic messaging to counter 
the ideological view. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Radical ideology is center of gravity of 
the social environment. Although the 
Swatis are moderate, radicalism was 
used as a rallying cry for militancy. 
 
Address and reform madrassas 
by strangling financial resources. 
Invest in conventional schools. 
 
MILI3 
 
 
Militants appealed to popular religious 
sentiments by proclaiming a “foreign 
intrusion” that is forcing conflict 
between infidels and Islam. 
 
Use strategic messaging to 
profess that this is not a war with 
the West, but an internal struggle 
for legitimacy.  
 
MILN4 
 
 
Militants infiltrated the military and 
promoted killings in the name of Islam 
to inspire sectarian violence within our 
ranks to weaken us. Madrassas were 
important recruitment areas that 
provide venues for militant planning.  
 
Prevent zealots from leveraging 
the distorted ideological view. 
Eliminate radical scholarship. 
Draw a wedge between militants 
and moderate religionists.  
 
MILO5 
 
 
Militant leaders used radical ideology 
to malign the government that they 
claim supports an un-Islamic legal 
system and only seeks power.  
 
Promote legal and political 
reform to counter the misguided 
ideological message. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Madrassas were centers of hate where 
religious scholars control students 
through coercion. Radical teachers 
were unable to articulate a coherent 
vision or exercise leadership.  
 
Counter with a positive message 
that leverages the conservative 
majority that rejected most of the 
radical ideology. 
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Radical ideology finding. The Taliban effectively recruited militants using radical 
ideology as a rallying cry. The planners identified ideology as a major factor, but the 
planning process was ineffective in devising activities to neutralize its impact on 
influential young tribesmen. Participants disagreed on whether radicalization stems from 
the madrassas or from multimedia messaging, but the recruiting impact was clear. This 
resulted in actions to block radical messaging and invest in traditional education. 
Conversely, the government was uncertain concerning madrassa radicalization, and 
reform became a controversial topic.  
All respondents agreed that a long-term strategic messaging campaign and 
educational reform initiative to counter the radical ideology was necessary. Some 
planners focused on the media to counter the radical messaging in real time, while others 
focused on a longer term approach to invest in traditional education as a preferred 
alternative to madrassas. However, madrassa reform remained elusive. Three respondents 
were adamant that the madrassa influence was not a significant factor. Despite the true 
role of madrassas in radicalization, most participants agreed that the government 
education system had failed, and a renewed investment in schools would be a significant 
enabler in the overall effort. Strategic messaging and education reform would both 
become significant lines of effort during the Swat campaign.   
Pakistani jurisprudence. The absence of a fair and impartial legal system 
undermined the national and provincial governance in the region. Pakistan’s 
constitutional judicial system did not meet the Pashtun expectations. Since the golden 
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days of the Swat Wali, or traditional governor, the Swatis place the utmost value on the 
rule of law and a swift and just legal system. The Wali had established an effective 
network of Qazi courts administered by a religious scholar and based in sharia law known 
as Dasturul Amal.  The antiquated Federal Crimes Regulations (FCR) established by the 
British and based on common law (foreign to the Swatis) during the time of the British 
Raj is inconsistent with their Paktunwali customs. In a December 2008 survey, Gallup 
Poll (2011) reported that only 39% of Swatis had confidence in the national judicial 
system. Many Swatis turned to the Taliban that offered a swift form of justice (Sharia) to 
alleviate disputes and deter criminal elements. Most lawmakers recognized that legal 
reform would bolster public confidence and perhaps disable the militant cause. 
The government attempted to rectify the lack of law and order by issuing the 
Nizam-e-Adl Regulation on March 15, 2009. Planners attempted to create what the 
Pakistani military calls “social space” to gain operational planning and preparation time 
by appeasing the militants. The regulation imposed Sharia in the Malakand and ceded 
control of large swathes of land to the Taliban. The Taliban controlled courts were 
allowed to decide all cases. The government agreed to release captured militants, even 
those responsible for public executions and rape. In return, the militants pledged to end 
the violence. The government thought that appeasing the Taliban in exchange for a 
pledge of peace would be successful. Table 7 provides s synopsis of the planner’s view of 
the lawless situation and planning considerations to redefine the legal system. The data 
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were derived from interview Question 3: Please share your views on the causes and 
effects of the Islamist militancy problem. 
Table 7  
Perspectives on Jurisprudence System in the Swat Valley 
Participant       Causes of Lawlessness    Planning Considerations 
 
MILA1 
 
  
 
Unwarranted search and seizure. 
Police stop citizens without warrant 
or probable cause, but elites never 
see court room. 
 
Reform system from police 
apprehension and detention to 
prosecution. Provide resources, 
proper training and equipment.  
 
MILO2 
 
 
No access to speedy justice. Lack of 
a professional cadre of lawyers and 
judges to administer justice. 
 
Resource and reform legal system 
consistent with Pashtun cultural 
and religious values - Paktunwali. 
 
MILI3 
 
 
No political accountability for legal 
proceedings that were poorly 
executed. Chaos absent a fair 
justice system…and Swatis turned 
to sharia system for law and order. 
 
Reform political and legal systems 
and discredit militant authority… 
a long-term proposition. 
 
MILN4 
 
 
Slow and corrupt Federal courts. 
Swatis perceive Taliban justice as 
superior to slow and corrupt 
Federal courts.  
 
Reform legal systems and discredit 
militant authority. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
Judicial system inefficient. Many 
Swatis yearn for return of the Wali, 
whose rule was renowned for equal 
justice.  
 
Legal system reform and 
incorporate best elements of the 
Wali system that resonate with 
tribesmen. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Timely justice elusive. Cases may 
take years, even decades, which 
empowers militants that promise 
swift Sharia justice.  
 
Expedite due process and 
incorporate elements of Sharia to 
gain Pashtun tribal support. 
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Federal jurisprudence finding. Swati confidence in the national legal system was 
low due to corruption, lack of accountability, inefficiency, and inequity. The ineffective 
judicial system was a valid grievance, and may be reformed by competent officials 
backed by adequate resources. Legal reform fell short of the national goal, creating a 
missed opportunity to bridge the government trust gap. 
The government attempt to reform the antiquated Federal Crimes Regulations by 
implementing the Nizam-e-Adl regulation was an indisputable failure. The deal 
unraveled when confidence in the newly founded Sharia system wavered. Militant leaders 
rejected the Islamic courts outright, placing the blame on corrupt government-appointed 
judges. In addition, the militants violated the agreement by refusing to lay down their 
arms. One respondent reported that the “hope of peace and order” among the people was 
shattered when the Taliban enforced their distorted view of Sharia. Swatis were horrified 
when a videotape surfaced showing Taliban enforcers publicly whipping a 17-year-old 
girl accused of adultery. The girl had not committed any offense, but was flogged simply 
because she refused her family's demand to marry someone of their choosing. The public 
flogging of this young girl created a severe uproar in Pakistan and inspired a worldwide 
condemnation of Taliban inhumanity. All participants agreed that the failure of Nizam-e-
Adl and the subsequent Taliban atrocities provided enough justification for the military to 
execute Rah-e-Rast and commence an all-out campaign to neutralize them. 
The Nizam-e-Adl failure created a significant opportunity for the planners. The 
subsequent Taliban atrocities weakened militant popular support and initiated a vicious 
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cycle of animosity among the tribes. The government could leverage that animosity. 
Before the Swat operation, International Republican Institute (2009) found most Swatis 
(72%) supported the Nizam-e-Adl peace deal with the extremists. After an extended 
period of militant violence and brutality, popular support of the agreement flipped. By 
April 2009, the World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis (2009) reported 
that only 21% of Swatis approve and 63% disapprove of Nizam-e-Adl. The Swatis were 
convinced that the militants could not be trusted to keep their word, and this presented an 
opportunity to bridge the trust gap. Since comprehensive judicial reform would take time 
and significant resources, the planners generally considered the effort to be beyond the 
scope of Rah-e-Rast. However, the planners agreed that a long-term investment in the 
legal system would yield enduring returns in trust and confidence.  
Social injustice and inequities. Poor social and economic conditions were major 
tribal grievances. Promises of social investment and development often resulted in little 
real activity. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that the 
Khyber Province experiences the highest incidence of poverty in Pakistan with 39.2% of 
the population characterized as poverty stricken, 41.1% in rural areas. Broken promises 
resulted in Swati cynicism in government. New American Foundation in Tankel (2010) 
reported that the Pashtun believe the greatest social problems in Khyber province include: 
lack of jobs (82% very important), lack of schools/education (73% very important), lack 
of good roads and transportation (82% very important), and poor healthcare (92% very 
important). Table 8 provides a synopsis of the participant’s perspectives on the social 
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environment. The data were derived from interview Question 3: Please share your views 
on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy problem. 
Table 8  
Perspectives on Social Injustice and Militancy  
Participant         Social Injustices         Planning Considerations 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Poor education. Swatis value 
education and do not have access 
to quality schools. 
 
Rebuild destroyed schools and afford 
access to all children…particularly 
young girls. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Social inequality. Society elites 
have access to a high living 
standard within secure residential 
areas. Common people do not 
have such access. 
 
International investment by NGO 
donors such as USAID, UK department 
of international development, UNICEF 
and the World Bank. Use military to run 
the programs. 
 
MILI3 
 
 
Poverty. Absence of economic 
opportunity discourages younger 
generation, making them 
susceptible to radicalization.  
 
Investment in social reform to 
demonstrate that the government 
provide for the future.  
 
MILN4 
 
 
Social neglect. Tribal tension and 
a poor economy enable militants 
to operate. Severe social neglect 
fuels radicalization. 
 
Socioeconomic and human resource 
development, creation of equal 
opportunities and optimal utilization of 
resources in a sustainable manner. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
Unemployment and lack of 
education create militants. Most 
militants were unemployed, 
uneducated, and landless tenants. 
 
Rebuild the educational system by 
reopening the Swat University with 
programs in agriculture, politics, 
forestry, and conflict resolution.   
 
CIV6 
 
 
Economic disparity. Sense of 
deprivation seduces new recruits 
and inspires violence as a means 
to force social change. 
 
Ministry of Finance accelerate 
economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Improve accountability 
through tax and financial reform. 
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Social impact finding. The planning process readily identified infrastructure 
development opportunities, but did not prioritize or adequately fund economic 
development. Social inequities and poverty directly correlated to the popular support of 
the Taliban who promised hope for the desperate. The opportunity to invest in 
socioeconomic development to gain a popular trust was hindered by inadequate 
interministry planning and insufficient fiscal resources. 
All respondents believed an investment in economic development was crucial to 
shifting popular support to government, but this was problematic for a poor nation. Some 
participants realized that international community assistance was required to augment 
meager national resources. This required an international coordination effort where aid 
and assistance would be solicited from government or nongovernment organizations and 
then fairly distributed to high priority projects. Most respondents reported that 
establishing project priorities was elusive and political corruption prevented aid from 
reaching those who could make a difference. Some respondents suggested that resource 
allocation and oversight should reside with the military, considered the most trustworthy 
federal institution. An improved aid distribution process supported with accountability 
would promote positive results. 
Governance and Military Integration 
Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) presented an overarching civil-
military strategy based in intelligence gathering to achieve the national policy objectives. 
The strategy involved the deployment of military forces while simultaneously conducting 
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select governance activities to support the military maneuver. The military campaign was 
extensive and involved an unprecedented three Pakistani Army Divisions. Given the 
disparity of focus and methods as previously described, the planners adopted an 
evolutionary operational term to describe the planning approach, called Targeted 
Intelligence Based Operations. The concept was based on establishing an extensive 
intelligence network within the region to identify and find the militants, protect the 
Swatis, and apply smart political reform and economic development to gain the enduring 
allegiance. Intelligence gathering was the key to success.  
The integration plan included three main phases with subcomponents. The first 
phase consisted of a civil-military campaign that was designed to destroy the militant 
capacity to wage war, establish security, and protect the Swatis during the operation. This 
included two military lines of effort: to provide an extensive relief effort to relocate the 
Swatis in well-provisioned displacement camps, while the Pakistani Army pursues a 
direct military assault against the militants. The second phase consisted of a Swati 
rehabilitation and reintegration campaign to return the displaced persons to their homes 
and reconnect the tribal society with the mainstream government through political reform 
and socioeconomic development. The third phase consisted of a long-term Taliban 
reconciliation and de-radicalization campaign to address root grievances and draw the 
younger Pashtun generation away from the extremists by countering the radical ideology.  
Synopsis of the military operation (April-June, 2009). This study focuses on 
the planning process rather than military maneuver; however, a brief synopsis of the 
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military operation is provided for context. Operation Rah-e-Rast began on April 26, 2009 
when paramilitary troops and helicopter gunships bombed Taliban strongholds. The 
military offensive would be executed in force involving over 30,000 soldiers. The 
operational objective was to kill or capture an estimated 5,000-7,000 Taliban in the Swat 
Valley. By connecting with progovernment Swatis, the military gained valuable 
intelligence before the general forces began operations. Prime ambush locations were 
scouted well in advance, and military conducted maneuver in large formations to deter 
ambushes. On April 29, Army forces advanced into adjacent districts to secure a critical 
line of communication into Swat. The Taliban quickly recognized that a large number of 
special operating forces and airborne troops were attacking, and started a collapsing 
defense into the Swat Valley. On May 3, the rapidly advancing Pakistani military 
assembled at the main entrance to the valley.   
The Army conducted a massive three-pronged air and ground offensive on May 7, 
2009. Swat’s emerald mines were secured by the 50th Airborne Division as the militants 
retreated to the hills and the capital city, Mingora. The Pakistani 19th Division/10 Corps 
supported by the insertion of Navy Seals advanced from the northeast into the Shangla 
Valley. Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were inserted by helicopter from the 
Northwest into the adjacent Peochar Valley to conduct seek-and-destroy missions. The 
XI Corps would advance from the Southwest to secure Mingora, and then advance 
through the valley. Soldiers approaching from three directions surrounded the militants to 
eliminate the possibility of escape. The combined forces then delivered a crushing blow.  
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Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) reported that fighting was 
particularly fierce since the Taliban recognized the unusual determination of the massive 
offensive. Surprising to the Army, the Taliban resorted to conventional frontline warfare 
rather than guerilla tactics. The military conducted extensive air strikes, artillery 
bombardment, and rocket attacks by helicopter gunships. Commandos were continuously 
inserted into known militant strongholds—and some were captured and beheaded. The 
Taliban prepared for a bloody urban battle against airborne forces by concentrating forces 
in Mingora—digging trenches, laying mines and taking positions on rooftops. Special 
Forces engaged in fierce urban fighting where the Taliban made fortresses of government 
buildings and hotels. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 
over 2.5 million fled in panic causing a significant humanitarian crisis (United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009).  
The Pakistani military regained control of Swat and declared the offensive over 
on June 14, 2009. Key cities, such as Mingora, were retaken in a week and only sporadic 
fighting occurred in the outskirts. According to Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT 
(2009), more than 1,700 Taliban militants were killed with a loss of more than 800 
soldiers killed and about 3000 wounded during the operation. At least 37 of the militants 
killed were Libyan, Uzbek, and Saudis linked to al-Qaeda. The military subdued the 
remaining small pockets of resistance.  
Swati assistance in identifying plain clothed militants during the final stages of 
the operation proved extremely effective. The tribesmen heralded the Army and they 
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helped them distinguish between reconcilable insurgents and those who were relentlessly 
dedicated to jihad; however, some militants escaped. The military reported an insufficient 
capacity of helicopters to guard valley approaches, and many Taliban repositioned to 
adjacent safe havens (Haq & Malik, 2009).  Security forces bombed and destroyed the 
headquarters of the Taliban leader, Maulana Fazlullah, but he evaded capture due to gaps 
in intelligence (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, 2009).  
Intelligence based military operations. The civil-military support planning 
would focus on gaining intelligence to identify the militants and protect the Swatis. 
Progovernment lashkar militias and the Frontier Corps were integrated with the military 
to solicit assistance and information from the Swatis, tired of the Taliban brutality. The 
planners segmented this phase into three main subcomponents: use of intelligence to gain 
a strategic advantage, strategic communications, and protection of displaced persons. 
First, a robust intelligence network was crucial to minimize collateral damage to persons 
and property. Second, the planners implemented a national strategic communication plan 
to inform the people of the government’s intentions, and alleviate their fears by providing 
detailed instructions for their safe transit away from the fighting. Third, the planners 
planned and organized humanitarian assistance for displaced persons well in advance. 
Every effort to protect the population would be taken. Table 9 provides a synopsis of the 
operational construct and individual efforts. The data were derived from interview 
Question 8: Is Pakistan’s countermilitancy doctrine adequate, or could it be improved to 
leverage the government interministries? 
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Table 9  
Approach to the Military Operational Campaign   
Participant   First line of effort Second line of effort  Third line of effort 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Border control 
measures to isolate, 
and weaken militants. 
Push militants out of 
strong positions and 
away from population. 
 
Identify and destroy 
militant enabling 
hubs. Daylight Air 
campaign with precise 
targeting to minimize 
collateral damage.  
 
Establish security 
checkpoints to prevent 
militant movements and 
isolate and protect the 
Swatis. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Special Forces connect 
with local leaders to 
gain intelligence on 
militant strongholds. 
 
Frontier Corps recruit 
lashkar militias to 
directly assist ground 
forces. 
 
Isolate Valley by 
containing militants and 
draw them away from 
urban areas. 
 
MILI3 
 
 
Established joint 
border bases. Protect 
important logistics 
nodes. 
 
Mobilize the tribes 
and reform lashkar 
militia who would 
join the govt. fight. 
 
Selective air and ground 
offensive targeting 
leadership with minimal 
collateral damage.  
 
MILN4 
 
 
Encircle militants with 
blocking forces.  
Isolate foreign 
interference.  
 
Special Forces 
integrate lashkars. 
Quick snap actions to 
nab high value targets. 
 
Counter narcotics effort. 
Identify routes, destroy labs 
and remove traffickers 
from influential positions. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
Seal the borders. Trap 
militants. Establish no-
go areas to buffer the 
militants from people.  
 
Disrupt militant 
support lines. Reform 
and coordinate 
w/local security to 
disable infrastructure.   
 
Eliminate militant 
sanctuaries. No safe harbor 
to fight another day. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Eliminate cross border 
smuggling. Destroy 
caches of arms and 
ammunition. 
 
Unleash major 
counterinsurgency 
assault to dislodge the 
militants… limit 
collateral damage. 
 
Eliminate militant cash 
crop–drugs. Alternate crop 
development a long-term 
strategy.  
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Campaign approach finding. The planning approach to the military campaign 
was varied and multifaceted. Although the Pakistani military was guided by the general 
counterinsurgency principle of isolating the people from the militants and then destroying 
their capacity to fight, the approaches differed among the planners. Some respondents 
leveraged the use of lashkar militias, while others focused on the deployment of regular 
troops. The conceptual method to isolate the valley varied from a network of checkpoints, 
blocking remote trails, to only guarding main entrance and exit points. Both direct action 
and indirect action was aimed at destroying a myriad of militant enabling nodes such as 
key leadership, cash crops, and arms caches. During the operation, the operation was so 
massive that all the aforementioned approaches and methods were applied. The most 
common theme for success was the effective use of intelligence.   
 Use of intelligence. Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) directed 
the exploitation of intelligence to identify and destroy the militants. Since the militants 
were irregular forces without uniforms or other identifying features, determining their 
strength or whereabouts was problematic. Protecting the Swatis, isolating the militants, 
and destroying their capacity to wage war would require a constant flow of information 
from insiders, or human contact, combined with remote sensor or signals data to 
corroborate the enemy disposition. Table 10 provides a synopsis of the critical elements 
of intelligence, and their preferred collection methods. The data were derived primarily 
from interview Question 9: How did the joint planning team shape the social 
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environment in Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist 
militants? 
Table 10 
Approach to Gathering and Using Intelligence  
Participant  Critical Elements of Intelligence   Gathering Method 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Conduct intelligence sharing 
between Ministries to infiltrate 
militant ranks and determine 
enabling capabilities.  
 
Connect with local lashkar 
militia to identify who was 
friend and who was foe. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Prevent militant recruitment and 
identify militants within displaced 
person camps.  
 
Use Special Forces to infiltrate 
camps, deter recruitment, and 
identify enemy.  
 
MILI3 
 
 
Gain popular trust in local 
government by connecting with 
elders and Pashtun at large. Trusted 
officials were scarce. 
 
Use Frontier Corps to infiltrate 
valley to gain trusted Pashtun 
agents.  
 
MILN4 
 
 
Reestablish confidence in security 
establishment by identifying 
criminals. Criminal and militant 
elements operate with impunity.  
 
Infiltrate and reform security 
institutions to alleviate 
corruption and regain popular 
support.  
 
MILO5 
 
 
Distinguish friend from enemy. 
Distinguish irreconcilable militants 
from those who will turn was vital to 
reconciliation effort. 
 
Empower tribal leaders to 
influence potential recruits by 
fostering a renewed hope. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Foster a positive public opinion and 
by identifying threats. Protect 
operating forces by determining 
ambush locations in advance.  
 
Build trust with lashkar militias 
to promote communication. 
Train lashkars to protect the 
lines of logistical support. 
 
138 
 
 
 
Intelligence impact finding. Intelligence significantly contributed to assuring 
public safety and minimizing collateral damage, but fell short of locating and detaining 
top militant leaders. Special Forces leveraged intelligence to receive valuable targeting 
information for precision munitions. General purpose forces swept the valley and 
eliminated subordinate militant leaders with the help of lashkar militia and tribal elders, 
but many top leaders escaped. There was some evidence of intelligence-sharing between 
government agencies and departments; however, the efficacy of an intelligence planning 
cell and extent of collaboration cannot be fully assessed.   
The effective use of intelligence improved Swati confidence in military 
operations, a key neo-Clausewitzian tenet. Taliban atrocities created a convergence of 
popular opposition to militant rule that created an opportune set of enabling conditions to 
undermine and destroy them. Intelligence flowed from disgruntled Swatis who revealed 
militant strongholds and dispositions. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project (2009b) 
reported that during Rah-e-Rast, there was a complete reversal in Pakistani attitudes 
toward the use of military with 53% in support and only 24% in opposition. By the end of 
the operation, favorable ratings of the military escalated to 89% and an unfavorable 
military view dropped further to 12%. The Army’s favorable conduct of the operation set 
the conditions for a successful implementation of governance.  
Strategic communications. The use of strategic messaging to counter the radical 
ideology and provide a viable alternative was an important component of the operational 
plan. On June 1, 2009, President Zardari emphasized that the war against militancy was a 
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total war and each section of society may, “defeat the mindset that nurtures militancy” 
(Associated Press in Haq & Malik, 2009, p. 53).  Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public 
Relation (ISPR) communicated a unified government message to confront “Pakistan’s 
war” rather than “America’s War” by effectively broadcasting via electronic media, cell 
phones, and radio to promote tribal support. Some participants emphasized that social 
media progressed rapidly, and success largely depended on delivering information 
quickly and accurately.  
Pakistan Operations in PATA and SWAT (2009) provided planning guidance that 
supported local media and regional broadcasting, protected radio towers, and 
disseminated meaningful information. The messaging focused on popular grievances and 
exposed militant atrocities. All participants agreed that accurate messaging was important 
to eliminate the government “say-do” gap, meaning that the military actions on the 
ground had to match government promises. Table 11 provides a synopsis of the different 
messaging objectives and the broadcasting methods. The data were derived from 
interview Question 9: How did the joint planning team shape the social environment in 
Swat Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants? 
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Table 11 
Perspectives on Strategic Communications  
Participant      Strategic Message     Delivery Method 
 
MILA1 
 
 
 
Militants were violent and 
government will protect you. Swatis 
advised to leave valley before 
military operations to reduce 
potential casualties.  
 
Leverage technology by using 
social media to communicate 
with the tribes. Engage with 
decisive military when militants 
pursue extreme violence. 
MILO2 
 
 
Islamabad will provide for you and 
for a better future. Approach the 
youth through media to counter the 
extremist ideology. 
Use Inter-Services Public 
Relations press releases to 
alleviate fears by providing 
detailed safety instructions 
MILI3 
 
Military engaging to protect you 
and the land. Synchronize ground 
operations with strategic messaging.  
Conduct media campaign to 
discredit militant leaders. Block 
militant FM broadcasts.  
 
MILN4 
 
 
Militant leader Fazlullah does not 
share Pashtun values. Counter 
militant radio announcements that 
intimidate teachers and school girls. 
 
Use psychological operations-
leaflets to warn tribes of the false 
hopes, misguided path, and ill-
conceived jihad.  
MILO5 
 
 
Militants were harming your women 
and families. Taliban reduced the 
social status of women by beating 
girls and closing schools. Use that 
information to our advantage.  
Reach disparate Swatis through 
word of mouth in the villages. 
Reach influential Swatis 
connected to the global economy 
by cell phones/computers.   
 
CIV6 
 
 
Promote and enhance the true 
Islamic faith and condemn the 
perversion of Islam. Soldier’s 
actions must match the rhetoric. 
Exploit radio networks that reach 
the most remote locations. 
Military action must not conflict 
with the broadcasted information.  
 
Strategic communications finding. The planning process adequately 
synchronized positive national messaging from multiple sources and at all levels: 
strategic, operational, and tactical. The military emphasized training the rank-in-file to 
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understand the messaging, and to ensure that actions on the ground were consistent with 
the government dispatches. The planners developed and implemented innovative ideas to 
broadcast a positive message. Participants reported that communication methods ranged 
from using social media (where available), exploiting cellular telephone messaging, using 
conventional radio and television, and even leveraging the word of mouth from village to 
village.  
National messaging to promote government legitimacy and enhance public safety 
was effective. The Swatis responded favorably to a government appeal to recognize the 
tremendous sacrifices of the nation, economically and politically, to defeat the extremist 
threat. The Ministry of Religious Affairs rallied religious scholars and educators to 
promote tenets of the true Islamic faith that embraces education and the arts (Government 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). At the District level, tactical messaging enhanced safety 
by providing specific transit instructions and life sustenance information for displaced 
persons. The military rank-in-file were familiar with the transit instructions and 
effectively implemented the plan. Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, Weber, & Lewis 
(2009) reports that during Rah-e-Rast, 72% of Swatis were confident in the way the 
government was dealing with the situation. 
 Countermessaging finding. National messaging to uncover the harmful effects 
of the radical ideology effectively isolated the militants from the tribe. Taliban 
unfavorable ratings increased from 33% to 70% during the operation (Pew Research 
Global Attitudes Project (2009 a, b). Strategic messaging revealed the moral bankruptcy 
142 
 
 
 
of the radical worldview. National broadcasts exposed the militant intransigence in an 
attempt to undermine their support base. Video broadcasts of teenage girls being flogged 
by Taliban leaders for going to school or committing trivial violations against Sharia 
tenets were uncovered. Broadcasts showed the militants destroying ancient statues of 
Buddha and prehistoric rock carvings, calling these antiquities un-Islamic. The militants 
prohibited vaccinations, and the government exposed the health risks associated with the 
misguided message (Mohammad, 2009). The Taliban purged everything considered to be 
evils including dancing, music, and female education. To gain esteem, the government 
exposed these draconian dictates. The Swatis, who value education for all children, 
became disillusioned with the militant rhetoric and responded by publicly opposing 
Taliban authority. Public opinion decisively turned against the militants.  
Information operations finding. Information operations to block Taliban radical 
messaging were partially effective. Militant use of widespread FM radio communications 
were blocked, especially the viral broadcasts of militant leader Maulana Fazlullah called 
“the radio mullah.” Two participants reported that the Taliban use of FM channels was 
largely rendered ineffective by army special forces who took control of key radio and 
television nodes. Many Swatis rallied to his cause by gaining inspiration from occasional 
FM radio sermons from highly mobile, low-cost and low-tech transmission sites. Some 
participants attribute the collapse of the Fazlullah’s support base to the destruction of his 
messaging outlets. Government dominance of all Taliban communications was 
unachievable, but controlling most enemy messaging outlets proved decisive. 
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Swati resettlement and rehabilitation campaign. The second phase of the 
campaign consisted of a plan to safely transit and protect the Swatis in well provisioned 
camps, and then return them to their homes after the operation. In April 2009, the 
Ministry of the Interior encouraged all Swatis to evacuate the valley with all that they 
could carry, sending approximately 2 million Swatis fleeing south into established camps 
or to join with relatives. The volume of displaced persons overwhelmed the capacity of 
the government.  
The military formed a Special Support Group (SSG) on May12, 2009 to directly 
support the rehabilitation effort. The ad-hoc military led group was an interservice unit 
that coordinated the efforts of military engineers and logisticians, civil government, and 
international donors to systematically care for and safely return the displaced Swatis. The 
SSG was severely under resourced, but achieved some success in synchronizing 
international assistance. The provincial government proved to be of minimal help, and the 
pervasive political corruption at all levels diverted badly needed resources away from the 
rehabilitation effort. Despite the barriers, the planners worked diligently to coordinate 
and restore life quality services. By July, the Interior Ministry announced that all the 
displaced persons could return home. 
Resettlement of the Swatis. Planners designed the resettlement program to 
provide life services and protection with capable and well-trained security forces within 
well-provisioned camps. Participants explained that the Taliban atrocities, that became 
the most significant catalyst for change in support against them, could be reinforced with 
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a cogent resettlement plan. The plan highlighted safety with a goal to relocate, protect, 
and resettle Swatis quickly and efficiently. Local lashkar militias would be constituted to 
provide valuable threat intelligence and guard vulnerable travelers. Securing the lines of 
communication in and out of the valley would ensure a safe exodus of innocents, while 
preventing the militants from escaping to adjacent regions. The military considered it a 
significant challenge to secure all the transit routes in and around the valley, especially 
with insufficient helicopter surveillance capability. The participants recognized that safe 
movement of over two million IDPs was extremely risky, but the success of the entire 
operation hinged on their safety.    
The quick and safe return of the Swatis was a national imperative. President 
Zardari explained to all Pakistanis, “We have been emphasizing upon the world that 
rehabilitation of the internally displaced people is the most critical element of the fight 
against militancy” (“Rehabilitation of IDPs”, 2009, para. 19). The preponderance of 
media reports claimed that the militants had melted away, at least from the urban areas, 
but they were still a formidable force in rural districts. The mayor of Swat, Jamal Nasir, 
was concerned that remaining militants still posed a dangerous threat, especially to 
landowners who were vulnerable to Talban intimidation and outside the reach of security 
forces. The mayor called for a significant military presence to protect returning Swatis. 
All participants reported that this became the most significant part of operation. One 
participant referred to it as, “the nations’ greatest-ever humanitarian challenge.”  
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Rehabilitation of the Swatis. The combined government and international 
community effort to care for the displaced persons was massive and the resettlement 
created a significant humanitarian crisis. President Zardari remarked, “The issue of 
rehabilitation of displaced persons was a huge challenge before the nation which should 
be met through the collective effort of the people, the government, and the international 
community” (“Rehabilitation of IDPs”, 2009, para 7). Some participants expressed 
concern that local security forces had to be in place before sending Swatis home or else 
the gains of popular confidence achieved in rehabilitation would be squandered. 
Although the military reported that the valley was cleared of militants, many Swatis did 
not translate “clear of militants” to “safe for civilians.”  Some participants reported that 
during the initial phase, the persistent mistrust in government created skepticism and a 
reluctance for many to return home. Consistent with neo-Clausewitzian thought, it was 
the military’s job to convince the Swatis that it was better to be a Pakistani citizen than a 
Taliban supporter—and to accomplish this, they may conduct actions to promote their 
popular perception as a protector. The safe passage of Swatis to their homes was a test 
that offered a great opportunity. Table 12 depicts the guiding principles to ensure public 
safety. The data were derived from interview Question 5: Do you believe that government 
policy adequately addresses Pakistan’s integration of governance with military 
operations to subdue the militancy problem? 
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Table 12 
Approach to Resettle, Protect, and Repatriate the Swatis  
Participant   Resettlement       Protection     Rehabilitation 
 
MILA1 
  
 
Protect the Swatis by 
safely by relocating to 
well provisioned and 
protected camps. 
 
Garrison the valley to 
supervise development 
and establish long-term 
relationships. 
 
Safely return Swatis 
Increase military 
presence with 
Frontier Corps.  
 
MILO2 
 
 
Create camps 
supported by 
ministries. IGOs and 
NGOs augment food, 
shelter, and water.  
 
Prevent militant 
infiltration into camps. 
Lessen risk of uprising 
or recruitment through 
intelligence. 
 
Leverage NGOs to 
provide direct 
support during 
migration in 
Islamabad’s behest. 
 
MILI3 
  
 
Establish 35 camps 
managed by the Army 
with consideration for 
cultural sensitivities.  
 
Provide Humanitarian 
Assistance. Coordinate 
with NGOs and USAID 
to provide basic needs. 
 
Coordinate 
multiministry effort 
to repatriate and 
sustain the Swatis. 
 
MILN4 
  
 
Special Support 
Groups coordinate 
with Finance Ministry 
to resettle tribe: 
ensuring safety and 
rehabilitation. 
 
Garrison to build 
relationships, including 
ex-Taliban. Military 
start infrastructure 
projects, protected from 
militant interference. 
 
Return the displaced 
persons safely to 
their homes… and 
protect them during 
journey. Build trust 
through military.  
 
MILO5 
  
 
Sustained care for the 
IDPs. Quick response 
needed to maintain 
public confidence. 
 
Garrison capital of 
Mingora with Army to 
provide extended local 
security.  
 
Manage NGO 
investment: USAID, 
UNICEF, and the 
World Bank.   
 
CIV6 
 
 
Protect Swatis by 
migrating to secure 
camps. Move quickly 
to resettle families. 
 
Military get out among 
the people. Garrison 
with checkpoints to 
isolate and protect. 
 
Provide financial 
assistance. Leverage 
US/international 
monies. 
 
147 
 
 
 
Rehabilitation impact finding. Superb planning for the resettlement and 
rehabilitation of millions of Swatis was a crowning achievement. The sustained all-
government effort included a safe resettlement provided by the military and life services 
(rehabilitation) provided by the ministries working with nongovernment organizations. 
Some participants reported that bureaucratic processing, persistent shortages of supplies, 
and political bickering were significant hurdles; however, the overall effort was 
successful due to international assistance. Haq and Malik (2009) reported that the U.S. 
government (USAID) worked directly in support of Pakistani Special Forces to distribute 
aid to the temporary camps. The U.S. provided nearly $246 million in humanitarian aid 
including nearly $82 million in USAID-Office of Disaster Assistance (OFDA) funding. 
The European Union and Japan joined the effort and pledged $150 million more. Despite 
the inflow of international investment, supplies were sometimes scarce and sanitation 
poor. Although weaknesses in bureaucratic processes resulted in inefficiencies, the safe 
passage of displaced families promoted confidence and greatly facilitated postconflict 
stabilization programs.  
The combined government and international community resettlement effort made 
a significant impact on the lives of the Swatis. Over two million displaced persons were 
resettled in 35 camps or vacated schools for protection and sustenance, and many others 
sought refuge with family or friends. By August 2009, only 3 months after the operation 
commenced, over 70% of the displaced families had returned to their homes in the Swat 
(United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). The Army 
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and their auxiliary Frontier Corps managed to effectively protect and care for the people 
with few deaths or injury. Most participants reported that the return of the displaced 
persons was safe and orderly.  
Despite a successful resettlement, some respondents expressed a significant 
concern of a tribal backlash. A vocal minority of Swatis perceived the national response 
to be lethargic, and the massive international effort risks undermining government 
credibility. Deploying too many government troops might generate excessive collateral 
damage that could tip the balance of support to the militants. An overaggressive military 
presence might fracture fragile agreements with neutral Taliban affiliates. Some 
participants reported that coercive sorting and favoritism toward politically connected 
Swatis turned many against the government and promoted militant recruitment. Militant 
infiltration into the camps was prevalent, and the threat of an uprising was ever-present. 
The government planners attempted to counter these second order effects.  
Intelligence impact finding. Intelligence was effectively used to prevent militant 
recruitment and disable influence within the internally displaced person camps. Most 
participants described the importance of intelligence to prevent militant infiltration, 
influence, or recruitment. Lashkar soldiers were embedded in the camps and used as 
informants. The operation was designed to draw the militants away from the camps and 
into urban areas (away from built-up-areas or BUAs) where precision strikes would 
effectively target militants, but preserve innocent lives and property. To protect Swati 
families with serving soldiers, Pashtun servicemen with a tribal attachments were 
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excused from duties. If elders discovered that these soldiers took up arms against fellow 
tribesmen, the entire family was at risk of death or injury. The military largely met the 
people’s expectation for safety and protection, and the aforementioned negative effects 
were never realized to any great extent. 
Post conflict surveys showed a significant rise in support of the Pakistani military 
due to the success in eliminating the Taliban threat while protecting the Swatis. Some 
participants reported incidents where tribesmen sought retribution against the militants: a 
positive sign that the military was gaining the trust of the tribe. In October, 2009, the 
International Republican Institute (2009) reported that 79% of Swatis desire the military 
to govern them and 70% support pursuing Taliban fighters in all tribal areas. Pew 
research data showed a consistent trend reporting a 60% support for the military during 
the postconflict phase, a significant increase in support previously reported to be 43% 
before the operation (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2009a). After the Swatis 
returned home, and with government popular support on the rise, all respondents 
acknowledged the great opportunity to reintegrate the Swatis into Pakistani society.   
Swati reintegration campaign. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(2010) emphasized reintegration through the attainment of a secure, just, and prosperous 
society by way of socioeconomic and human resource development. The government-run 
Khyber Development Authority was formed to expedite the development of human and 
natural resources, and develop reconstruction opportunity zones to promote commerce. 
The strategy included Public-Private Partnerships to establish industry, promote 
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agriculture, and develop natural resources. At the strategic level, the main effort was a 
restoration of fundamental rights of the Swati citizens via a just legal system, equal 
opportunity employment, and equal access to services (Pakistan 13th National Assembly 
of Parliament, 2009). At the operational level, the critical elements of the plan included 
investments in education, health, agriculture, urban development, trade, and energy.   
The aggressive reintegration plan would require a whole-of-government 
approach, and all respondents recognized that the resource intensive effort would be 
long-term. Data analysis revealed three main investment venues to bolster public 
confidence in government: an immediate investment in public education, improvements 
in healthcare, and long-term investment in life quality infrastructure and services. Table 
13 depicts the reintegration initiatives and the data were derived from interview Question 
6: How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military activity? 
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Table 13 
Approach to Reintegrate the Swatis into Pakistani Society  
Participant     Education      Healthcare  Economic 
Development  
 
MILA1 
 
 
Education reform. 
Rebuild destroyed 
schools and afford 
unlimited access.   
 
Reopen hospitals and 
improve infant mortality 
and reduce disease.  
 
Build local 
governance 
framework. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
No comments. 
 
Invest in healthcare, 
Swatis value health and 
modern medicine. 
 
Limit international 
contributors to 
prevent undermining 
govt. authority.  
 
MILI3 
 
 
Education 
investment by 
reopening schools 
destroyed or closed 
by the militants. 
 
No comments. 
 
Conduct economic 
Development to 
demonstrate govt. 
commitment and 
dedication. 
 
MILN4 
 
 
Support Education 
Ministry during 
reconstruction.    
 
Counter the Taliban 
degradation of health 
services. Afford access 
to female doctors and 
promote dignity. 
 
Socioeconomic 
development to 
complement military. 
High visibility hydro-
electric investment. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
Rebuild the 
educational system 
by reopening the 
Swat University.  
Focus on conflict 
resolution. 
 
Rebuild healthcare 
infrastructure destroyed 
by the militants.  
 
Expedite development 
of human and natural 
resources. Public-
Private Partnerships to 
promote industry and 
agriculture. 
 
CIV6 
  
 
Institute National 
Action Plan for 
Madrassa reform. 
 
No comments. 
 
Conduct economic 
stimulation. Invest in 
the national power 
grid. 
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Reintegration impact finding. The planning process did not adequately establish 
social development priorities or match infrastructure projects with the most pressing life 
quality issues. The Swati reintegration plans were noble, but under resourced and beyond 
the financial capacity at the provincial or national levels. Despite the meager investment, 
the infrastructure projects positively influenced public opinion. 
All participants suggested that the reconciliation plan was a good one; however, 
the resources to carry out such a strategy were lacking. Planners worked with the 
ministries to quickly allocate and implement the funds, although all participants 
recognized that return on these investments would not be seen for several years. Pakistan 
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported the annual Swat Valley 
expenditures included 11 billion Rs. (110 million US dollars) on security, 26 billion Rs. 
(260 million US dollars) on education, 4 billion Rs, (40 million US dollars) on health, 
and 3 billion Rs. (30 million US dollars), on roads, water, agriculture, and industry 
combined. Most participants agreed that the expenditures were not enough to adequately 
provide services to the national standard. All respondents expressed concern that the 
investments would be short-lived, but conceded that they were making a difference in the 
short-term. A post operation poll conducted by World Public Opinion in Ramsay, Kull, 
Weber, & Lewis (2009) showed that over 70% of Swatis were confident in the 
government’s revitalization effort, and only 7% support the Taliban return.  
Education infrastructure. The government seized an opportunity to leverage the 
strong desire of the Swatis to educate their children. In January 2009, the Taliban 
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announced that the Pashtun had to stop sending girls to schools. They threatened tribal 
leaders who refused to heed the warning, announcing that schools would be bombed and 
girls that attended schools would be killed. The militants proclaimed that female 
education was against Islamic teachings and spreads vulgarity in society. Hundreds of 
schools were destroyed, and thousands of teachers lost their jobs—over 80 thousand 
children were left without a school.  
Education impact finding. Investments in public education were limited by fiscal 
constraints, but the achievements resonated with the Swatis. The Swatis value education, 
perhaps above all other institutions, therefore rebuilding the degraded educational system 
provided a valuable opportunity to reconnect government with the tribes. Public Opinion 
in Pakistan's Tribal Region (2010) reports that 73% of Swatis believed education to be 
the most important governance issue. The Ministry of Education reversed the school 
closings and worked with security forces to protect the remaining infrastructure. Over 
350 schools and colleges were rebuilt, but many remained decrepit, forcing children to 
study in open fields. The provincial authorities built temporary classrooms during the 
interim period. The Khyber Education Minister also directed teachers to resume their 
duties. Over 21,000 students, including girls, were enrolled in makeshift schools within 
the displaced population. Education standards in the Malakand improved markedly, 
literacy increasing from 37% to 47% in the year of the operation (Pakistan Government 
of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013).  
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Healthcare infrastructure. Taliban harassment and degradation of the primary 
healthcare centers afforded another opportunity to defame the militants and shore up 
public confidence. The militants prohibited polio vaccination campaigns for children, and 
many women healthcare workers were targeted and killed (Din, Mumtaz, and 
Ataullahjan, 2012).  Women were forced to deliver family planning and health services at 
the home since extremist ideology restricted their ability to work openly in public. Din 
estimates that 29% of health facilities in the Swat District were destroyed. Health workers 
were systematically killed as they worked to save wounded tribesmen loyal to the 
government. The Taliban shamed female workers on radio broadcasts and subjected them 
to forced marriages, kidnappings, and death. All respondents reported that the militants 
applied a combination of fatwas (religious decrees), threats, and physical assaults that 
extended even to their children. One fatwa stipulated that it was a Muslim’s duty to 
kidnap female workers, to marry them forcibly or abuse them as sexual slaves.  
Healthcare impact finding. Investments in healthcare bolstered public confidence 
in government and discredited the Taliban. The Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation 
and Settlement Authority, working with the military and District Commissioner, 
instituted a plan to reopen and upgrade health care facilities as security improved 
(Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). Working with nongovernmental 
organizations such as UNICEF, the provincial authorities reinstituted quality health 
services. Large percentages of children received vaccinations and psychological 
counseling. Thousands of expectant mothers were provided delivery kits and direct 
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assistance. The government offered free medical care to the poor and significant 
improvements were made in emergency response capacity. Public Opinion in Pakistan's 
Tribal Region (2010) reported that 91% of Swatis believe that improving healthcare was 
the most important governance achievement. To this end, the military worked diligently 
with the private and public institutions to normalize the regional healthcare institutions.  
Physical infrastructure. The government created a Provincial Reconstruction, 
Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority (PaRRSA) to coordinate the multiministry 
rebuilding effort. The Authority developed an effective Malakand Comprehensive 
Stabilization and Socioeconomic Development Strategy that sought to address the 
underlying grievances fueling the unrest and to provide equal access to resources through 
partnerships between the government, civil society and the private sector (Pakistan 
Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production, 2012). The Khyber rehabilitation 
plan focused on three main investment sectors: hydro-electric power, water distribution, 
and road development (Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2013). Enhancing 
the power grid throughout the Malakand was considered a key enabler and included a 
multiyear plan to invest in two power plants at Machai and Ranolia. The plants added 20 
megawatt electricity to the national grid and reduced power rates. The Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa Oil & Gas Company was established to oversee the national effort to 
construct three new major hydro-electric projects. One participant reiterated the benefit of 
large visible project with considerable social impact over several small village projects 
that have limited benefit and are soon forgotten.  
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Infrastructure impact finding. The military working with the District 
Commissioner facilitated highly visible private-public projects provided a dual benefit of 
creating employment and fostering public confidence. Economic development had the 
combined effect of regaining popular confidence by improving life quality, and 
preventing radicalization by offering desperately needed employment opportunities. 
Power grid and flood control investments had an immediate impact. The construction of 
agricultural water channels and new dams solved a persistent regional water management 
problem. New dams helped manage annual rains to increase the regional water supply for 
potable water, sanitation, and irrigation. The provincial government pursued the 
development of agriculture for food production with an emphasis on aid to small farmers. 
Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported that about 75% of the 
province was dependent on agriculture, especially the poorest households.  
The government enhanced regional economic prosperity by improving the 
transportation nodes. The Khyber province created a special Urban Policy Unit to assist 
in provincial transportation planning and facilitate interprovincial coordination to gain 
synergy among investors. Pakistan Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2010) reported 
that 44% of provincial roads and 78% of Swat roads were in poor or bad condition after 
the operation. A concerted effort to improve existing road conditions by repairing 
damaged roads, constructing new links, and upgrading current transportation grids 
boosted commerce within the Malakand. As a result, 478 kilometers of roads and 11 
bridges were constructed, but the demand for road transport expanded at a faster rate than 
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economic development. Two participants reported that the military worked with Swati 
business leaders to secure and upgrade the most vital transportation nodes to prevent the 
militants from disrupting vital commercial hubs.  
Swati reconciliation and de-radicalization. The objective of this phase of Rah-
e-Rast was to reconcile with the Pashtun, de-radicalize the militants, and promote an 
enduring national allegiance from the reformed militants. To accomplish this, the 
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority pursued a dialogue 
with tribal elders to address root grievances, and a de-radicalization plan was initiated to 
change perceptions. The government restored the traditional tribal hierarchy to empower 
the elder leaders (Maliks), and marginalize the Taliban-backed holy men (Imams). Once 
the government stabilized the tribal system, a series of negotiations addressed the 
longstanding causes of dissatisfaction. In parallel, rehabilitation centers reformed active 
militants by changing their radical worldview, especially among young men.  
Tribal reconciliation. Pakistan’s 13th National Assembly of Parliament (2008) 
promoted reconciliation to address grievances with Swatis who pledged support for the 
Pakistan Constitution. The tribesmen often found themselves caught between an 
oppressive Taliban who demanded allegiance through coercion and the provincial 
government that required allegiance, but provided poor services. Most respondents 
reported that the Taliban tactic of coercion and intimidation provided an opportunity to 
reconcile. Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) outlined a plan to dialogue with the 
elders, backed by investment to promote credibility. As a guiding principle for 
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negotiations, the National Assembly espoused the rights of Swati citizens as equivalent to 
those of the Pakistani majority. Table 14 depicts the participant’s planning construct. The 
data were derived from interview Question 6: How did you apply and integrate 
governance principles with military activity in the execution of Swat operations? 
Table 14  
Approach to Reconcile with the Swatis  
Participant    First line of effort      Second line of effort 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Restore the tribal hierarchy. 
Empower elders and marginalize 
the Taliban backed Imams. 
 
Countermilitancy training to 
observe Paktunwali to gain hearts 
and minds of the moderate sector. 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Isolate tribe from foreign 
radicalized elements. Spill-over of 
foreign fighters promotes a Jihadi 
culture. 
 
Form small unit bases manned by 
well-trained security forces, 
enforcing curfews and connecting 
with the people to gain confidence.  
 
MILI3 
 
 
Realize human rights for the most 
vulnerable through partnerships 
between the government and 
private sector. 
 
Educate and train jawans (junior 
soldiers) in nation building to win 
the popular hearts and minds.  
 
MILN4 
 
 
Empower Maliks and marginalize 
Imams. Reestablish the tribal jirga 
system and start a dialogue. 
 
Respect human rights and political 
inclusion to enable reconciliation. 
Government build relationship 
with reconcilable militants.  
 
MILO5 
  
 
Protect Swatis with a minimal 
force of arms. Prevent widespread 
arrests, targeted assassinations, and 
aggravated militant massacres. 
 
Reform resource allocation and 
tax policy to gain confidence. 
Prevent collusion between citizens 
and tax officials who erode trust. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Institute National Action Plan to 
implement confidence building 
measures. 
 
Restore and reactivate the tribal 
jirga to replace the Taliban 
governance system. 
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Reconciliation impact finding. The Army and Frontier Corps, working with the   
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority, effectively 
implemented near-term tribal confidence building measures and reconciliation activities. 
In the void of leadership created by the militant defeat, the government was able to 
reconstitute the traditional tribal jirga system. The provincial government reasserted tribal 
control under their oversight within one year of the operation. 
The Pakistan SWAT Campaign Strategy (2011) directed that the Pakistani Army 
occupy the valley for one year, then cede control back to the Swatis supervised by the 
provincial authorities. Senior officials formed a provincial APEX committee (civil-
military coordination cell) to coordinate military security operations, empower the tribal 
hierarchy, and reform the judicial system. The government reactivated the tribal jirga to 
supplant the Taliban shadow governance system. The committee frequently consulted the 
maliks on policy and transferred governance from the military back to tribal control.   
The provincial government planned the orderly transfer of power from the 
military to the tribal jirga. Pakistan Current Countermilitancy Operations (2015) 
emphasized a strict observance and respect for culture and traditions. Soldiers attended 
familiarization training in Paktunwali. Soldiers ensured that government directives and 
activities were consistent with tribal customs. The police protected places of worship and 
tribal meeting areas from militant attacks. Some respondents reported that soldiers were 
previously perceived as foreigners to the Swatis, but cultural awareness training paid off. 
All participants reported that the soldiers were well-versed in Paktunwali, and they 
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adhered to stringent rules of engagement that afforded protection. Troops were locally 
garrisoned to build relationships and provide responsive security. Some respondents 
reported that tribal relationships provided a social buffer to militant influence.  
Militant de-radicalization. To complement reconciliation, the Provincial 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority initiated an aggressive de-
radicalization program. The program had two main components, a continuing dialogue to 
address grievances and a retraining program for young active militants. Pakistan SWAT 
Campaign Strategy (2011) prescribed an inclusive negotiation process that emphasized a 
national dialogue condemning extremism. The document outlined the importance of 
using persuasion rather than coercion to reconnect to the people. In conjunction with 
negotiations, de-radicalization schools were established for vulnerable youth. 
The Pakistani Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education focused on 
rehabilitating young militants. The government established a joint venture between the 
Pakistani Army, private foundations, and UNICEF to care for juveniles who were rescued 
by security forces. Most of the candidates were recruited from families who were unable 
to pay Taliban tax levies, and became paid suicide bombers. About one-third of the 
children were turned in by their parents, one-third were apprehended by security forces, 
and one-third surrendered themselves. The students were lodged in rehabilitation centers 
located in Mingora, locally called Sabawoon, and in Bara Tehsil. In-resident students 
received quality education in ethics, patriotism, and the true meanings of Islam. Medical 
professionals, especially psychologists and psychiatrists, worked alongside social 
161 
 
 
 
workers to reintegrate them back into mainstream society. Table 15 provides a synopsis 
of the respondents’ expectations concerning de-radicalization. The data were derived 
from interview Question 6: How did you apply and integrate governance principles with 
military activity in the execution of Swat operations? 
Table 15  
 Approach to De-radicalize Active Militants  
Participant     First line of effort      Second line of effort 
 
MILA1 
 
 
Advanced training for police to 
institute militant de-radicalization 
programs and replace military to 
lessen tensions. 
 
Support de-radicalization centers 
to return reconcilable militants 
back into mainstream society. 
 
 
MILO2 
 
 
Replace Army governance with a 
competent civil authority and 
support de-radicalization centers. 
Political dimension important. 
 
Encourage reconciliation with 
insurgents who vow to break with 
extremist groups, especially 
foreigners aligned with al-Qaida.  
 
MILI3 
 
 
Promote dialogue to instill 
cooperation among the tribes. 
 
Prevent the return to Taliban rule. 
 
MILN4 
  
 
Establish de-radicalization centers. 
Prevent human rights abuses within 
the centers. 
 
Negotiate w/reconcilable militants. 
Release captured militants in 
return for pledge to cease violence 
and surrender weapons. 
 
MILO5 
 
 
De-radicalization program to 
rehabilitate young men prone to 
suicide bombing. Provide 
counseling and religious education.  
 
Reunite families and provide 
economic opportunity. Ministries 
assist with search and unification 
of divided families. 
 
CIV6 
 
 
Strength through negotiations 
rather than military force. Address 
root causes and provide legitimate 
alternatives. 
 
Establish a national narrative to 
condemn all extremist militancy 
and delegitimize the extremist 
worldview.  
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De-radicalization impact finding. Planning for the establishment of joint civil-
military de-radicalization centers was innovative; however, the effectiveness of the 
overall de-radicalization program remains uncertain. De-radicalization programs were 
initiated immediately after military operations concluded. Sabawoon and several centers 
in Bara operated with the assistance of the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps supported 
by the privately operated Hum Pakistani Foundation and UNICEF. One participant 
reported that more than 102 of a total 177 youngsters between the ages of 12 and 17 were 
released from Sabawoon and over 600 at Bara after completion of their reformatory 
courses. The respondent lauded the performance of the center that reintegrated the former 
militants into society after receiving behavior training. However, most participants 
remained skeptical of program success. Some respondents suggested that de-
radicalization will ultimately fail in the absence of a national narrative to condemn all 
radical elements. Some participants preferred the Secretary of the Interior’s effort to 
focus on madrassa reform (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and 
Transparency, 2009). Two respondents reported that madrassa reform provided a dual 
benefit: to de-radicalize current students and directly prevent recruitment.  
To augment the de-radicalization effort, most participants believed that the 
government may redouble efforts to publicly condemn the extremist worldview. The 
national government needed a meaningful dialogue to change public perceptions of the 
war. Gallup poll (2011) revealed that public perceptions concerning ownership of the war 
were divided, with 37 % of Swatis believing it to be Pakistan’s war, 39 % considering it 
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to be America’s war, and 22 % believing both had a shared stake in the outcome. 
However, a few respondents were convinced that a public condemnation of radicalism 
would not change militant behavior. Hardcore militants were not willing to compromise 
Sharia law, nor were they willing to concede or share governance. One respondent 
reported that it is difficult to get the militants to negotiate at all. However, survey data 
showed that there was hope that an ongoing discourse will promote peace. A poll by Al 
Jazeera and Gallup Pakistan revealed that Swatis prefer to reconcile rather than endure an 
extended military campaign (Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, 2011).   
Summary of Swat Campaign Findings 
The findings provide clear evidence that governance activities were productively 
integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy during Operation Rah-e-
Rast in 2009. The national policy guidance to assimilate ministry activities was cogent, 
but the planners faced some significant challenges. The planning process did not 
ascertain governance priorities nor identify the most promising socioeconomic 
investments or institutional reforms. The planners differed in their approaches to identify 
the right governance activity at the right time to subdue militancy and achieve an 
enduring peace. The findings provide insights into the planning barriers and suboptimal 
processes that may provide a catalyst for doctrinal change. 
The national policy objectives were well understood by all participants; however, 
their solutions varied based on individual biases and policy interpretations. Strategic 
guidance findings revealed that the planning process did not adequately address 
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translating national policy to a coherent implementation of governance activities. The 
planners skillfully designed a hybrid civil-military plan, but each participant had a 
different view on governance priorities and methods. The national government had no 
formal venue or forum to plan and coordinate interministry activities. The operational 
approach findings exposed that a comprehensive analysis of the real world contextual 
situation was necessary to determine priorities and coordinate limited government 
capabilities to improve the social conditions within a fiscally constrained environment. 
Despite a lack of ministry coordination, the application of governance significantly 
contributed to subduing militant violence. The use of force findings showed that 
integrating a measured military response with effective governance effectively destroyed 
the enemy while fostering a trust in government. At the provincial level, the government 
achieved this by affording protection and providing life quality services during the 
operation. The planners were adept in finding the proper balance between using force and 
exercising governance.  
Participant testimony supported by government metrics reaffirmed that the 
campaign instilled calm to the valley, ending the recurrent bombing of schools, police 
stations, and hospitals, and the public beheading of opposition leaders. The intelligence 
impact findings revealed that the planning process took full advantage of intelligence to 
identify and locate the militants while minimizing collateral damage. Intelligence 
planning empowered ministries to disable militant support networks, enable lashkar 
militia units, and prevent militant recruitment within the displacement camps. As a result, 
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the militants were effectively neutralized in the valley, and their capacity to reconstitute 
was diminished.  
The Swat operation reestablished peace in the valley; however, maintaining 
provincial government control remains a challenge because tribal grievances were not 
fully addressed. The trust in government findings confirmed that the Swatis remain 
optimistic of district governance, but skeptical of national authority. The government 
established tribal control with provincial oversight within one year of the operation, but 
the slow progress of political reform and economic development undermined government 
credibility. The military working with the District Commissioner empowered the 
traditional tribal jirga to fill the void left by the militant leadership, but the establishment 
of a stable political environment remains elusive. The social impact findings revealed that 
the government missed an opportunity to foster public confidence by inadequately 
resourcing infrastructure projects. Planners have differing perspectives of the most 
pressing social issues, and the planning process failed to adjudicate the differences.  
The consensus resolution goal to fully reestablish the writ of the State was 
hindered by the lack of political reform and intrusive foreign intervention. The federal 
jurisprudence finding showed that judicial system reform initiatives have fallen short, and 
local civil governance requires military protection and oversight. The elders viewed 
military intervention into tribal affairs as inconsistent with traditional values and 
historical lines of authority. The foreign military integration findings revealed that public 
confidence was further undermined by Islamabad’s tacit approval of foreign support, 
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most notably allowing U.S. drone strikes, which caused an unnecessary loss of lives. The 
planning process did not adequately address the proper synchronization of Allied military 
support. Advances in Pakistani government credibility were often negated by violations 
of Pakistani territorial integrity from Allied strikes.  
The consensus resolution goal to use public messaging to counter radical ideology 
contributed to mission success. The strategic communications findings revealed that 
positive messaging to condemn Taliban brutality and solicit national support was helpful 
in shifting the dialogue in favor of Islamabad. As confirmed by the reconciliation finding, 
the Swati perception of the military changed from invader to protector, and laid the 
foundation for reconciliation. National and regional messaging from multiple media 
sources provided valuable information to the Swatis that afforded protection during the 
resettlement, but changing public perceptions requires a long-term effort. The 
information operations finding showed that a considerable effort was required to block 
the Taliban propaganda from many media outlets. The countermessaging finding 
confirmed the political benefits of exposing the Taliban atrocities; however, the planners 
needed a better process to craft an enduring strategic narrative. Nationally controlled 
media adequately revealed the harmful impact of the militants’ nefarious actions, but a 
coherent national narrative to condemn jihad and all the radical elements was absent.  
The Parliament’s goal and actions to protect and rehabilitate displaced persons 
significantly reduced the public trust deficit with government. The rehabilitation impact 
findings confirmed that the resettlement and reintegration over two million Swatis was a 
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success. Although weaknesses in bureaucratic processes resulted in service inefficiencies, 
the safe passage of displaced families was the crowning achievement of the postconflict 
stabilization work. The combined Pakistan and international community endeavor to 
maintain security and provide life services fostered a public confidence that enabled all 
other governance efforts. The education, healthcare, and infrastructure impact findings 
showed that despite limited resources, the government’s meager investment in these 
services resonated with the tribes and built a basis for reconciliation.  
The national goal to implement social change and economic development achieved 
limited results. Positive improvements were seen in the rebuilding of educational 
institutions, and the revitalization of healthcare facilities; however, the social impact 
finding revealed that an under resourced economic development plan at the District level 
failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to shift Swati allegiances to the 
government. The reintegration impact findings exposed gaps in service delivery that were 
exploited by the militants attempting to solidify their foothold. The Provincial 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority was responsive and governance 
processes became more transparent, but the accomplishments fell well short of alleviating 
poverty, advancing human rights, or creating employment. The de-radicalization impact 
finding showed that the lack of social development progress created a significant problem 
for post-conflict de-radicalization programs, run by joint military-government 
partnerships. Program administrators found it difficult to regain the allegiances of young 
radicalized Pashtun, and the efficacy of the de-radicalization initiative is uncertain.  
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Chapter 5: Discussions, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The concurrent integration of governance activities with military actions 
significantly contributed to the success of Operation Rah-e-Rast. Although there were 
many barriers and shortfalls in the planning process, the operation represents Pakistan’s 
first successful whole-of-government countermilitancy operation. By June 30, 2009, the 
military cleared the valley of Taliban and the level of violence was subdued to levels 
experienced before the Islamists intruded into the Swat District. After the operation, the 
Swatis enjoyed a safe security environment, a functioning education system, and access 
to healthcare, and a return to tourism and commerce.  
Prior to Rah-e-Rast, the Pakistani military had a mixed record of countermilitancy 
successes and failures; however, the approach to the Swat campaign diverged 
significantly from contemporary military doctrine. The Pakistani Army showed an 
impressive capacity to adapt emerging counterinsurgency doctrine to the militant threat. 
Planners learned from previous failures, resulting in a new hybrid planning approach 
incorporating neo-Clausewitzian prescriptions into the military’s traditional planning 
construct. The union of the Pakistani Army, Swat District Commissioner, and the 
Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority adequately 
implemented a civil-military approach that strengthened the Pashtun confidence in 
government and disabled the militant support base. Conversely, the overall planning 
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process was ad-hoc and suboptimized. Improvements in planning doctrine may facilitate 
future successes in the global Islamist militancy struggle.  
Interpretations of the Findings 
Operation Rah-e-Rast successfully reduced militant violence in the Swat District 
and bolstered confidence in the mainstream government authority. The Swat campaign 
achieved the two main national policy objectives: to eliminate the terrorist threat from the 
Malakand and to protect the Swati people. The Rah-e-Rast planners deviated from a 
traditional counterterrorism approach aimed at destroying militant leadership and support 
nodes and applied a population-centered approach. The planners embraced the tenets of 
neo-Clausewitzian theory by designing a campaign with governance activities that 
reconnected the people to their government and to their military. However, the planning 
team was not optimally postured to translate all the national policy guidance into 
effective and efficient governance action. The analysis of the social environment was 
inadequate, and the prioritization of governance activity supported by sufficient resources 
was not realized. Governance may be methodically pursued by a team of subject matter 
experts knowledgeable in government, the social sciences, and program management.  
The Pakistani national and provincial authorities did not fully achieve all their 
stated objectives. Political reform to afford collective tribal representation, judicial 
reform to provide quick and effective justice, and educational reform remain unresolved. 
The objective shortfalls were linked to the planning process that did not adequately 
identify governance priorities nor properly allocate scarce resources to the most pressing 
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social problems. Policy and doctrine did not provide sufficient guidance to establish 
cross-organizational venues or forums to address root grievances, prioritize governance 
initiatives, and efficiently apply private and government resources in the most productive 
way.  
Despite an ad-hoc civil-military planning process and planning teams with limited 
expertise in governance, the Rah-e-Rast planners performed well. The planners 
innovatively applied strategic communications and intelligence to build meaningful 
relationships between the people and their government. The relationships fostered trust, 
and that trust undermined the militant support base that was tenuously sustained with 
coercion and intimidation. The Swatis readily assisted the military in identifying many 
militant strongholds, and the military responded by providing safe transit and a secure 
environment for the Swatis. The new countermilitancy approach based in neo-
Clausewitzian theory proved to be more effective in subduing militancy than the sole use 
of direct military action. Documented and derived evidence supports the three theoretical 
propositions identified in Chapter 3.  
Concerning the first theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that positive 
governance interactions integrated with protective military activities promoted stability 
between the government, the people, and the military. The stability promoted confidence 
in the Military Commander and Swat District Commissioner that enhanced provincial 
government legitimacy. The operation successfully reestablished the writ of provincial 
authority and disabled the Islamic shadow governance. The military embraced neo-
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Clausewitzian tenets that emphasize protecting the people and establishing enduring 
relationships with social and economic solutions rather than applying a predominant 
force of arms. Pakistani survey data showed a marked improvement in government trust, 
a testament that the new approach was successful in reaching the people. The 
overwhelming defeat of the militants and reduction in violence provided compelling 
evidence that Pakistan’s new countermilitancy strategy worked; however, shortcomings 
in the planning process prevented taking full advantage of the military successes. 
The study results validate Pakistan’s countermilitancy approach, but planning 
effectiveness was not optimized. The National Assembly and the All Parties Conference 
strategic framework provided excellent guidance; however, governance integration varied 
based on individual biases and policy interpretations. The clarity of national objectives 
facilitated a unity of effort and common understanding among the ministries. Conversely, 
the planning process did not sufficiently identify the most important governance 
attributes to pursue–and when to purse them. Governance and military activity were on 
parallel paths to a peaceful end-state, but were merely mutually supporting rather than 
fully integrated. The formation of a joint civilian-military partnership to rebuild destroyed 
infrastructure was a collective success, but reform opportunities were squandered after 
the dissolution of the Taliban authority. 
The planning process did not adequately address translating national policy to 
specific governance tasks. The ministries pursued governance activities that enabled the 
military by happenstance or intuition rather than in an analytical way. One notable 
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example was the approach to alleviate political corruption and disenfranchisement that 
were identified as major grievances. The planners differed on the manifestation of the 
problem. Some participants suggested that corruption fostered violence and a dangerous 
security situation, while others believed that it promoted social instability. The difference 
in perceptions would lead to differing solutions—one military and one sociopolitical—
and the implementation of both solutions were independent of each other.  
Concerning the second theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that the 
renewed confidence in government successfully undermined the Islamist militant support 
base. The findings revealed that the militants were weakened and vulnerable without a 
popular support base, thus enabling a military use of arms to readily destroy them. 
Effective government dissemination of information and use of local media enabled a safe 
and efficient resettling of displaced persons. Public safety increased public confidence 
that precipitated valuable intelligence that contributed to operational successes. The 
military leveraged intelligence to pinpoint militant strongholds and facilitate precision 
targeting to minimize collateral damage and reduce unwarranted deaths. Despite these 
successes, durable political and social reform remains intangible and a barrier to 
sustaining tribal relations. Judicial reform to implement Nizam-e-Adl (Sharia 
jurisprudence) and establish a quick and just legal process fell short, political reform to 
increase inclusivity did not become manifest, and the tempo of economic development 
did not meet tribal expectations. Lack of political and social reform sustains an ever-
present risk to government authority. 
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Operational success in Swat was impeded by an incomplete analysis of the social 
environment. Understanding the social dynamics within Clausewitz's trinity consisting of 
the people, national government, and the military was fundamental. The planners need 
social research to prioritize governance pursuits that are consistent with the cultural and 
religious values of the tribe. This would signify a holistic assessment of the relationships 
within the trinity and the influence of the militants on those relationships. Neo-
Clausewitzian theorists envision that the implementation of governance is directly linked 
to the ability of government to foster trust and achieve legitimacy. The military may 
apply sufficient armed force to suppress militancy; then governance may be pursued 
unencumbered by an unstable security environment. Political and social reform can then 
be sustained after operations or the Taliban authority may reemerge. 
Concerning the third theoretical proposition, the findings confirmed that 
governance enabled military operations in subduing the violence. However, there was no 
evidence to support that governance could fully supplant military action. The planning 
process was adept in determining the right balance between using a force of arms and 
applying governance, but the process was ad-hoc. Neo-Clausewitzian thought emphasizes 
the application of logic and reason to properly apply all elements of national authority in 
balance to counter the chaotic nature of the enemy. This portends a planning process that 
analyzes the social environment and efficiently applies all instruments of national power 
against the threat. The government’s winning of Swati hearts and minds kept the radical 
militant threat at bay with only a discriminatory use of force; however, the fragile peace 
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requires a constant tempo of governance reform. The findings revealed that Rah-e-Rast 
planning did not include a formal process to assess the social dynamics and allocate 
resources accordingly. As a result, near-term military tactics proved successful, but the 
lack of long-term social investments failed to advance important government reform 
initiatives.  
Pakistani planning doctrine did not adequately provide a process to efficiently 
apply an all-government approach in an austere fiscal environment. The study reveals 
that a planning process that establishes governance priorities may optimize the 
application of limited resources. The Pakistani strategic review astutely embraced an 
interministry approach; however, in a fiscally constrained environment, determining 
which governance attributes to pursue proved elusive. Absent a formal prioritization 
process, the planners pursued several programs simultaneously with an unknown sense of 
impact or duration. Governance pursuits were left to interpretation, and the linkage of 
investment to social impact was uncertain. The de-radicalization program validates this 
point. The planning for de-radicalization centers was exceptional, but the success of the 
program is in jeopardy due to an uncertain commitment to resources and manpower.  
The Pakistani military successfully adopted a population-centered approach to 
countermilitancy; however, formal training on the approach remains ad-hoc. Provisional 
training proved instrumental in achieving operational success. Soldiers were schooled on 
Pashtun cultural sensitivities, and small unit formations easily operated among the 
people. Conventional military doctrine advocated massive firepower—both from the air 
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and with artillery—but the military applied it judiciously to minimize collateral damage. 
The Army shifted focus to community protection by working with the District 
Commissioner, lashkar militias, local police, and the Frontier Constabulary. These 
tactical adaptations reaffirmed the neo-Clausewitzian theoretical tenets that local security 
and community relations were paramount in this environment, but embedding these 
tactics, techniques, and procedures into the mainstream civil-military continuum of 
training and education remains elusive.   
The planning process did not take full advantage of foreign economic and military 
assistance. The Pakistani people frequently misinterpreted the military support from the 
United States because many events were not coordinated with Pakistani ground 
operations. Joint planning coordination was necessary to prevent mutual interference. 
Advances in government credibility were often negated by violations of territorial 
integrity by Allied forces. The Taliban effectively recruited militants using anti-American 
sentiment as an enabler. Substantial American support for displaced persons mitigated the 
perception problem, but the dichotomy of views concerning international aid and military 
support is reconcilable within the planning process.  
Limitations of the Study 
The results of the qualitative study are limited by the subjective nature of 
participant testimony. The study reflects a scientific objectivity of the planning process 
through a faithfulness to facts provided by a cadre of Pakistani security professionals who 
are protected by a stringent interview protocol. Strict adherence to the protocol 
176 
 
 
 
counteracted the inherent qualitative subjectivity. Protection and anonymity of my 
participants promoted objectivity, although total objectivity cannot be achieved from 
national security professionals who are exceedingly dedicated to their profession—and 
are employed by the Pakistani government. My role as a researcher to conduct a 
subjective interpretation of Swati behavior and of the participant testimony and 
observations concerning that behavior is a study weakness. However, an objective view 
of governance may be achieved by analyzing the first-hand experiences of those who 
planned the operation and the Swatis who experienced the effects.  
A weakness inherent in qualitative research is its limited generalizability of the 
findings due to the particularity of case-based data. The application and meticulous 
adherence to the analytical model counteracted this qualitative study weakness. Although 
hundreds of civilian and military planners were involved with the Swat campaign, the 
participant pool represented subject matter experts with a broad and complete perspective 
on the research problem. The study uncovered some inconsistencies in their expert 
testimony, despite working on the same plan under identical circumstances. The 
application of the analytical model in Appendix B uncovered undisputed facts and 
common themes by triangulating data with official government documents and surveys.  
The study findings are not absolute, but this single case study—albeit limited in 
scope—contributes to social science discipline by validating a critical case in the 
continuum of countermilitancy research. Given the time and adequate resources, a 
multiple case study approach that includes several operations within a myriad of 
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circumstances could legitimately be accomplished with a succession of case studies. 
Multiple cases would promote transferability and data validity and may serve to validate 
doctrinal recommendations. Differing sociopolitical objectives may require alternate 
governance strategies, but those distinctions may be determined from the research of 
multiple cases.  
Implications for Social Change 
This study contributes to the body of militancy research by focusing on the 
integration of governance with military operations in a contemporary campaign. This 
case study validated Pakistan’s new strategic approach that embraced neo-Clausewitzian 
theoretical tenets. Joint operational planning process improvements may better address 
the motivations of conflict inspired by Islamists and the implementation of competent 
governance to prevent it. The research was unique by exploring the problem from the 
viewpoint of an Islamic Republic—the State of Pakistan—rather than a Western 
perspective and the impact of addressing governance on desired changes at the societal 
level. Several implications for increasing effective governance in fighting Islamist 
militancy emerged from the Pakistani experience within the Swat Valley of Khyber 
Province.  
Study Implications 
Establish a permanent Joint Interministry Coordination Group to 
synchronize the civilian and military countermilitancy effort. The study findings 
revealed the governance promotes a public confidence that undermines militant support, 
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but planning effectiveness was not optimized. This group may facilitate a unity of effort 
among the ministries. A permanent body of civilian and military experts located within 
the Interior Ministry may translate national policy to specific governance tasks that may 
be implemented at the provincial or district level. Experts in security, justice, health, and 
education may establish governance priorities, call for global resources, and allocate 
resources to the most pressing social issues. A standing Special Support Group, similar to 
the Provincial Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority that formed after 
the Swat operation, could implement the national policy and distribute the resources 
provided by the governing body at the ministry or provincial level. This is a similar 
concept the U.S. Office of Military Affairs located within the State Department’s 
USAID. 
Establish a National Human Rights Board to protect human rights by 
coordinating and implementing a social improvement strategy. The study findings 
revealed that operational success was impeded by an incomplete analysis of the social 
environment and the lack of a formal planning process resulted in a disjointed 
rehabilitation, reintegration, reconciliation, and de-radicalization strategy. This board, 
chartered by the Pakistani National Assembly and under Khyber Provincial oversight, 
could conduct a holistic assessment of the at-risk population and devise a cogent strategy 
to protect the people from Islamist influence. A national level human rights group that 
embraces Pashtun cultural values may serve to sustain tribal confidence in government 
and prevent the radicalization of youth to undermine the Islamist social support system. 
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The board could also provide policy for judicial reform and militant rehabilitation to 
further isolate the Islamists and strengthen a popular trust in government.  
Establish a Regional Strategic Policy Committee to advise and implement 
national policy at the regional level. The study findings showed that some local reform 
opportunities were squandered after the expulsion of the Taliban. A standing joint 
advisory committee within the District, codified in civil-military doctrine, could provide 
policy development and implementation oversight of militancy contingencies prior to, 
during, and after operations. The District Commissioner may lead a cooperative jirga 
comprised of tribal or community elders, local and magistrates, and military commanders 
to address regional security concerns, government reformation initiatives, and economic 
development priorities. The committee could assess governance activities using existing 
social assessment tools, and advise national leaders in policy implementation and the 
proper allocation of resources.  
Codify strategic messaging in countermilitancy doctrine. The study results 
showed the positive impact of government information dissemination in enabling a safe 
and efficient resettling of displaced persons. To bolster effectiveness, the message 
planning process within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relation (ISPR) organization 
could be formalized to coordinate national messaging themes across all ministries. The 
messaging may transcend all levels of warfare, and all information domains. The process 
could leverage current technologies, establish unified themes, and synchronize 
information dissemination to meet national objectives.  
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Expand the Pakistani Army’s Special Services Group to enhance the 
military’s capacity to expand the countermilitancy campaign to other Islamist 
controlled regions. The study revealed the importance of specially trained 
counterinsurgency units, supported by good intelligence, in implementing a population-
centered strategy. These forces proved invaluable to the success of Operation Rah-e-Rast. 
A permanent cadre of special operating forces trained and educated in insurgency warfare 
may be imbedded with general purpose forces to plan and implement countermilitancy 
operations. This capability may be enhanced by instituting a formal course of instruction 
for all civil-military security professionals. This course of instruction is teachable within 
the Pakistani professional military education system. Government planners across all 
governance disciplines should have access to foster an interministry culture. The 
Pakistani National War College and subordinate staff colleges within the military domain 
may be a suitable venue for this joint education. 
Conclusions 
The emerging global Islamist militancy threat may be countered by protecting 
vulnerable populations and isolating them from the radical ideology, then reconnecting 
them with the mainstream government. To accomplish this, national authorities may 
integrate governance with military operations in a balanced way to directly destroy the 
militant capacity to wage war. Achieving this balance requires an all-government effort 
to identify address grievances, apply governance principles that resonate with the people, 
and provide adequate resources to regain the “hearts and minds” of the affected 
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population. National efforts to foster an interministry culture that embraces a population-
centered approach may promote a synergy that focuses limited resources on the most 
important social issues to undermine the radical Islamic movement. Governance then 
becomes a valuable tool for national and provincial leaders to achieve an operational 
harmony that protects the people from militancy and promotes government legitimacy.  
The Pakistani operations in the Swat Valley revealed valuable insights on the joint 
planning process. The military sought to understand the Pashtun culture and protect their 
way of life. The military commanders worked alongside the Swat District Commissioner 
to build enduring relationships, founded in trust. Economic development in healthcare 
and education sent a clear message that tribal values would be honored and the 
government intended to stay for the long term. Although somewhat ad-hoc and under 
resourced, the Pakistani Army successfully collaborated with government ministries to 
foster a public confidence that challenged the Taliban and undermined their capacity to 
wage war. The Swatis responded positively to the gestures of political inclusivity and 
accommodation, but enduring political reform remains elusive due to the exigent nature 
of merging tribal cultural norms with mainstream Pakistani political principles.  
The study indicates that the Pakistani implementation of governance to counter 
Islamist militancy in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province was an effective strategy in reducing 
violence and restoring government control. Most of the Swat Valley remains under the 
provincial authority and violence was subdued to preoccupation levels. Several years 
after the operation, the Pakistani government continues social investment, relative peace 
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ensues, and the Swatis generally reject Islamist influence. The theory of promoting public 
confidence to enable the military and disable the Islamists was validated; moreover, 
future government efforts may be enhanced by leveraging the Swat lessons.  
Cogent policy from standing national and regional policy committees comprised 
of government, military, and tribal representatives may empower civil-military planning 
and implementation. A sound strategy, backed by sufficient resources, from rehabilitation 
to de-radicalization is necessary to ensure the safety and repatriation of people suffering 
the misguided brutality of radical Islamists. The study reaffirmed that direct military 
action alone is not sufficient. Specially trained and educated security teams comprised of 
military, paramilitary, and police may communicate and reconnect with the people to 
draw them away from militant influence. A renewed public confidence in government 
promotes valuable intelligence and weakens the militant support base. In addition, 
doctrinal enhancements that assess the social environment, identify priorities, and design 
governance activities that are directly linked to cultural values may foster a public trust in 
government that undermines the Islamist cause. These operational planning 
enhancements are universal, and may be transferable to other regions of the world that 
are devastated by Islamist inspired violence.   
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol and Interview Questions 
 
The narrative inquiry is designed to explore the planning considerations and 
implementation of governance in countermilitancy operations in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa 
Province (KPK) during the Swat Valley government activities and operations of 2009.  
The manner for interviews will be conducted via a secure internet or audio-teleconference 
connection. The questions are meant to obtain your perspectives on Pakistan’s 
countermilitancy campaign.  Only audio and no video will be recorded. Digital recorders 
will be used during the interview session and secured in locked containers.   
No more than two interview sessions will be needed and each interview session 
will not exceed 90 minutes. In addition to the audio recordings, extensive field notes may 
be taken to synchronize discussion points. The field notes may contain observations 
regarding body language, facial expressions, or tone of voice. In addition to obtaining a 
signed consent, the full description of the study and all consents will be provided to the 
participants. The interviewee will be provided the opportunity to review the transcript. 
The interviewee will be reassured that the participant’s identity will be kept confidential 
and all research data will remain secure. 
Research Question 
RQ1 - During the implementation of Pakistan’s countermilitancy campaign in 
Swat Valley of the Malakand Division of Khyber Province, how were governance 
activities integrated with military operations to subdue Islamist militancy?  
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Interview Questions 
The questions are designed to be flexible and open-ended to explore the 
effectiveness of the countermilitancy planning process. The initial three questions are 
directed for an establishment of personal experience (non-identifiable) that validate 
participant credibility. Questions 4-6 are designed to gain and understanding of the 
participant’s experience with the planning process and view of Islamist militancy in 
general and the perspective of the ability of the government to deal with it. Questions 7-9 
are directly related to the specific research that I have already conducted through 
literature review and document analysis.  
Question 1- What are your national security related duties associated with the 2009 Swat 
Valley operation conducted in Khyber Province? Follow-up question - What involvement 
did you have in the planning or conduct of countermilitancy operations in the Swat 
Valley? Please do not share your actual position title or other data that may be specific 
only to you or divulge your identity.  
Question 2- Please share your experiences in planning with the different ministries to 
deal with the Islamists who operated in Swat Valley. Associated follow-up questions: 
What was your overarching national policy guidance? How was policy guidance 
integrated into the campaign plan? Was the national policy implemented as anticipated? 
Did the operation meet the desired policy end states? 
Question 3- Please share your views on the causes and effects of the Islamist militancy 
problem in Pakistan’s Khyber Province. Possible follow up question - Do you have any 
first-hand experience with Islamist Militant activities? 
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Question 4 - How did you coordinate the government’s civil-military ability to counter 
militants operating in Swat Valley? Possible follow-up question-How do you view your 
government’s ability to protect the Pashtun tribe from the militant threat? 
Question 5- Do you believe that government policy adequately addresses Pakistan’s 
integration of governance with military operations to subdue the militancy problem? 
Question 6 – How did you apply and integrate governance principles with military 
activity in the execution of Swat operations? 
Question 7- What is your involvement with and perspective on the joint civil-military 
countermilitancy planning process? Possible follow-up question - How did the militants 
exploit weaknesses in the plan? Were the militants deterred by strengths in the 
relationship of the military to their people and government?  
Question 8 – Is Pakistan’s countermilitancy doctrine adequate, or could it be improved to 
leverage the government interministries?  
Question 9- How did the joint planning team shape the social environment in Swat 
Valley to augment or enable military operations against the Islamist militants?   
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Appendix B: Case Study Linear Analytical Model 
  
Real-World Contextual Conditions 
Mistrust of Pakistani Government 
Dangerous Security Environment 
Rising Radical Islamic Influence  
Lawless Society  
Socioeconomic Injustice and Depravity 
  
Governance & 
Military   
Integration 
  
  
    
  
    
  Campaign  Planning 
  
Rival Interventions 
Foreign Intervention 
Islamist Militant activities 
  Governance  Policy   
Campaign 
Effects 
